[29ASR2d128]
MATAIUMU SIOFAGA, Appellant/Appellee
v.
FOLAU I`AULUALO, Appellee/Appellant
_____________________
Registration of the Matai
Title "I`AULUALO" of the
High Court of
Appellate Division
AP No. 5-94
AP No. 6-94
[1] A.S.C.A. § 1.0407(d) only applies
to a family with fewer than 25 qualified members.
[2] A.S.C.A.
§ 1.0407 has no provision for the transfer of signatures.
[3] A.S.C.A. § 1.0407 functions like
a jurisdictional limit on the Land and Titles Division. If a candidate does not submit a petition
with 25 signatures, the court simply cannot consider his claim.[29ASR2d129]
[4] For a matai
title claimant to qualify under A.S.C.A. § 1.0403(b)(2), he still must
show both that a parent was an inhabitant of
[5] An inhabitant is one who resides actually
and permanently in a given place, and has his domicile there.
Before
Counsel: For Folau I`aulualo, Tautai A.F. Fa`alevao
For
Mataiumu Siofaga, Gata E. Gurr
Opinion:
I. Introduction
Tipisone Manu Aoelua
("Tipisone") filed with the Territorial
Registrar his claim to succession to the matai title I`aulualo of the
Prior to trial, Tipisone
and Naiuli withdrew their respective claims to
succession, leaving Mataiumu and Folau
as the remaining candidates. On January
26, 1994, the trial court dismissed Folau's objection
and counterclaim on the grounds that his petition lacked the requisite 25
supporting family signatures as required by A.S.C.A. § 1.0407. The trial court also dismissed Mataiumu's objection and counterclaim on the grounds that
he was ineligible for matai succession under A.S.C.A.
§ [29ASR2d130] 1.0403. With no
candidates remaining, the court remanded the matter of selection of a
titleholder to the I`aulualo family.
Each party moved for a new trial or reconsideration
pursuant to A.S.C.A. § 43.0802(a). The
trial court denied both motions on
II. Folau's
Appeal
The trial court dismissed Folau's
claim for failing to meet the requirements of A.S.C.A. § 1.0407, which provides
in pertinent part:
(b) A counterclaim
or objection [to succession to a matai title] must be
supported by a petition signed by no less than 25 persons related by blood to
the title in question. The petitioners
must be at least 18 years of age and residents of
.
. . .
(d) In the event the
family does not have the number of members qualified as required to support the
counterclaim or the objection, the counterclaimant or objector shall so state
in a signed affidavit.
Folau testified that he was
off-island when Tipisone offered the title for
registration. By the time he returned,
the 60-day statutory period for the filing of counterclaims or objections, see
§ 1.0407(a), had nearly expired.
During the time remaining, he was able to garner only 10 signatures,
instead of the required 25. Because he
did not have enough signatures, he filed an affidavit, attempting to comply
with the provisions of § 1.0407(d).
Section 1.0407 clearly requires a minimum of 25
qualified, supporting family signatures on an objection or counterclaim. We find absolutely no ambiguity or discretion
in this requirement. The apparent
reasoning behind this requisite is to ensure that a candidate has sufficient
support from the family.
[1] Section 1.0407(d) gives
counterclaimants respite from the requirements of 1.0407(b) in only one
circumstance: when "the family does
not have the number of members qualified as required . . . ."
A.S.C.A. § 1.0407(d). We agree with the trial court that this
provision applies to families of fewer than 25 members. "Does not have" does not [29ASR2d131]
mean "does not have remaining" or "can not be found" or
some similar interpretation which Folau would have us
place upon it. Thus, § 1.0407(d)
only applies to a family with fewer than 25 qualified members.1
Folau's objection that such a rule
precludes small minorities in a large family from blocking a candidate with
more support seems to be precisely the point.
If a candidate can not find 25 family members who support his claim as matai, the court cannot support it either. That is, if a claimant is only supported by
10 family members in his bid to be matai, the Fono (or Legislature of American Samoa) has deemed that we
should not bestow the title upon that claimant.
A candidate can not get around the 25 signature requirement simply by
filing an affidavit under § 1.0407(d) claiming no one was left to sign his
petition.2
Folau's reliance on Asuega v. Manuma, 4
A.S.R. 616 (Trial Div. 1965), is unavailing.
In that case, the court dealt with a predecessor statute to
§ 1.0407, which read: "Every person claiming succession to a matai title shall file with the Clerk of the High Court a
written claim . . . accompanied by . . . a petition signed by three-fourths of
the members of the claimant's family . . . ."
[2] Folau's final argument has to do with the withdrawal of two
of the four candidates for the title. Tipisone, the original claimant under A.S.C.A.
§ 1.0405, withdrew his petition for candidacy on the day of the trial,
proclaiming his support for Naiuli. Naiuli also
withdrew his candidacy on that day, throwing his support behind Folau. Folau now argues that the support, and thus the signatures,
of those candidates should transfer to him.
This argument lacks any foundation.
Section 1.0407 has no provision for the transfer of signatures. The people who signed the petitions of the
withdrawn candidates had given their support to those candidates, not Folau. If it is true
that "[Folau]'s claim is substantially supported
by more than 25 qualified members of his family," as he argues, see
Appellant Folau's
[3] In practice, § 1.0407
functions like a jurisdictional limit on the Land and Titles Division. If a candidate does not submit a petition
with 25 signatures, the court simply cannot consider his claim. Cf. In re Matai
Title "Patea", 25 A.S.R.2d 139 (Land
& Titles Div. 1994) (dismissing claims of two candidates whose petitions
had 17 and 24 signatures each).
Perhaps the Fono enacted such a provision in
the spirit of the age-old adage "de minimis
non curat lex"
(the law does not concern itself with trifles).
A person with fewer than 25 family members supporting his petition has a
de minimis claim to the title.
In any account, the Fono
has plainly set forth the requirements for filing a counterclaim in
§ 1.0407. It is not our function to
rewrite the law but merely to interpret it.
We have no question about the interpretation of § 1.0407. Thus, we affirm the trial court's dismissal
of Folau's claim because his petition did not have
the requisite number of signatures.
III. Mataiumu's
Appeal
A.
Construction of A.S.C.A. § 1.0403
Mataiumu was born in Faleasi`u,
A person not possessing all of the following qualifications
is ineligible to succeed to a matai title:[29ASR2d133]
.
. . .
(b) He must have
been born on American soil; provided that a person born of parents who were
inhabitants of American Samoa, but temporarily residing outside of American
Samoa or engaged in foreign travel, at the date of birth of such child, may,
for purposes of this subsection, be considered as having been born on American
soil if:
(1) while actually residing in American Samoa, and at any
time within one year after he attains the age of 18 years, he files with the
territorial registrar a renunciation, under oath, of allegiance to the country
of his birth; or
(2) he has resided in
Mataiumu clearly does not meet the
requirement of § 1.0403(b) that he be born on American soil. The trial court found that he also does not
meet the exception to this requirement by being born of inhabitants of
Mataiumu's father was American Samoan,
but his mother's village was in Faleasi`u,
[4] Mataiumu makes no claim to come under the exception set
forth in § 1.0403(b)(1), but he has met the continuous, 10-year residency
requirement of § 1.0403(b)(2). However,
for Mataiumu to qualify under § 1.0403(b)(2), he still must show both that a parent was an
"inhabitant[]"4 of
[5] Since the Code does not define
"inhabitant," we must look elsewhere to determine the word's
meaning. Black's defines
"inhabitant" as "[o]ne who resides actually
and permanently in a given place, and has his domicile there." Black's
Law Dictionary 703 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Ex Parte
Shaw, 145 U.S. 444 (1892)) (emphasis added). Based on the evidence presented to the trial
court, Mataiumu's father was not an inhabitant of
Mataiumu's contention that his father
is an inhabitant of
Mataiumu has also failed to convince
us that his parents' residence outside the territory was
"temporary." We agree with the
trial court that "his parents were not just living [in
Thus, Mataiumu has failed
to satisfy the requirements of the exception under § 1.0403(b)(2).5[29ASR2d135]
B. Conflict
with Federal Law
Mataiumu has claimed that
§ 1.0403 conflicts with federal law.
However, his brief is so poorly drafted that we have trouble
ascertaining precisely what he is alleging.
As near as we can tell, there are three potential claims: (1) that 8 U.S.C. § 1408 directly
supersedes A.S.C.A. § 1.0403; (2) that Mataiumu,
as a
The first claim, that federal law supersedes
§ 1.0403, has no foundation. 8
U.S.C. § 1408 grants
The second claim, that Mataiumu
is entitled to seek a matai title because he is a
Finally, Mataiumu appears
to allege a violation of equal protection.
If this is the case, he has failed to carry his burden. Mataiumu's argument
goes no farther than citing Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, 1
A.S.R.2d 10, 12 (Appellate Div. 1980), for the proposition that the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection applies in American Samoa. He does not tell us upon what basis he is
alleging discrimination or what standard we are to apply in examining whether
the discrimination survives constitutional scrutiny.6[29ASR2d136]
Folau also has made no arguments
concerning these important questions.
Thus, we have virtually no briefing on an issue we are not even sure Mataiumu meant to raise.
We find that Mataiumu, as appellant on this
issue, has failed to carry his burden.
C. Privileges
and Immunities
Mataiumu next claims that
§ 1.0403(b) abridges his privileges and immunities. He does not tell us whence his right to be
free from such an abridgement arises. We
assume it must be from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Revised
Constitution of American Samoa, Rev. Const. Am. Sam. art. I,
§ 16, since the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Revised
Constitution of American Samoa, reads:
"No law shall be made or enforced which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of
We cannot look to the United States Constitution for
guidance, since that clause offers us no parallel here. Although the language of the clauses is similar,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution was
particularly enacted to restrain states from extending privileges and
immunities to its own citizens which it did not extend
to citizens of other states. See
16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 713 et seq.
(1979). The intent
was to protect citizens in the new union of states from discrimination as they
traveled from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
We have nothing paralleling the federal system in
Furthermore, we are unsure who comprises a "citizen[] of
Thus, we are faced with an important question: To whom does the Privileges and Immunities
Clause apply? The section of the
American Samoa Code dealing with citizenship has been explicitly reserved. See A.S.C.A. § 41.01. Do we apply the clause to "American
Samoan[s]" as defined by the Code? See
A.S.C.A. § 41.0202. Do we apply it
to "[p]ermanent resident[s]"? See id. Maybe it should apply to "[n]ational[s] of the
Even if we determine to whom the clause applies,
counsel has not informed us how it should be applied. We are not convinced that the clause is meant
to eliminate discrimination against nonresidents or non-citizens, since it does
not even mention these people. Mataiumu seems to argue that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is actually a guarantee of equal protection. See Appellant Mataiumu's
Thus, as with the equal protection claim above, we
are forced to dismiss Mataiumu's privileges and
immunities claim because he has not carried his burden of proving the issue.
IV. Conclusion
Thus, neither Folau nor Mataiumu has convinced us that the trial court erred. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed,
and the matter of [29ASR2d138] selection of a titleholder to the matai title I`aulualo of the
It is so ordered.
* Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, serving by designation of the Secretary of the Interior.
** Honorable John S. Unpingco,
1 To the extent that In re Matai Title "Fagaima", 4 A.S.R. 83 (Land & Titles Div. 1973), is inconsistent with this opinion, we overrule it. We do not express an opinion at this time, however, as to whether the word "family" in § 1.0407 refers only to a full extended family or may, under appropriate circumstances, refer to clans of an extended family or other different grouping.
2 Additionally, Folau's affidavit seems to have been false. It does not appear that there were too few family members remaining to sign his petition, but rather that he did not have enough time to garner the signatures. Clearly, not having enough time does not satisfy § 1.0407(d).
3 Nothing in § 1.0407 prohibits a qualified family member from signing more than one candidate's petition. Thus, it may have merely been mathematically improbable that more than one candidate could get three-fourths of the family members to sign a petition. No issue has been raised in this case as to whether a family member can sign more than one candidate's petition under § 1.0407.
4 A.S.C.A. § 1.0103 informs us that
"the plural includes the singular" in interpreting provisions of the
Code. Thus, presumably, Mataiumu need only have one parent who was an inhabitant of
5 We agree with the concurring opinion in the
trial court below that the Fono should reassess the
purpose behind requiring a claimant to a matai title to
be born on American soil or be born to inhabitants of
6 The trial court measured Mataiumu's claim of equal protection violation under a rational basis standard. See trial court's Order on Mots. for New Trial at 5. Without explicitly endorsing that standard of review, we note that Mataiumu has not argued that any more stringent standard should apply. We agree with the trial court that § 1.0403 is rationally related to a legitimate purpose, and thus satisfies the rational basis test.
7 The words "privilege" and
"immunity" have been taken to be nearly synonymous. 16A
Am. Jur.
2d Constitutional Law § 724 (1979) (citing Connor v.
Elliott, 59 U.S. 591 (1856)). A
"privilege" is a peculiar advantage, exemption, or immunity; while an "immunity" is an exemption or
privilege.