CRIMINAL
Despite assertion that breathalyzer results were erroneous, evidence that Appellant crashed into another vehicle as he was overtaking it, that he admitted to having drunken two beers and a shot of tequila, that he was observed with red eyes and alcohol breath, and that he failed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test and refused to perform the other two field sobriety tests was sufficient to support jury’s finding that he was driving under the influence. Pule v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 7 (1997).
For an appellant to prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, he must show that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Suani v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 28 (1997).
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence the inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether the trial court could reasonably arrive at its verdict. Suani v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 28 (1997).
To establish possession of a controlled substance the government must present evidence that the defendant had dominion and control over the contraband. Suani v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 28 (1997).
Mere fact appellant was defensive and angry under police interrogation and that he lived 90-120 feet from the two marijuana plants growing in nearby bush land is insufficient evidence to permit a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of a controlled substance. Suani v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 28 (1997).
Prisoners
have a constitutional right of access to the courts and a right of access to a
threshold level of legal information or aid.
Since the High Court maintains the only public law library in the
Territory, where an incarcerated criminal defendant is proceeding
pro se, the prisoner’s demand for access to the High Court library is
legitimate. However, the prisoner is not
constitutionally guaranteed unlimited access to the law library. Security considerations and avoidance of
abuse may require the prisoner to accept occasional, but regular access to the
library rather than access according to his whim. The prisoner is only entitled to a reasonable
amount of time to use the library. Adams v. Reavis, 1 A.S.R.3d 104 (1997).
Where
the government seeks to resume a prosecution over five and one half years after
it filed a criminal complaint and obtained a warrant for the defendant’s
arrest, this constitutes an unreasonable failure, neglect, or refusal to
prosecute which would authorize the court to dismiss the case. A.S.G. v. Lavata’i, 1 A.S.R.3d 164 (1997).
According to
Art. 1, § 6 of the Revised
Constitution of American Samoa, does not state
that the term “infamous crime” includes only the crimes of murder and
rape and excludes all other crimes. A
plain reading of this provision of the Revised Constitution suggests that the
crimes of rape and murder are merely examples of the much larger category of
“infamous crimes.” The term “infamous crime” is contained in the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which requires an indictment
to hold a person “to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime.” Because of the close nexus between the
The Revised Constitution requires the Court to determine whether the Defendant is a threat to society, and does not require the heightened standard of proof by “clear and convincing” evidence. A.S.G. v. Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 166 (1997).
The
intended deterrent effect of the sentence in a criminal case is of paramount
importance. A.S.G. v. Pu’aa, 1 A.S.R.3d 170 (1997).
Where
prosecutor and defendant differed over whether waiver of preliminary hearing alone
or whether waiver and plea to third case were consideration for dismissal of
first two cases, dismissal of two cases in exchange for the waiver was unlikely
and therefore agreement properly construed in government’s favor. A.S.G. v. Felise, 1 A.S.R.3d 171 (1997).
Despite
differing interpretations of agreement, neither interpretation specifically
prohibited prosecutor from presenting facts of two alleged escapes as basis for
probation revocation in other, unrelated case.
Therefore, prosecutor did not breach agreement with defendant. A.S.G. v. Felise, 1 A.S.R.3d 171 (1997).
Article I, Sec. 5 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa, which guarantees the right of individuals "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures", protects only those with a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the area searched. A.S.G. v. Atafua, 1 A.S.R.3d 174 (1997).
Where a defendant neither asserts nor demonstrates a property or possessory interest in the bush land searched this is insufficient to establish the Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or that his constitutional rights were violated. A.S.G. v. Atafua, 1 A.S.R.3d 174 (1997).
The right to be free from an unreasonable search is a personal right which may not be vicariously asserted. Even if the police violate someone else's constitutional rights by failing to obtain a warrant before conducting a search on the property, such information does not justify exclusion of the seized evidence in a different person’s prosecution. A.S.G. v. Atafua, 1 A.S.R.3d 174 (1997).
Article I, § 5 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa guarantees the right of individuals "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." A.S.G. v. Dunham, 1 A.S.R.3d 176 (1997).
Article I, § 5 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa attaches privacy rights only to those individuals who have legitimate expectations of privacy with respect to the searched area. A.S.G. v. Dunham, 1 A.S.R.3d 176 (1997).
Where search at issue took place in the bush, and defendant neither asserted nor demonstrated that he had a property or possessory interest in area, he had no standing to complain of warrantless search. A.S.G. v. Dunham, 1 A.S.R.3d 176 (1997).
Had police violated another individual’s constitutional rights in conducting warrantless search, such violation would not justify exclusion of the seized evidence against the named defendant. A.S.G. v. Dunham, 1 A.S.R.3d 176 (1997).
An evidentiary hearing to review probable cause for a search warrant is only mandated where a defendant alleges deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, and can support those allegations with an offer of proof. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
Probable cause for a warrant may be founded upon hearsay and information received from informants. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
A judge may issue a warrant without requiring informants to be produced, as long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
Only affiant may be subject to impeachment at such evidentiary hearing determining existence of probable cause for warrant. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
Criminal defendant’s assertions that warrant relied on “general and vague” statements of confidential informant, and that confidential informant may be unreliable, or may not exist were insufficient to require evidentiary hearing reviewing propriety of warrant. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
As long as the information put forth by an informant is believed to be true by the warrant’s affiant, every fact recited in the warrant need not be correct or complete. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
Substantial basis existed for crediting hearsay of confidential informant where affiant investigated informant’s criminal history, verified the informant’s credibility with another police officer, and utilized his own knowledge to corroborate veracity of informant’s statements. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
Challenge to propriety of warrant must be more than conclusory and be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine affiant. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
The law enforcement privilege entitles the American Samoa Government to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
A trial court must balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
The crime charged, the possible defenses, and the possible significance of the informer’s testimony are among factors that the court should consider in determining whether disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity is warranted. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
Disclosure of confidential informant’s identity was not appropriate where defendant was charged with cultivating and possessing marijuana on his land, officers had already located and seized the marijuana, and where examination of informant would not be relevant and helpful to defendant’s case. A.S.G. v . Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 178 (1997).
Under Article 1, Sec. 5 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa, a judge is not required to learn the identity of a confidential informant upon whose information a warrant is issued. A.S.G. v. Fa’atulu, 1 A.S.R.3d 184 (1997).
The Government is privileged to conceal the identity of an informant and the trial court is not required to conduct an in camera examination of the informant where the defendant makes no showing that an in camera examination of the informant by the court would develop information “relevant and helpful” to a particular legal theory advanced by the defendant. A.S.G. v. Fa’atulu, 1 A.S.R.3d 184 (1997).
Article I, § 5 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa parallels the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and provides a safeguard against "unreasonable searches and seizures." A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
A warrantless arrest of a suspect is reasonable where the suspect is found near the scene of a felonious crime, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect committed the crime, and where the arrest occurs within a short period of time after the crime has occurred. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
A child may be taken into temporary custody by a law enforcement officer without order of the court when there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has committed an act which would be a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
The term "reasonable grounds," in the context of an arrest, is substantially the same as "probable cause." A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
Probable cause for a warrantless arrest must exist at the time the arrest is made, and the government has the burden of showing that such probable cause existed. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
“Reasonable grounds” existed to detain juvenile suspect where officers knew that the victim’s body had been found that afternoon on beach, where they also knew that bruising on the victim's neck indicated possible strangling in ocean, where suspect had been seen in area and at time that victim last seen alive, where suspect was reported to be acting nervously, and where suspect fled in response to request for information. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
The Miranda
rule applies in
Territorial law prohibits introduction into evidence of statements by child in response to interrogation by police unless a parent, guardian or legal custodian were advised, at the time of interrogation, of the child's right to remain silent, that any statements made may be used against him in a court of law, of the right to the presence of an attorney during the interrogation, and of the right to have counsel appointed. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
Where evidence presented established that there was no police intimidation, coercion, or deception, when taking into account minor defendant’s age and level of intelligence, waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
Fact that defendant’s testable intelligence quotient was equal to a second grader did not establish that he was unable to understand his actions in waiving his Miranda rights. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
Low mental ability in and of itself is insufficient to establish that a defendant did not understand his rights. A suspect’s inability to read the Miranda form does not necessarily mean that he was unable to understand his rights as they were being read to him. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
Territorial law respecting the Miranda rule is complied with if either the parent or counsel present when Miranda warning read. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 186 (1997).
A.S.C.A. § 45.0115(c)(2) confers upon the Attorney General’s Office independent power to prosecute an individual 14 years or older as an "adult" for felony crimes involving violence. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 193 (1997).
The judiciary in American Samoa has the power under to certify an underage individual as an adult for the purposes of criminal proceedings under A.S.C.A. § 45.0115(c)(1). However, it has no power to interfere with a prosecution under A.S.C.A. § 45.0115(c)(2). A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 193 (1997).
The Juvenile Justice Act exclusively uses "chronological age," and not "mental age" to determine whether or not a particular defendant qualifies for treatment as a "child" or as an "adult." A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 193 (1997).
Where a defendant has undergone a psychiatric examination and been found competent to stand trial and assist his counsel it seems logical to conclude that he would have been capable of understanding the very elemental rights that Miranda affords, notwithstanding his academic stunting. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 195 (1997).
The Juvenile Justice Act of 1980 provides additional safeguards for juveniles beyond those discussed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Under ASCA § 45.0204, the "parent, guardian or legal custodian" must be advised of the child's Miranda rights in order for a waiver of those rights to be permissible. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 195 (1997).
Where a juvenile is interviewed by police officers in the presence of the juvenile’s father the requirements of ASCA § 45.0204 are met. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 195 (1997).
Functioning academically at a grade-school level does not necessarily preclude the comprehension of the basic rights Miranda affords. Evidence that a juvenile is able to function adequately outside school, testify clearly and intelligently and assist his counsel may establish the juvenile was and is capable of understanding his Miranda rights. A.S.G. v. Pino, 1 A.S.R.3d 195 (1997).
The Juvenile
Justice Act was designed to encompass any and all situations in which children
break the law, and was not intended to permit certain juveniles to commit
misdemeanor assaults without subjecting them to answer for their behavior
through some form of adjudicatory proceeding.
A.S.G. v. Fa’apito,
1 A.S.R.3d 199
(1997).
A.S.C.A. Sec.
45.0115(c)(2) does not prevent the Attorney General
from charging certain children with misdemeanors as well as felonies,
under certain circumstances, including when the child's conduct is a crime of
violence. A.S.G. v. Fa’apito,
1 A.S.R.3d 199
(1997).
While there are a number of other provisions
in the Juvenile Justice Act that talk about dealing with children as adults
only in the context of felony charges, the Act expressly contemplates
prosecution of children for felonies and misdemeanors. A.S.G.
v. Fa’apito, 1 A.S.R.3d 199 (1997).
Where the government prosecutes a child as
an adult for a crime of violence the child is not a "juvenile" within
the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act and the High Court cannot assert
jurisdiction over the matter under A.S.C.A. Sec. 3.0208(a)(4). Furthermore, the High Court does not have
jurisdiction over this case under A.S.C.A. Sec. 45.0115(a)(1), which grants the
trial division of the High Court exclusive jurisdiction over cases concerning
"any delinquent child, as defined in subsections (2) and (9) of 45.0103”,
because a child charged with a crime of violence is excluded from the
definition of "delinquent child" under A.S.C.A. Sec.
45.0103(9)(B)(I). A.S.G. v. Fa’apito, 1 A.S.R.3d 199 (1997).