[31 ASR2d 195]
Estate of MAKERITA
SHIMASAKI
High Court of
Trial Division
PR No. 6-93
March 26, 1997
[1]
Only the sa`o is authorized in matters concerning
separation agreements for communal land.[31 ASR2d 196]
Before
Counsel:
For the Estate of Makerita Shimasaki and Administrator Katherine S. Fua,
Albert Mailo
For Intervenor Letuugaifo Iereneo, Togiola T.A.
Tulafono
For Intervenors Peneueta Tauiliili and Loi Poi, Afoa L.
Su`esu`e Lutu
Opinion and Order:
The
probate of the estate of decedent Makerita Shimasaki ("Makerita") was commenced
on April 12, 1993. On May 8, 1993,
the court appointed Christine Shimasaki Tu`uu ("Christine") as the estate's
first administrator. On February
23, 1995, the court designated petitioner Katherine Shimasaki Fua ("Katherine")
as the administrator to replace Christine, who had permanently relocated outside
the Territory.
Christine included a certain
building ("the building"), located in Leone,
The
court regularly heard the petition on July 1, 1996, with all counsel present,
and makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
Tui Pio
("Tui") and Saipoia Pio ("Saipoia") married in 1950. No children were born of this
marriage. However, both had
children from previous marriages, including Tui's son Loi and Saipoia's daughter
Makerita and sons Letuugaifo and Mose.
Tui never legally adopted any of Saipoia's children. Lafaele Shimasaki
("Lafaele") and Makerita married in 1965. Peneueta is Mose's daughter.
The building is located on
the Save family's communal land known as "Fagasaua" in Leone,
We declare that Tui has something similar to a life estate in the
house. He can possess it, but
cannot dispose of it during his lifetime.
He must preserve it, keep it insured against storm and fire and upon his
death it will pass to Makerita. In
the event the house is rented, he must share the rent with Makerita, giving her
1/3 of the receipts after payment of any expenses for protection and maintenance
of the house. The court in equity
retains jurisdiction over this matter.
Either party can apply for further order to carry out the intent of the
decision or in the event of change of circumstances to modify the
decree.
Tui
Pio v. Lafaele Shimasaki & Makerita Shimasaki, CA No. 98-83, at 3-4 (Trial Div. Jan. 30, 1984)(decree).
Apparently Tui then lived in the house, while Makerita and
Lafaele primarily resided in Tafuna until they died. Makerita died in 1989. Lafaele died later. They left seven children, including
Christine and Katherine. Tui
survived Makerita and Lafaele.
However, his health began to seriously deteriorate in 1985, and he
traveled to and from
The
building is constructed near the shoreline in Leone and suffered severe damage
in the hurricanes of 1966, 1989, and 1991.
Tui, with the help of others, rebuilt the structure after the first
hurricane. Peneueta and the store
lessees, along with Tui, Mose and Loi, were the main contributors to
reconstruction after the second and third hurricanes.[31 ASR2d 198] Peneueta is still paying an outstanding
loan for this work. She also added
a large extension to the living area of the building in
1993.
1.
Principal Basis of the Parties' Claims
Makerita's estate, and Katherine as the
administrator, claim the estate owns the building. This claim is based on Makerita's
remainder interest recognized by the court in CA No. 98-83. Alternatively, they contend that the
estate has an interest in the building according to Makerita's share with her
siblings as Saipoia's heirs.
Letuugaifo uses the same heirship theory in support of his claimed
interest in the building. Peneueta
asserts ownership of the building as Tui's assignee.
2. The 1960
Separation Agreement
Makerita's estate argues that the 1960 separation agreement
fails without the Save's execution.
Statutory law authorizes the separation of structures, as personal
property, from communal land by agreement.
A.S.C.A. § 37.1502.1
The law also requires the sa`o execute any separation agreement
for the benefit of anyone other than himself. A.S.C.A. § 37.1503(a).2
[1] This court has clearly enunciated that under the mandate of
A.S.C.A. § 37.0102(d), only the sa`o may order a survey for title registration
of communal land, and the sa`o may not delegate that authority. Galea`i v.
Ma`ae, 2 A.S.R.2d 4 (App. Div. 1984). We would ordinarily apply the same
principle to separation agreements subject to and given the wording of §
37.1503(a).
However, we think that the 1960 separation agreement making
the building Tui's personal property was executed in substantial compliance with
the statutory requirement of the Save's signature. Save expressly directed the preparation
and immediately supervised the execution of the[31 ASR2d 199] agreement. We believe that he had a pervasive role
in the creation of the agreement.
Thus, we hold that the 1960 separation agreement was and is valid. We hasten to add, however, that we limit
this decision to the peculiar circumstances of this case.
Makerita's estate, Letuugaifo, and Peneueta have rights to
the building only from the legal ramifications of the 1960 separation
agreement. We next turn to these
consequences.
3. The
Heirship Claims
Clearly, Tui became the sole owner of the building under
the 1960 separation agreement. The
agreement is plain and unequivocal in this respect. No one else, including Saipoia, was
given any express interest in the building. Thus, Saipoia was excluded from an
interest in the building other than her undivided one-third dower interest in
personal property under A.S.C.A. §§ 40.0201 and 40.0103.
Local
case authority recognized dower as a fee simple absolute interest, at least when
the dower interest takes actual effect, under prior statutory law. Tolivale v.
Ufanua, 3 A.S.R. 196, 199 (Trial Div. 1956); A.S.C. § 959
(1948). This result is
contrary to our understanding of dower as traditionally a life estate under
common law. See Homer H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations 220
(West 1968); 25 Am. Jur. 2d Dower and Curtesy §§ 1, 6 & 7
(1966).
Moreover, the former fee simple characterization of dower has not been
carried over in A.S.C.A. § 40.0201.
Since Saipoia predeceased Tui and her dower interest in the building
never came into being, her heirs, specifically her children, including
Letuugaifo and Makerita, could not acquire any interest in the building by means
of Saipoia's dower interest.
4. The 1984
Judicial Decision
The
court, in the 1984 decision, recognized the validity of the 1960 separation
agreement but then, as a matter of equity, gave Tui a life estate and Makerita a
remainder in the building. However,
we do not think that Makerita gained a permanent property interest, if any at
all, in the building by this decision.
The
court in 1984 probably achieved an equitable result under the then existing
circumstances. The court also anticipated modification of this result due to
changed circumstances and, though a questionable proposition, purportedly
retained jurisdiction for this purpose. Thus, the court envisioned a future set
of different property interests in the building without specifying any
triggering events. Conceptually,
this expectation seems to create for Makerita a remainder either subject to
complete[31 ASR2d 200] defeasance (an initially
vested remainder) or subject to the uncertain condition precedent that she
survives Tui (a contingent remainder).
See, B.E. Witkin, Summary of California Law,
Real Property 535 (9th ed. 1987) (citing Restatement,
Property § 157). Thus, Makerita's remainder was either
subject to defeasance or delayed in existence, and was defeated by her death
before Tui.
However, we believe that the court reached an untenable
result in the 1984 decision. The
decision totally contradicts the absolute property interest in the building
conveyed to Tui by the 1960 separation agreement and for that reason is
ineffective. Consequently, Makerita
never acquired a remainder interest in the building, and her estate cannot own
the structure by this means.
5. The 1993
Gift Deed
The
provisions of the present law, A.S.C.A. §§ 37.1501-37.1506 and prior law, 27
A.S.C. §§ 401-406 (1973), A.S.C. §§ 12.0201-12.0204, and, we believe,
sub-chapter 28.02 (Amendment No. 2 of 1958) of the 1949 American Samoa Code,
along with the language of the 1960 separation agreement, do not prevent the
owner of a separated structure from transferring his title to any other
person. In fact, the agreement
expressly contemplates potential transfer to the owner's "heirs, devisees,
legatees, legal representatives and assigns." The 1993 gift deed by Tui to Peneueta
meets all legal requirements to transfer Tui's title to the building. Thus, we hold that Peneueta now owns the
building.
1. The 1960
separation agreement was and is valid.
The Save transferred an absolute fee simple interest in the building to
Tui by this agreement.
2. Saipoia's
only interest in the building was her potential dower interest if Tui
predeceased her. Since Tui survived
Saipoia, her dower interest never vested, and her children and other heirs
cannot succeed to any interest in the building by inheritance from
Saipoia.
3. The 1984
judicial decision was ineffective to give Makerita any remainder or other title
interest in the building.
Makerita's estate does not have any interest in the
building.
4. Tui's gift
of the building to Peneueta by deed in 1993 was valid. Peneueta is the present owner of the
building in fee simple.
It is
so ordered.[31 ASR2d 201]
********
1 Virtually identical provisions were
in previous codes. A.S.C. § 12.0201
(1961) and 27 A.S.C. § 402 (1973).
The 1960 separation agreement was actually based on the provisions of
subchapter 28.02 (Amendment No. 2 of 1958) of the then existing 1949 American
Samoa Code. We have not located the
1949 Code with this amendment appended.
However, the language of the 1960 separation agreement clearly indicates
that the applicable code provisions in 1960 comported with the present and other
codes succeeding the 1958 Amendment.
2 See also A.S.C. § 12.0202 (1961) and 27 A.S.C. § 403(a) (1973).