[30ASR2d37]
v.
ABRAHAM SAMANA aka APELU SAMANA, and ABIGAIL SAMANA, Defendants
High Court of
Trial Division
CR No. 72-95
CR No. 73-95
[1] In order to
quash a warrant, the court must determine that the magistrate or judge in
issuing the warrant was misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant
knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard
of the truth.
[2] The fact that an affidavit contains a falsity
is not enough to negate the probable cause underlying a warrant unless the
affiant knew of or recklessly disregarded the falsity.
[3] The court may hold an in camera hearing
with a confidential informant to aid in determining whether an affiant made a
false statement knowingly or recklessly when the defendant does not have enough
evidence to quash a warrant but has presented evidence in that direction.
Before RICHMOND, Associate
Justice, TAUANUŽU, Chief Associate Judge, and SAGAPOLUTELE, Associate Judge.
Counsel: For
Plaintiff, Frederick J. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney [30ASR2d38]
General
For
Defendant Abraham Samana, Reginald E. Gates
For
Defendant Abigail Samana, David P. Vargas
Order for In Camera
Hearing with Confidential Informant:
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 1995,
plaintiff American Samoa Government filed an information charging defendants
with unlawful production of the controlled substance of marijuana, A.S.C.A.
§ 13.1020(a), and unlawful possession of the same controlled substance,
A.S.C.A. § 13.1022(a). On April 2,
1996, we denied the defendants' motion to conduct an in camera hearing
with the government's confidential informant to determine whether his identity
should be revealed to aid them in their defense. On April 12, 1996, the defendants moved to
suppress the evidence obtained under the search warrant. This motion came regularly for hearing on May
2, 1996, with defendants and all counsel present.
II. FACTS
The facts are substantially
as recited in our earlier order. See
American Samoa Govt v. Samana,
30 A.S.R.2d 1 (1996) (Order Denying Motion for in Camera Hearing)
[hereinafter In Camera Order].
The focus of the most recent hearing was Police Officer Paulo Leuma's statement, in his affidavit to secure the search
warrant, that the confidential informant had stated to Leuma
that he had purchased marijuana from the defendants at their residence on
December 2, 1995. Two witnesses
testified that both defendants were at their relative's wedding at the precise
time they were supposedly selling drugs to the confidential informant. Several other witnesses under subpoena were
prepared to affirm this fact. One
testifying witness declared that the vehicular driving time between the
defendants' home and wedding place was 20 to 30 minutes. Both witnesses went on to state that the
defendants were continually in their immediate or near presence for the entire
weekend during which the wedding, and the alleged drug sale, took place.
The assistant attorney
general countered only with a written questionnaire from the defense attorneys
to the confidential informant. The
confidential informant substantiated Leuma's
affidavit statement that the drug sale took place on December 2, 1995, at the
defendants' residence. Because the
defendants could not have been both at the wedding and at home selling drugs at
the same time, there is clearly a problem with the date of the alleged drug
sale.[30ASR2d39]
III. DISCUSSION
[1-2] Defendants seek to quash the search warrant because
it is based upon erroneous information--namely, the fact that the confidential
informant bought drugs from the defendants at their residence on December 2,
1995. Even assuming that the testimony of
the defense witnesses is true, however, and that the defendants were at the
wedding on this date, the defendants have failed to satisfy the test for
quashing a warrant. In order to quash a
warrant, we must determine that "the magistrate or judge in issuing the
warrant was misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant knew
was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of
the truth." United States v. Stanert, 7862 F.2d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis
added). Thus, the fact that an affidavit
contains a falsity is not enough to negate the probable cause underlying a
warrant unless the affiant knew of or recklessly disregarded the falsity.[1]
The defendants have not
shown this additional criterion. No
testimony was presented at the evidentiary hearing regarding Leuma's veracity.
Nor was any testimony presented indicating that Leuma
recklessly disregarded the fact of the defendants' absence from their home on
the date in question. On the other hand,
the government has not offered any explanation for the problem with the
date. Neither Leuma
nor any other witness took the stand to explain why his sworn testimony, though
admittedly hearsay, places the defendants at their house at a time on a day
when they clearly were not there.
[3] Although the defendants have not yet presented us
with enough evidence to quash the warrant, they have plainly presented evidence
in that direction. The person whom could
best fill the gap in their facts concerning whether the false statement was
made knowingly or recklessly is the confidential informant, whose identity
remains unrevealed. "Where the
disclosure of an informer's identity . . . is relevant and helpful to the
defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of the cause,
the privilege [against disclosure] must give way." In Camera Order (quoting [30ASR2d40] Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61
(1957)). We concluded the In Camera
Order by stating that if the defendants were "able to develop sufficient evidence
which puts the . . . reliability of the confidential informant in
question," we would again consider the question of holding an in camera
hearing to determine whether the informant's identity should be revealed. Id.
The defendants have now developed such evidence.
Therefore, the court will
hold an in camera hearing with the confidential informant on May 10,
1996, at 11:00 a.m. All counsel must
submit to the court questions that they would like the court to ask the
informant by 4:00 p.m. on May 9, 1996.
When we determine whether or not the confidential informant knows facts,
which tend to show that Leuma knowingly or recklessly
presented falsities in his affidavit for the search warrant, we will issue an
appropriate order.
It is so ordered.
********
[1] The defendants must also show that the falsity in the affidavit was material to the judge's determination of probable cause to issue the warrant. United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1985). It certainly appears that the information regarding the December 2, 1995, drug sale was material to the judge's determination of probable cause in issuing the warrant in question, though we need not determine the issue at this time.