ESTATE OF PEMILA YOUNG (deceased), HARRY YOUNG
Administrator,
ATONIO MATA, and FA`AALIGA SEUMANUTAFA, Plaintiffs,
v.
M/V DIANA LYNN,
her engines, tackle, apparel and furniture,
W. F.
MANAGEMENT CO, INC., a corporation,
and Does I through X, inclusive, Defendants.
Trial
Division
CA No. 28-93
CA No. 31-94
CA No. 32-94
December 2, 1997
[1] A party against whom a claim is asserted may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
[2] Once a moving party has put forth a prima facie case, the party opposing summary judgment has the burden of showing that there are genuine issues of material fact which render summary judgment inappropriate.
[3] In reviewing the pleadings and papers supporting a motion for summary judgment, a court must view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
[4] The definition of a “seaman” under the Jones Act is a mixed question of law and fact.
[5] Where the facts and the law reasonably support only one conclusion, summary judgment is mandated.
[6] The Jones Act provides a cause of action to seamen for personal injuries sustained in the course of their employment.
[7] In order for an individual to be considered a
“seaman” under the Jones Act, (1) the individual’s duties
must contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its
mission; and (2) the individual must have a connection to a vessel in navigation
(or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in nature and
duration. [1ASR3d155]
[8] All circumstances of an individual’s
employment must be weighed to determine whether he/she has a sufficient
relationship to the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon.
[9] Where vessel had remained in dry dock and tied up
at port for at least three years, individuals who had repaired vessel in
attempt to ready it for navigation were considered “land-based”
employees, not seamen, and were not entitled to relief under the Jones Act.
[10] Where port engineer had no authority to hire
crewmembers, his statement that Plaintiffs were “crewmembers’
carried no weight in determining seaman status.
[11] Where workers possessed expectations of becoming
seamen in the future, such expectation was insufficient to raise workers to
seamen status in present.
[12] Requirement that employee’s work be done at
sea is first basic principle of being a seaman.
Before
Counsel: For Plaintiffs, Brian M. Thompson
For Defendants, William H. Reardon
Introduction
Pemila Young (“Young”) and plaintiffs
Antonio Mata (“Mata”) and Fa`aaliga Seumanutafa
(“Seumanutafa”) were hired by defendant W.F. Management Co.
(“W.F. Management”) to perform work in refurbishing the M/V
Conquistador. On March 30 or March 31, 1992, Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa
entered and began cleaning a fish well on the M/V Conquistador. They were later
discovered unconscious. Mata and Seumanutafa sustained injuries as a result of
this accident. Young was transported to
After repairs were completed
on the Conquistador, it was certified by the U.S. Coast Guard and began to
operate under the name M/V Diana Lynn.
Plaintiff Estate of Pemila Young (“Estate of
Young”) brought a wrongful death action and Mata and Seumanutafa brought
personal injury actions against defendant M/V Diana Lynn (“M/V Diana
Lynn”) and W.F. [1ASR3d156] Management,
the vessel’s owner. It is asserted in all three cases that Young, Mata,
and Seumanutafa are “seamen” and thus entitled to sue their
employer pursuant to the Jones Act and general maritime law. The court
consolidated the three cases.
W.F. Management moved for summary judgment on grounds
that Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa are not seamen and thus not entitled to
recover under the Jones Act or general maritime law. We heard the motion on
December 12, 1996 and took it under advisement. We also scheduled a hearing on
December 31, 1996 on a contemporaneous motion filed by Young, Mata, and
Seumanutafa to compel W.F. Management to produce requested crew’s lists
and sale and transfer documents for the M/V Diana Lynn, information relevant to
the motion for summary judgment. Then, on December 31, 1996, we deferred ruling
on the motion for summary judgment until the deposition of David L. Franklin,
W.F. Management’s owner, concerning the hiring of Young, Mata, and
Seumanutafa, was available. This deposition was later taken and was filed in
this action on April 25, 1997.
Discussion
I. Summary Judgment
[1-3] “A party against whom a claim . . . is asserted
. . . may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.” T.C.R.C.P
56 (b). Once the moving party has put forth a prima facie case, the party
opposing summary judgment has the burden of showing that there are genuine
issues of material fact which render summary judgment inappropriate. Amerika
Samoa Bank v. Pacific Reliant Industries,
20 A.S.R.2d 102, 109 (App. Div. 1992); see also, Bryant
v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 25 A.S.R.2d 171, 173 (Trial Div.
1994). However, “In reviewing the pleadings and supporting papers, a
court must view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Lang v. American Samoa Gov’t, 24 A.S.R.2d 59, 60 (Trial Div. 1993).
W.F. Management maintains that the issue of whether
Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa are seamen, and thus eligible to sue the M/V Diana
Lynn and W.F. Management under the Jones Act and general maritime law, is one
of both law and fact which can be resolved on summary judgment when there is no
dispute as to the material facts. The Estate of Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa
argue that the issue of whether an individual is a seaman is a question of fact
and cannot be appropriately decided on summary judgment.
[4-5] The definition of a “seaman” under the
Jones Act is better characterized as a mixed question of law and fact than as a
pure question [1ASR3d157] of fact. “The inquiry into seaman
status is of necessity fact specific; it will depend on the nature of the vessel
and the employee’s precise relation to it. Nonetheless, summary judgment
is mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one
conclusion.” McDermott Int’l
Inc. v. Wilander, 498
We conclude, therefore, that the issue of whether
Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa are seamen is an issue appropriately decided on
summary judgment.
II. Seaman Status
[6] The Jones Act provides a cause of action to a seaman
for personal injuries sustained in the course of employment. 46 U.S.C.S. App.
§ 688 (Law. Co-op. 1987). A recent case, Heise v. Fishing Co. of Alaska, Inc., 79 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 1996),
is quite similar to the case at bar and applies the legal definition of seaman
as used in the Jones Act and general maritime law. In Heise, the court affirmed a district court’s summary judgment
ruling that a temporary land-based repair worker was not a seaman under the
Jones Act.
[7-8] The Heise court
used the two prong test set forth in Chandris,
Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 115
S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995):
First, . . . an employee’s duties must
contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission.
. . . Second, . . . a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation
(or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of
both its duration and its nature.
the total circumstances of an individual’s
employment must be weighed to determine whether he had a sufficient relation to
the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon. . . . [T]he
ultimate inquiry is whether the worker in question is a member of the
vessel’s crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working
on the vessel at a given time.
Chandris 515
[9-11] Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa were simply land-based
employees who happened to be working on the M/V Diana Lynn at the time they were
injured. W.F. Management hired them to perform repairs on the ship to help
ready it for navigation. Seumanutafa did state that before the accident, John
Mourian, W.F. Management’s port engineer, told him that Young, Mata, and
himself were crew members. Mournian, however, had no authority to hire
crewmembers. By their depositions and affidavits, Mata and Seumanutafa admit
that, whatever their future expectations, they were not members of the crew
when they were injured.[1]
Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa never signed the ship’s articles and were
never on the vessel’s crew list.
[12] “[T]he requirement that a seaman work at sea in the service of the ship
embodies the first basic principle of the definition of seaman . . . .” Heise, 79 F.3d at 906 (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted) . Land-based workers are not seamen. The M/V
Diana Lynn was not in navigation at the time of the accident. The vessel had
been in dry dock and tied up at port undergoing repairs for at least three
years. When the vessel was shifted from one position at the dock to another, it
was not under her own power. As Mata and Seumanutafa state, the ship did not
leave port until after the accident.
Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa do not, therefore, meet
the definition of seaman as established in Chandris
and subsequent cases.
Order
Because Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa were land-based,
non-crew member employees while working on the M/V Diana Lynn, they are not
seamen entitled to remedies under the Jones Act or general maritime law. We grant
summary judgment in favor of W.F. Management and the M/V Diana Lynn and against
the Estate of Young, Mata, and Seumanutafa.
It is so Ordered.
**********
[1] “. . . John Mourian promised us we would be crew members of the vessel when it left port . . .” Mata Aff. at 1. The Heise court addressed similar circumstances in which a plaintiff’s belief at the time of injury that he would eventually be hired as a crew member was insufficient to raise the repair worker to seaman’s status. Heise, 29 F.3d at 906.