ANDRY
SAGAPOLUTELE, aka
ANDREW SAGAPOLUTELE, Appellant,
v.
High Court of
Appellate Division
AP No. 22-98
[1]
The term “custody”, used in A.S.C.A. § 22.0223, is not statutorily defined and
its common meaning is broader than “confinement” which is limited to detention
in a penal institution.
[2]
The common law has traditionally allowed courts the discretion to combine
confinement with probation, work release and other alternatives as opposed to
mandating straight confinement.
[3]
Where statute required convicted offender to spend at least 90 days in custody,
court could, at its discretion fashion a sentence which included work release
or other sentencing alternatives. [3ASR3d35]
Before
Counsel: For
Appellant, Mitzie J. Folau, Assistant Public Defender
For
Appellee, John Cassell, Assistant Attorney General
OPINION
Per Curiam:
Andry Sagapolutele appeals from the trial court’s
denial of his motion for work release during a 90-day mandatory sentence after
he pled guilty to felony driving while his license was suspended. Sagapolutele’s license was suspended for six
months under § 22.0211 because he had been convicted as a first time offender
of driving under the influence. His
second offense brought him within the penalty provision § 22.0223.
[1] Sagapolutele contends that the trial court erred when
it denied his motion on the grounds that it had no discretion under § 22.0223
to authorize work release in lieu of confinement in jail. He asserts that § 22.0223, which requires
that he serve at least 90 days “in custody,” is broad enough to include work
release as part of his “custody.” See Black’s Law Dictionary (defining
custody as “the care and control of a thing or person” and confinement as
“detention in a penal institution”).
[2] Because the government did not submit a brief, and
Sagapolutele did not cite Samoan law discussing the legal definition of
“custody” in connection with § 22.0223, counsel were questioned during oral
argument on comparative statutes and legislative intent. No Samoan case law that has been called to
our attention defines in a criminal context the legal term “custody.” Common law courts traditionally have treated
penalty language as conferring upon sentencing courts reasonable discretion in
the fashioning of a suitable combination of confinement, probation, work
release, and similar alternatives to straight confinement.
[3] Until the Fono expresses its intent to depart from
the traditional common law discretion reposed in the law courts, we hold that
the trial judge does have reasonable discretion in choosing appropriate [3ASR3d36]sentencing alternatives under
§ 22.0223. In the case at bar, the trial
court had discretion to grant work release, if it saw fit to do so, but was
under no compulsion to do so.
We vacate the sentence imposed, and remand the case to
the trial court for the imposition of any statutory sentence the court may deem
appropriate in the exercise of judicial discretion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
**********
* Honorable
Alfred T. Goodwin, Senior Circuit Judge,
**
Honorable Alex R. Munson,