ROPATI ONOFIA and SIA ONOFIA, Plaintiffs,
v.
MARITIANA SUA PITOITUA, Defendant.
CA No.
56-96
______________________________
MERITIANA LOTO, Plaintiff,
v.
ROPATI ONOFIA and SIA ONOFIA,
Defendants.
LT No.
5-97
Trial
Division and Land and Titles Division
December
10, 1997
[1] One tenant in
common cannot sell or bind the interest of another co-tenant without proper
authorization, including any specific portion of that estate.
[2] Parties to a contract
for the sale of land must mutually assent to their agreement, tested by an
objective or external standard.
[3] In
[4] A claimant cannot
successfully assert part performance when he fails to keep his own bargain.
Before
Counsel: For Ropati
and Sia Onofia, Aumoeualogo S. Salanoa
For Meritiana Loto, Gata E. Gurr
OPINION AND ORDER
[1ASR3d160]
In 1996, plaintiffs/defendants Ropati Onofia
("Ropati") and Sia Onofia ("Sia") initiated suit, CA No.
56-96, in the Trial Division against defendant/plaintiff Meritiana Sua Pitoitua
aka Meritiana Loto ("Meritiana"). Ropati and Sia sought damages for
money paid to purchase land, the costs of clearing, cleaning, and cultivating
the land, and the value of the house they built on the land. In 1997, Meritiana filed suit, LT No.
5-97, in the Land and Titles Division to evict Ropati and Sia from the
land. She also alleged that Ropati
assaulted Meritiana's husband and that Ropati and Sia disturbed the peace, took
neighbors' property, and ignored eviction letters.
The cases were consolidated for trial. At the trial, on October 8, 1997, Ropati
and Sia requested specific performance as alternative relief and, for this
purpose, moved to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence under
T.C.R.C.P. 15(b). Meritiana did not
pursue the assault, peace disturbance, and trespass/conversion issues.
Core Issue
The key to this case is whether a valid,
enforceable agreement to sell land between Meritiana as seller and Ropati and
Sia as purchasers exists.
Facts
Meritiana and Sia were the principal
players. In October 1993, Ropati
and Sia needed a place to live, and because of previous interactions, Sia
approached Meritiana. She allowed Ropati
and Sia to move into her house on individually owned land in
On or about February 6, 1994, Meritiana
authorized and later Ropati and Sia constructed a shack, which cost about
$2,400, near Meritiana's house. Sia
testified that at that time, Meritiana also orally agreed to sell Ropati and
Sia a parcel for the same $5,000 price at that location in lieu of the parcel
under litigation. Sia paid $500
down for this parcel and agreed to $300 monthly payments for the $4,200
balance. Sia's daughter
memorialized this agreement in a handwritten note. The note, however, is not signed by
Meritiana, who denies the parcel substitution, and it fails to mention the $300
monthly payment term.
Although Ropati and Sia did not make payments in
$300 monthly increments for the second parcel, Sia documented disbursements of
varying amounts totaling $2,534.75, which were paid to Meritiana after February
1994. Sia admitted that Meritiana
sporadically requested small sums as [1ASR3d161]
loans, all but one of which ranged from $5 to $100. Sia also claimed, however, that
Meritiana agreed to apply these amounts as payments towards the purchase of
this parcel.
Meritiana signed receipts for only $315 of the
total amount claimed. One receipt,
No. 096, dated April 1994, is for $100, but bears an additional interlineated
notation of $60. A sequential
receipt on the same type of form, No. 097, is for $100 and is dated April 13,
1993. We believe, however, that
receipt No. 097 was actually issued in 1994. The last two receipts of this group
which are on a different type of form, No. 1905 for $30 and No. 1906 for $25, are dated October 13 and 19, 1994 respectively. Receipt
No. 1906 bears the notation "Land only" and is the only receipt that
even suggests in writing any connection with a land transaction.
Sia also presented two other notes written by her
daughter, which allegedly record payments to Meritiana toward the land
purchase. One note lists 16
entries, totaling $659.75. The
other contains 17 notations, totaling $510. Neither note is signed by Meritiana, who
denies receiving any of these amounts, either as land purchase payments or
small loans. Meritiana insists that
she always gave receipts for any sums of money she procured from Sia.
Sia testified that she paid the remaining $1,050
to Meritiana. She offered a
receipt, No. 1286, dated October 14, 1993, as proof of this payment. This receipt shows a $50 payment on
account for an $80 obligation, with an added notation of another $1,000 still
outstanding. Changes have been made
to this receipt. The due date of
this payable, listed as January 7, 1995, appears to have been changed to 1994,
or vice versa. Not only does this
receipt not bear Meritiana's handwriting, but it also seems, on its face, to
relate to car repairs, not a land transaction. Meritiana denied any connection with
this activity, and we believe this to be the case.
Sia also declared that, with Meritiana's
permission, she and Ropati extensively cultivated land both adjacent and
further afield from their shack. If they are evicted from the land, Ropati and
Sia expect compensation for their lost plantation, which they value at $25,000,
as well as the money they spent to buy land from Meritiana and construct their
shack. Meritiana, however, views
this cultivation as payment in kind for Ropati's and Sia's temporary use of the
parcel adjacent to her house.
We also have in evidence a quitclaim deed
conveying the entire land to Meritiana, her sister Vaililo Werner
("Vaililo"), and her brother Aniga Su`a, Jr ("Aniga"). [1ASR3d162]
Discussion
We conclude that for three fundamental reasons,
Ropati and Sia did not have a valid, enforceable agreement to purchase any of
the land from Meritiana.
[1] First, one tenant in common cannot sell or bind
the interest of another co-tenant without proper authorization, Thompson v.
Bowman, 6 Wall 316, 18 L.Ed. 736 (1867); including any specific portion of
that estate. Praire
Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924). Meritiana, Vaililo, and Aniga own the
entire land as tenants in common.
No exception to this limitation on a co-tenant's authority to convey
land owned in common applies in this case.
[2] Second, parties to a contract for the sale of
land must mutually assent to their agreement, tested by an objective or
external standard. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761 n. 2 (2nd
Cir. 1946). Meritiana
understood that she was agreeing to sell a parcel in a portion of land involved
in litigation, when and if she prevailed in that lawsuit. Ropati and Sia believed that they were
buying a different parcel, one immediately adjacent to Meritiana's house. Even though Ropati and Sia spent $2,400
to construct a shack on this second parcel and cultivated land on and near this
parcel, these actions do not meet the legal standard of mutual assent. Meritiana denies the substitution of
parcels, and no other objective evidence exists to show any meeting of the
parties' minds on the sale of this second parcel.
[3] Third, in
No agreement for the sale of real property or any
interest therein is valid unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof,
be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or his agent thereunto
authorized in writing but this does not abridge the power of any court to
compel the specific performance of any agreement for the sale of real property
in case of part performance thereof.
[4] Ropati and Sia did not have a written contract
with Meritiana for the purchase of land.
The notation "Land only" on receipt No. 1906 is ambiguous as
to the nature of the referenced transaction and does not identify any
particular parcel of land. This
receipt is not a sufficient memorandum to bind Meritiana to a land sale. Moreover, Ropati and Sia did not make
any subsequent $300 monthly payments after the initial payment. A claimant cannot successfully assert
part performance when he [1ASR3d163] fails
to keep his own bargain. Marshall & A. Bank v.
Samiabrock, 217 N.W. 416 (
For these reasons, we conclude that Ropati and
Sia did not have a valid, enforceable agreement with Meritiana for the purchase
of any land. They are therefore not
entitled to specific performance of the alleged agreement. Goodrich v. Lathrop,
29 P. 329 (
On the other hand, Meritiana borrowed small sums
from Sia from time to time and failed to repay debts which should be paid. The total amount claimed is $3,334.75,
including the $300 paid in October 1993, $500 paid in February 1994, $315 in
receipts signed by Meritiana, $1,169.75 listed by Sia's daughter, and the
$1,050 car repair receipt. Sia's
assertion of any right to be refunded the car repair sum is incredible. Hence, we conclude that Sia is entitled
to recover only $2,284.75 from Meritiana.
Ropati and Sia occupy land owned by Meritiana,
Vaililo, and Aniga under a revocable license. Meritiana revoked that license and is
now entitled to evict Ropati and Sia from the land. Ropati and Sia constructed their shack
on the land with Meritiana's permission, and they are now entitled to remove
this building from the land. Talo v. Tavai,
2 A.S.R. 63, 72-74 (Trial Div. 1939).
Ropati and Sia were permitted by Meritiana to
cultivate portions of the land both within and outside the boundaries of the
parcel in dispute. Sia's evaluation
of the crops at $25,000 is outrageously excessive, but Ropati and Sia are at
least entitled to the current fruits of their farming endeavors to prevent
Meritiana's unjust enrichment.
Order
1.
Ropati and Sia are denied specific performance and are evicted from the
land owned by Meritiana, Vaililo, and Anigo.
2.
Ropati and Sia shall vacate the land owned by Meritiana, Vaililo, and
Anigo within 60 days of entry of this opinion and order. They may remove their shack from the
land within this 60-day period, but if they fail to do so, the shack becomes
the property of Meritiana, Vililo, and Anigo. They may also harvest, within this
60-day period, any mature crops which they previously planted, but any trees
and other permanent plantings shall remain on the land as the property of
Meritiana, Vaililo, and Anigo.
3.
Meritiana shall pay $2,284.75 to Sia in repayment of funds borrowed by
Meritiana from Sia. Meritiana shall
make this payment in full within 60 days of entry of this opinion and
order. If she fails to do so, she
may pay installments of no less than $100 per month, plus interest at 6% per
annum, on the balance then owing, commencing on the 15th day of the
first full [1ASR3d164] month after
the 60-day period and continuing until the entire sum is paid in full.
4.
Each party shall pay their respective attorney’s fees and costs.
Judgment shall enter accordingly. It is so Ordered.
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