T.C.R.C.P. Rule 6(a) sets forth the applicable time to file motions for reconsideration or new trial under A.S.C.A. § 43.0802(a). PAL Air International, Inv. v. Porter, 1 A.S.R.3d 1 (1997).
The stay provisions set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) do not apply to actions brought by the debtor which inure to the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. PAL Air International, Inv. v. Porter, 1 A.S.R.3d 1 (1997).
The doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation of the legal and factual issues that were settled between the same parties in prior litigation. A.S.G. v. Meredith, et al., 1 A.S.R.3d 14 (1997).
The doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation of issues that could have been raised but may not have been raised in the prior litigation. A.S.G. v. Meredith, et al., 1 A.S.R.3d 14 (1997).
Where doctrine of res judicata barred action, equitable claims, claims regarding oral representations made by government officials, and claims that the government forfeited its title need not be reached. A.S.G. v. Meredith, et al., 1 A.S.R.3d 14 (1997).
Where a court places property which is the subject of a dispute into the hands of a trustee prior to a final determination of the merits of the case this does not divest a party claiming ownership from asserting the party’s claim for legal and ownership title and rights to the property at the subsequent trial. Bendall v. Samoa Aviation, Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 16 (1997).
Failure to file a formal, written motion to disqualify constitutes a waiver on the issue of a judge’s impartiality. Tuaolo v. Fruean, 1 A.S.R.3d 33 (1997).
A judge’s impartiality is a pre-trial issue. Motions to disqualify judges made after trial are improper and untimely. Tuaolo v. Fruean, 1 A.S.R.3d 33 (1997).
Under the “Rule of Necessity,” an interested judge is required to sit on a matter where it otherwise would not be heard. Tuaolo v. Fruean, 1 A.S.R.3d 33 (1997).
The “Rule of Necessity” requires judges to sit even when where they otherwise would be required to recuse themselves sua sponte. Tuaolo v. Fruean, 1 A.S.R.3d 33 (1997).
The “Rule of Necessity” is properly invoked where there is no evidence to suggest that sufficient replacement judges are available. Tuaolo v. Fruean, 1 A.S.R.3d 33 (1997).
When a plaintiff files a tort claim with the Attorney General at any time within the two-year period provided by § 43.1204, the running of the two-year period is stayed and the statute is tolled for such time as the Attorney General takes to act upon the claim or until such time as the claim is denied by default. . Bradcock v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 42 (1997).
Where prior resort to a mandatory administrative procedure is a prerequisite to filing a claim in court, the running of the limitations period will be tolled during the administrative proceeding. Bradcock v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 42 (1997).
Where a discharged employee presents sufficient facts which, if proven at trial, could persuade a reasonable factfinder to find that he had a just cause termination clause in his employment contract, that his employer wrongfully terminated his employment without just cause, and that the employment was terminated in violation of the requirements of procedural and substantive due process the employer’s motion for summary judgment will be denied by the court. Faumuina v. A.S.G. Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 45 (1997).
T.C.R.C.P. 6(d) requires parties to serve supporting memorandum not later than 3 days before the hearing, unless otherwise permitted by the court. Where memorandum filed on a Friday, and motion heard the following Monday, movant had obviously not complied with T.C.R.C.P. 6(d). BHP Petroleum South Pacific, Inc. v. Daitoh Trading Co. 1 A.S.R.3d 60 (1997).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no "genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. BHP Petroleum South Pacific, Inc. v. Daitoh Trading Co. 1 A.S.R.3d 60 (1997).
On motion for summary judgment, non-moving party's factual assertions, supported by evidence such as affidavits, are presumed to be true. BHP Petroleum South Pacific, Inc. v. Daitoh Trading Co. 1 A.S.R.3d 60 (1997).
Where plaintiff alleged that “delivery notice,” containing a demand for payment, had been signed by the defendant at the time of delivery of the goods, factual issue was raised as to whether the parties had a written contract. BHP Petroleum South Pacific, Inc. v. Daitoh Trading Co. 1 A.S.R.3d 60 (1997).
T.C.R.C.P. Rule 15(a) allows a party to amend
his pleadings once, as a matter of course, any time before a permitted
responsive pleading is served. Pipili v. Ah Sue, 1 A.S.R.3d 63 (1997).
A T.C.R.C.P. Rule
12(b) motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for the purposes of
T.C.R.C.P. Rule 15(a). Pipili v. Ah Sue,
1 A.S.R.3d 63 (1997).
Failure to allege the
jurisdictional amount in the complaint does not subject it to dismissal where
the complaint is amended to include this allegation prior to the filing of a
responsive pleading by the defendant. Pipili v. Ah Sue, 1 A.S.R.3d 63 (1997).
Trial court has discretion to refuse declaratory
relief when it is not necessary or proper at the time it is sought. Tauia v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 64
(1997).
In most declaratory relief actions, exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a prerequisite to judicial review. Tauia v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 64
(1997).
Dismissal of government employment action without prejudice proper where dispute had not undergone three-part administrative procedure. Tauia v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 64 (1997).
Under
three-part administrative procedure, government employee submits written
grievance to supervisor, Director of Manpower Resources conducts an informal
hearing and issues a “final decision,” after which employee may appeal to
Personnel Advisory Board. Tauia v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 64 (1997).
The relief afforded
by T.C.R.C.P. Rule 6(a), extending the period for time computations to the next
business day when the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday,
applies to the filing period for motions for a new trial. Bank of Hawaii v. Neru, 1 A.S.R.3d
69 (1997).
A
motion to stay enforcement of an order awarding worker’s compensation benefits
will not be granted unless it is shown that irreparable damage must ensue to
the employer unless a stay is issued. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Star-Kist y Samoa, Inc. v.
Comm’r of the American Samoa Gov’t Workmen’s Comp. Comm’n., 1 A.S.R.3d 67 (1997).
The
fact that the employer might have difficulty recovering the repayment of
compensation from the employee if the award to the employee is reversed on appeal, is insufficient reason to grant a stay. Star-Kist y Samoa, Inc. v. Comm’r of the American Samoa Gov’t
Workmen’s Comp. Comm’n., 1 A.S.R.3d 67 (1997).
Where
writs of execution and garnishment did not conform to and follow the judgment,
Clerk of Courts properly directed to strike surplusage before issuing
them. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1
A.S.R.3d 87 (1997).
A
plaintiff possesses standing to sue if he is able to show: (1) an injury to a
legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) an injury that is causally
related to the defendant's challenged conduct, and not resulting from
independent action by some third party not before the court; and (3) the
prospect of achieving redress for the injury from a favorable decision that is
not too speculative. Vaella’a v. Sunia, 1 A.S.R.3d
88 (1997).
A preliminary injunction may be
ordered under American Samoan law when it is shown: (1) that there is a
substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail at trial on the merits
and that a permanent injunction will be issued against the opposing party; and
(2) great or irreparable injury will result to the applicant before a full and
final trial can be fairly held on whether a permanent injunction should
issue. Vaella’a v. Sunia, 1 A.S.R.3d
88 (1997).
A
court tests substantial likelihood of success by whether the movant has a good
chance of success, evaluated in the court's discretion, not measured by any
mathematical probability, and taking into account serious issues calling for
more deliberate consideration. Vaella’a v. Sunia, 1 A.S.R.3d 88 (1997).
In its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial. G.H.C. Reid & Co. v. K.M.S.T., 1 A.S.R.3d 100 (1997).
The court will not grant a stay of judgment pending appeal automatically or casually. Instead, because a stay of execution is essentially a form of injunctive relief, the court will balance the equities and determine whether or not the motion for reconsideration is likely to be successful. G.H.C. Reid & Co. v. K.M.S.T., 1 A.S.R.3d 100 (1997).
Under the judicially-developed doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 120 (1997).
Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, relieves parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and encourages reliance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent decisions. However, the doctrines are distinct in that res judicata applies only between parties and their privies to the prior action, while collateral estoppel may be invoked by a stranger to the prior action against a party to that action. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 120 (1997).
Stranger plaintiffs may, under certain circumstances, use the doctrine of collateral estoppel offensively, to estop a defendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 120 (1997).
A trial court has broad discretion in determining when offensive collateral estoppel is appropriate, and must consider the following factors: (1) whether the new plaintiff could have easily joined the previous action; (2) whether the defendant had sufficient incentive in the earlier action to litigate the matter with vigor; (3) whether the application of collateral estoppel would be unfair to the defendant for other reasons; (4) whether the issues in the two actions are identical; (5) whether the court’s holding in the earlier action was actually litigated and. necessary to a determination on the merits; (6) whether the judgment in the earlier action was final. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 120 (1997).
The burden of proof is on the party against whom the doctrine of collateral estoppel is sought to be applied to produce some evidence indicating that the party seeking to apply the doctrine adopted a "wait and see" attitude so as to avoid the binding force of a potentially adverse ruling in the previous action. This is true even where the plaintiff has not adequately explained the failure to join the previous litigation. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 120 (1997).
Where future suits are foreseeable at the time of the first action, the defendant can not claim that there was a lack of incentive to litigate the issue so as to avoid the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 120 (1997).
Issue preclusion in the context of the doctrine of collateral estoppel only applies when the issue raised is the same issue that was decided in an earlier case. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 120 (1997).
The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents relitigation of all issues of fact or law that were actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior proceeding. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 120 (1997).
Issue preclusion only applies to final judgments on the merits. For purposes of issue preclusion, final judgment includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. The fact that the losing party in the earlier case may still appeal the ruling to a higher appellate court does not render the judgment non-final. Nelson & Robertson Pty. Ltd v. K.M.S.T., Inc., 1 A.S.R.3d 120 (1997).
The method and timetable for deciding a Rule 12(b) motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(d) of the American Samoa Trial Court Rules of Civil Procedure is left to the sole discretion of the trial judge who may defer that determination until trial. The last portion of Rule 12(d) gives the court discretion to grant a preliminary hearing or to defer resolution of the issues until trial. Gatolai v. A.S.G., 1 A.S.R.3d 129 (1997).
An action for malicious prosecution
may not be asserted by way of cross-complaint or counterclaim in the original
proceedings, prior to its termination, since it is essential that the original
proceedings shall have previously terminated in favor of the party bringing the
malicious prosecution action. Bank of Hawaii v. Randall, 1 A.S.R.3d 141 (1997).
Party may not seek to be relieved from accord and satisfaction when he or she later realizes that such was a bad bargain. Samoa Sharkfin Trading Co. v. Ho Py Hong, 1 A.S.R.3d 143 (1997).
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ and will not issue unless:
(1) the plaintiff has a plain right to have the act performed; (2) the
defendant has a plain duty to perform it; and (3) there is no other adequate
remedy available to the plaintiff. Adams v. Reavis, 1 A.S.R.3d 146 (1997).
Where statute
did not authorize, but instead prohibited, work release of inmate, writ of
mandamus would not lie. Adams v. Reavis, 1 A.S.R.3d 146 (1997).
A party against whom a claim is asserted may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (1997).
Once a moving party has put forth a prima facie case, the party opposing summary judgment has the burden of showing that there are genuine issues of material fact which render summary judgment inappropriate. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (1997).
In reviewing the pleadings and papers supporting a motion for summary judgment, a court must view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Where the facts and the law reasonably support only one conclusion, summary judgment is mandated. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (1997).
Admissible evidence adduced at preliminary injunction hearing will be made part of the trial record and need not be repeated at the trial on the merits. Gurr v. Gurr, 1 A.S.R.3d 203 (1997).
Res judicata is a rule of substantive law and not of practice or procedure. Mailei v. Faumuina, 1 A.S.R.3d 206 (1997).
Res judicata cannot be set aside by employing A.S.C.A. § 3.0242(b). Mailei v. Faumuina, 1 A.S.R.3d 206 (1997).
Although Rule 11 sanctions are normally imposed against an attorney, they may be imposed against a party when warranted. Mailei v. Faumuina, 1 A.S.R.3d 206 (1997).
Sufficient grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction exist where (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail at trial on the merits and that a permanent injunction will be issued against the opposing party; and (2) great or irreparable injury will result to the applicant before a full and final trial can be fairly held on whether a permanent injunction should issue. Pagofie v. Matagi, 1 A.S.R.3d 227 (1997).
A preliminary injunction should be granted where "sufficient grounds," are shown pursuant to the requirements of A.S.C.A. § 43.1301(g) and (j). First, the party seeking the injunction must show the greater likelihood of prevailing at trial. Second, the equities must weigh in favor of the party seeking the injunction and show that party would certainly suffer cognizable immediate injury, if the injunction is not granted. I’aulualo v. I’aulualo, 1 A.S.R.3d 230 (1997).
A complaint in a contested land case that the Governor failed to provide the affected plaintiff with notice of the Governor’s decision concerning alienation of communal property is not subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Ah Soon v. Tafa’ifa, 1 A.S.R.3d 236 (1997).