HC TULIFUA
TINI P. LAM YUEN, Senior matai of the Tulifua Family for himself and on behalf
of the Tulifua Family, Appellant,
v.
TALAE TUITELE and HEIRS OF UAINE
TUITELE,
TOM HO CHING and PATRICIA HO CHING,
Appellees.
High Court of
Appellate Division
AP No. 14-98
(LT No. 10-93)
[1]
The land registration system in American Samoan blends a
[2] The certificate of registration has the same function as a
decree in a quiet title action, so meticulous attention to service of process
is absolutely essential.
[3] Absent compelling proof to the
contrary, a trial court is required to conclusively presume that the Registrar
recorded a land title only after complying with his obligations under the law.
[4] P.L. No. 21-1 made three changes to the procedures for public
notice under the land registration process: (1) it required independent
verification of the pre-existing village and courthouse posting requirements;
(2) it required all notices of land registrations to receive verified
publication in a local newspaper once each 30 days of the 60-day posting
period; and (3) it compelled strict compliance with these [3ASR3d55] procedures by prohibiting the registrar from registering
land until such notice verifications were filed with the registrar.
[5] Where Registrar possessed actual knowledge that posting had
been prematurely removed and statutory notice requirements had not been met, he
was prevented from legally certifying that notice requirements had been
complied with and therefore such registration failed for lack of notice.
[6] With regard to individually-owned land, a person may not
register the title of others nor may he or she register any interest less than
clear title to land.
[7] The Territory’s statute governing intestate succession to real
property other than communal lands provides only for intestate succession to
real property of a decedent with title to such real property, not a mere claim
to such land.
[8] Intestate succession does not occur automatically. The court confers rights of succession upon
qualified and eligible heirs after fully complying with the statutes governing
the orderly administration of estates.
Before
WARD,* Acting Associate Justice, GOODWIN,** Acting Associate Justice, MUNSON,*** Acting Associate Justice, AFUOLA,
Associate Judge and ATIULAGI, Associate Judge.
Counsel: For Appellant, Afoa L. Su’esu’e Lutu
For Appellees,
Gata E. Gurr
OPINION AND ORDER
Appellant
High Chief Tulifua Tini P. Lam Yuen, Senior Matai of the Tulifua Family (“HC
Tulifua”), brought suit in the Land and Titles Division of the High Court on
February 26, 1993, against Appellees Talae Tuitele (“Talae”), the Heirs of
Uaine Tuitele (“Heirs”), and Tom and Patricia Ho Ching (“Ho Chings”) to set
aside a 1989 land registration of individually owned land of the Heirs, to
object to a [3ASR3d56] proposed lease of a portion of said land to Ho-Chings,
and to claim title to the subject land as the communal land of the Tulifua
family. The case proceeded to trial on
The
trial court issued its Opinion and Order on
Factual Background
This
controversy concerns the 1989 registration of a previously unregistered parcel
of 14 plus acres of land known as “Nonuaimoa” in the
the
legal description. Plaintiff’s Exhibit
#1 ("Plain. Exh."). Both the
written description and the surveyor’s drawing list the land claimants as:
Nelson Tuitele, Jr.; Alaisea E. Tuitele; Lanitiiti E. Tuitele; Mata`u L.
Tuitele; Lefiu M. Tuitele; and Uaine F. Tuitele. The surveyor’s certificate, appearing on the
survey drawing, recites the survey was conducted in June of 1971 in accordance
with applicable government regulations at the request of one “Uaine T.” Also appearing on the drawing is the Land and
Survey Division Manager’s Certificate, dated
Nearly
18 years after the 1971 land survey, Talae filed a notice for the proposed
registration of land with the territorial registrar on May 10, 1989, along with
the 1971 survey and a certificate signed by the land surveyor and village mayor
to the effect that public oral notice of the land survey had been given in the
village of Taputimu at a meeting of the village chiefs on June 5, 1971. Plain. Exh. # 1. Talae’s notice proposed to register the 14.18
acre parcel of the land “Nonuaimoa” as the individually owned land of the
“Heirs of Uaine Tuitele”. Plain. Exh. #
1. The notice was posted by a staff member of the registrar’s office and an
affidavit to that effect signed and filed by that employee the same day,
Some
days later, the mayor (“pulenuu”) of the
On
On
July 13, 1989, the registrar issued a certificate of registration “as an
individually-owned land of heirs of Uaine Tuitele” of a “portion of land
‘Nonuaimoa’ in the village of Leone,
containing 14.18 acres more or less.” Plain. Exh. 3 (emphasis added). At some undisclosed date thereafter this
certificate was apparently amended to read: “...portion of land ‘Nonuaimoa’ in
the
The
late Uaine Tuitele was a member of the Tuitele family of the
Appellant
HC Tulifua succeeded to his title on
Discussion
A Registration
of Title to the Land “Nonuaimoa” was Invalid
1.
[1-2] We first address the issue of the validity of the registration of
title to the land “Nonuaimoa” to the Heirs as their individually-owned
land. Although we ultimately decide this
matter on a narrow issue of law, we [3ASR3d58]
do so within the broader context of the unique facts and issues of law this
case presents or suggests.
*
* *
In a
Foloi, et. al. vs.
Tuitasi, 18 A.S.R. 2d
88, 93, 94 (App. Div. 1991) (quoting 6A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property, 908[3][a], at
83-8 (Rohan ed. 1991)).
2. Trial Court Committed Errors of Law in
Validating Registration of the Land
a. Trial Court's Findings
[3] We note that both parties cite Ifopo v. Siatu’u, 12 A.S.R. 2d 24 (App. Div. 1989), as supporting
their respective legal positions in this controversy. That case requires a trial court, “absent
compelling proof to the contrary” to conclusively presume “the Registrar
recorded a title only after complying with his obligations under the law”.
The trial court found that the affidavit of posting the
statutorily required notice of the proposed land registration was facially
defective. Tulifua
v. Tuitele, 2 A.S.R.2d 205, 209 (Trial Div. 1998). The affidavit confirmed only that a single
notice was posted in the
The trial court noted that the credible testimony at trial of the
staff member in charge of the posting was to the effect that two, not one,
notices were actually posted in the village of Taputimu, although that same
staff member testified that the notice torn down by the mayor of Taputimu and
taken to the registrar was not replaced during the May 10 to July 10, 1989
posting period.
It is an undisputed fact that in this land registration the
registrar had actual, personal knowledge that at least one of two land
registration notices statutorily required to be posted in the village of
Taputimu for 60 days prior to issuing the certificate of land registration had
been removed by the mayor of that village.
Notwithstanding this fact the trial court ruled that because “the
Territorial Registrar is obligated to register a land title only when all of
the statutory requirements are met, the court should not assume that the
Registrar did not carry out this responsibility.”
b. Trial Court's Errors of
Law
We disagree. The trial
court buttressed its decision not to disturb this finalized land registration
upon its analysis of the statutory notice requirements effective on the date of
(1). Effect of P.L. No. 21-1
P.L. No. 21-1 left unchanged the pre-existing statutory
requirements that notice of a land registration be posted for 60 days at the
courthouse in Fagatogo and in two locations in that village containing or
nearest to the land offered for registration.
The amendments, however, specifically required strict verification of
such 60 day postings to be filed with the Registrar, respectively, by the Clerk
of Court and the mayor of the village in which the notices were posted.
In addition, the new law required notice of the proposed land
registration “be published in a local newspaper at least once each 30 days
during the 60-day notice period.”
A.S.C.A. § 37.0103(a). P.L. No.
21-1 contained one further, and significant, requirement in a new subsection:
The territorial registrar shall not
register any land until the applicant has provided notarized statements
from the pulenuu,” (i.e. village mayor) “newspaper, and clerk of court, each of
which states that the required notice has been given. [3ASR3d60]
A.S.C.A. § 37.0103(c) (emphasis added).
Although the trial court held that P.L. No. 21-1 had no
retroactive effect with respect to Talae’s filing, we remain unpersuaded that
general rules of statutory construction must strictly apply to land laws
enacted by the Legislature of American Samoa under Art I, Sec. 3 R.C.A.S.
Recognizing the unique nature of such statutes to preserve and protect the
Samoan land tenure system and the intertwined Samoan way of life, we are
inclined to presume the Legislature intended the broadest possible application
of such statutes at their earliest effective
date.
[4] P.L. No. 21-1 amended the procedures for
the public notice requirements of the land registration statute. It made three changes: (1) it required
independent verification of the pre-existing village and courthouse posting
requirements; (2) it required all notices of land registrations to receive
verified publication in a local newspaper once each 30 days of the 60-day
posting period; and (3) it compelled strict compliance with these procedures by
prohibiting the registrar from registering land until such notice verifications
were filed with the registrar.
Facially, these procedural amendments appear to have presented no
substantial compliance problem for Talae’s 12 day old proposal to register
individually-owned land. Nor would any
substantial rights of Talae’s underlying claim of the Heirs’ ownership of the
land appear to have been diminished by applying the new procedures.
(2). Cases Cited by the
Trial Court are Not Supportive of its Holding.
The trial court cited 2 cases supporting its holding to deny
application of P.L. No. 21-1 to Talae’s pending land certification filing. In the Ambrosino
case, the issue facing the Court was whether certain 1983 amendments to the
Illinois Securities Act adding several new exemptions from registration
requirements applied to the 1981 securities transactions being litigated. The Court held that the:
[The] general rule is that statutes and
amendments are presumed to operate prospectively absent express statutory
language to the contrary.
The Court noted however that:
[A]n exception to this rule exists where
the statute or amendment relates only to remedies or procedures. *** Even then,
however, the statute or amendment will not be applied retroactively if to do so
would destroy a substantive right.
[3AR3d61] Ambrosino
v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 965, 974 (N.D.
A court is to apply the law in effect at
the time it renders its decision unless do so would result in manifest
injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the
contrary.
Franklin v New Mexico, ex
rel. Dep’t of Human Resources, 730 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1984).
Neither the subject matter nor the reasoning of either case
appears persuasively applicable to the instant matter. We need not, however, decide this issue in
order to ultimately decide this case.
3. Registrar's
Actual Knowledge Prevented Registrar from Certifying that the Statutory
Requirements Had Been Met.
[5] We hold narrowly that under the facts of
this case, the actual knowledge of the Registrar of the removal of the posted
notice of this land registration in the Village of Taputimu by its mayor during
the first few days of public display prevented the Registrar from legally
certifying that “. . . all the requirements of this chapter have been complied
with. . .” under A.S.C.A. § 37.0103(d) (1989) or its identical predecessor
A.S.C.A. § 37.0103(c) (1981). The
Legislature has iterated and reiterated with sanctions its clear requirement
that:
Notice of the proposed registration shall
be posted for 60 days on the bulletin board at the courthouse in Fagatogo and
at 2 public places in the village in which or nearest to which the land is
located. . .
A.S.C.A. § 37.0103(a).
The Registrar knew or should have known that the land registration
notice procedures that his office practiced were to be amended during the 60 day notice period of Talae’s proposed land
registration. Indeed, these amendments
appear specifically intended to independently verify that the required postings
of notices were duly displayed during the 60 day notice period.
[3ASR3d62]Regardless of whether P.L. No. 21-1
actually applied to this land registration, the Registrar could not reasonably
be expected to rely upon his current posting practices when finally issuing the
certificate of registration. His actual
knowledge of the removal of the notice precluded any reasonable bases for
certifying that all requirements of posting had been complied with.
We note that in an analogous case, Foloi, supra, this court remanded a land certification case for
rehearing on the notice requirements when it appeared the notice had been
posted for only 34 days. On rehearing
the trial court found that notice in the village where the land was located had
only been posted for 34 days, from August 6, 1987 through September 8, 1987,
and that the territorial registrar’s affidavit of posting was signed on August
6, 1987, “. . . before, rather than after the posting period was
completed.” Foloi,
et al v Tuitasi, 22 A.S.R.2d 1, 3 (1992). The trial court concluded that “...
compliance with the statutory notice requirements for registration of title
under A.S.C.A. § 37.0101 et seq. is an essential feature of the registration
process.”
We reach the same conclusion for similar reasons in the instant
case. The registration fails for lack of
notice.
B. Issues for Relitigation
We also note, without deciding, several other areas of concern
that this case presents. As it appears
this decision may prompt a new filing for the registration of the subject land,
we raise now, without deciding, those concerns so that those issues may be
addressed in any subsequent administrative or judicial proceedings.
The 1971 land survey reflects six named individual members of the
Tuitele family as claiming the subject land as their individually-owned
land. Nearly 18 years later, that same
survey was filed when Talae proposed registration of title to the land by the
“Heirs of Uaine Tuitele”.
The certificate affirming that notice was duly given to the
village chiefs in council at Taputimu at the time the survey was executed some
16 years after the survey, by the village mayor. This person is the same individual which
Talae fondly recalls as being a strong advocate for Talae’s claim that the land
is individually-owned during at least two instances when the Tulifua family
asserted their communal land claims to the land. R.T. at 81-82; R.T. at 66.
[3ASR3d63] Both during the 1971 survey and the 1989
registration, the senior matai title of the Tulifua family was vacant. Uaine Tuitele was the son of a holder of the
Tulifua title. R.T. at 76. Talae is the grandson of Uaine Tuitele. R.T. at 66.
Within this context, we view the proposed 1989 registration of title to
the subject parcel of land by Talae as individually owned land of the “Heirs of
Uaine Tuitele” as facially suspect.
The record contains no testimony identifying that group of people
comprising the “Heirs”. We are provided
with no basis for either including or excluding the 6 named individuals
asserting ownership of the land under the 1971 survey as being members of the
group of ‘Heirs’.
Nor can we reconcile the clear dictates of the recording statute
with the use of such a factually and legally vague term. A.S.C.A. § 37.0101(a) provides:
The owner of any land in
[6] This clear, statutory language appears to
prohibit a single person, such as Talae, from registering anything other than
his title to the subject land. No
provision is set forth in this statute specifically authorizing a person to
register the title of others or any interest less than clear title to the
land.
By his use of the term “Heirs of Uaine Tuitele” (Talae’s grandfather’s
heirs), Talae appears to claim title to the subject land vested in such
heirs. Yet the Territory’s statute
governing intestate succession to real property other than communal lands does
not support such a claim. A.S.C.A. §
40.0202 reads:
When any person having any title to
any real property dies without disposing of such real property by will, it
shall be succeeded to and must be distributed, subject to the payment of debts
and the rights of dower, in the following manner:
(a) All real property shall lineally
descend forever, to the issue of the decedent, but shall not lineally ascend,
except as set forth in subsection (c).
(b) On failure of lineal descendants, the
brothers and sisters of the decedent, or their issue, shall succeed to the real
property.
(c) When the decedent has left no issue
capable of inheriting, nor brothers, nor sisters, nor issue of such, the real
estate shall vest in the father if living, and if not, in the mother, if
living.
(d) When any person dies leaving none who
can claim as heir, [3ASR3d64]
the surviving spouse shall inherit the
estate.
(emphasis added).
[7-8] On its face, this statute provides only
for intestate succession to real property of a decedent with title to
such real property, not a mere claim to such land. Nor does intestate succession occur
automatically. The court confers such
rights upon qualified and eligible heirs after fully complying with the
statutes governing the orderly administration of estates. See
generally A.S.C.A. §§ 40.0301-40.0342 and specifically 40.0332 which reads
in pertinent part:
[T]he trial division of the High Court
shall make and file a decree of distribution, which shall name the persons
entitled to the estate and the proportions or parts to which each is
entitled. Such decree shall be
conclusive as to rights of heirs, legatees, devisees and creditors....
In addition to our concerns that such a registration of title as
proposed by Talae could thwart the orderly statutory scheme for the succession
to individual titles of real property, the lack of named individuals in an
initial land registration certificate frustrates the objects of that
system. Title to the land is not quieted
nor may persons desiring to deal with that land be afforded any certainty as to
the conclusiveness of that certificate. Foloi, supra. Stated differently, such practices would lead
to an extremely weak original link in a government sanctioned chain of title to
individually owned lands.
Allowing registration of lands in such a fashion also raises
notice issues. We could easily foresee a
situation where a person could believe she was an “heir” and therefore not
object to a land registration only to later learn that legally, she could not
inherit an interest in the land and, as a result of the finalized land
registration, she was barred from pursuing alternative legal claims to the
land.
A final concern on the issue of registration of title to
individually-owned lands by proxy and vesting title in preceding generations is
the apparent potential for avoiding the strict Samoan blood requirements in the
land alienation scheme adopted by the Legislature. The Legislature sought to preserve all
communal and individually-owned lands for persons of at least one-half Samoan
ancestry. A.S.C.A. § 37.0204(c) reads:
If a person who has any nonnative blood
marries another person who has any nonnative blood, the children of such
marriage cannot inherit land unless they are of at least one-half native blood.
[3ASR3d65] We see the potential for the easy avoidance
of this statutory restriction by allowing the initial registration of
individually-owned lands in the “Heirs” of a named ancestor.
Conclusion
We do not lightly reverse the learned trial court’s decision in
this matter. We do so only in the face
of compelling evidence that the minimal requirements for public notice of this
land registration were clearly not met.
In addition, the peculiar factual situation presented by this case,
coupled with the application of related, relevant statutory mandates, buttress
our admittedly narrow finding in this matter.
We specifically do not decide the issue of whether or not the
subject land is the property of either of the parties herein. Either side may pursue their land
registration objectives as provided by law and thereby quiet title to this
land. Indeed, with both parties
currently united behind their respective capable and forceful spokesman, the
prompt pursuit of a title registration by either or both parties would afford a
unique opportunity for both sides to exhaustively air their claims of
ownership.
Order
The Opinion and Order of the trial court is hereby reversed and
this case remanded thereto with instructions to enter judgment for the
Appellant HC Tulifua vacating the 1989 Certificate of Title to the 14.18 acre
parcel of land “Nonuaimoa” in the Village of Taputimu to the Heirs of Uaine
Tuitele as their individually owned land and to issue an order to that effect
to the territorial registrar.
It is so Ordered.
**********
* The Honorable John L. Ward II, District Court Judge, serving by designation of the Secretary of the Interior.
** The Honorable Alfred T. Goodwin, Senior
Circuit
*** The Honorable Alex R. Munson,