§ 2 Administrative
Agencies, Officers and Agents
§ 3 Separation
of Administrative and other Powers
§ 4 Powers & Proceedings of
Administrative Agencies, Officer & Agents
4(1) Due
Process
4(3) Hearings
and Adjudications
§ 5 Judicial
Review of Administrative Decisions
5(2) Procedure
5(3) Scope of Review
5(4) Disposition
Because the Governor has general
supervision and control of all executive departments, agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, personnel decisions are subject to his
direction as long as his actions are in accordance with applicable territorial
and federal laws and rules. Rev. Const.
Am.
When the
government makes rules to govern the conduct of its affairs, it must abide by
those rules and act within its authority.
Sala v.
§
2 Administrative Agencies, Officers
and Agents
SEE
An agency's head may only reassign an employee involuntarily with the concurrence of the Director of Human Resources and with a finding that the reassignment be in the best interests of the government; failure to follow the regulatory standard is arbitrary and an error of law. A.S.C.A. § 4.1044(6); A.S.A.C. § 4.0804(b). Leiato v. Personnel Advisory Board, 21 A.S.R.2d 25.
If done within the scope and by the apparent authority of a de jure public officer, a de facto public officer's acts are binding on third parties; it is as if the de facto public officer were legally selected, qualified and in possession of the office. Toilolo v. Poti, 24 A.S.R.2d 1.
§ 3 Separation of Administrative and other
Powers
SEE
Administrative board, given statutory authority to advise
agency and to perform such duties as governor assigns, had no authority to
issue binding personnel decisions absent explicit grant, especially when Code
sets forth hiring and termination procedures that do not involve board. Banks v.
As adequate safeguards exist to inform the Director of Administrative Services of the natural "termination" of insurance policies by expiration of the policy period, the legislature did not intend the statute requiring an insurer to notify the Director at least ten days prior to "cancellation" of a policy to apply to "terminations." A.S.C.A. § 22.2013. Pu`u v. Lepule, 8 A.S.R.2d 68.
Under statute providing that blank forms for petitions required of candidates for elective office should be distributed by election officer, and also providing that eligibility of candidates should be determined after they had filed the required petitions, election officer had no authority to withhold blank forms from a prospective candidate whom he did not did not believe to be eligible for election. A.S.C.A. §§ 6.0301(b),(d). Siofele v. Shimasaki, 8 A.S.R.2d 81.
Under territorial
immigration statute, the immigration board determines only whether an alien is
deportable; the decision actually to deport a deportable alien is within the
discretion of the attorney general.
A.S.C.A. § 41.0616. Leti v. Immigration Board, 8 A.S.R.2d 107.
Order of deportation must be made by the Attorney General. A.S.C.A. § 41.0616. Rakhshan v. Immigration Board, 15 A.S.R.2d 29.
The Attorney General's Office may not simultaneously act as both counsel and legal advisor to a government agency. A.S.C.A. § 4.1034. Leiato v. Personnel Advisory Board, 21 A.S.R.2d 25.
§
4 Powers and Proceedings of
Administrative Agencies, Officer and Agents
SEE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7(1) – DUE PROCESS
Argument that
license was "revoked" without procedural due process was unfounded
where evidence shows license was never granted.
Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2.
Ferstle v.
In order to have
a cognizable claim for deprivation of procedural due process, one must first
possess a "liberty" or "property" interest in the
government action complained of. Am.
Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Procedural due
process requirements are not fixed, but vary with circumstances and particular
demands of the case; however, some sort of notice and hearing is required
before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Notice and
hearing afforded to satisfy procedural due process need not be full judicial
hearing. Am. Sam. Const. art. I §
2. Ferstle v.
To satisfy
requirement of procedural due process, opportunity to be heard must be granted
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, but need not always be granted
prior to the initial deprivation of property.
Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2.
Ferstle v.
Ordinarily, due
process is satisfied by proceedings less than a full evidentiary hearing prior
to adverse administrative action, and the sufficiency of such proceedings is to
be determined in light of 1) the private interest that will be affected by the
official action, 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards, and 3) the government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would impose. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Procedural due
process is satisfied by piecemeal proceedings wherein parties were advised of
the required showing, the proofs were considered promptly by the regulating
agency, parties were advised of the agency's findings of insufficiency, parties
submitted further proofs, agency considered proofs and again advised parties
that such proof was insufficient, agency did not issue a denial and remained
open to further submission of proofs.
Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2.
Ferstle v. V. American
Due process
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard are not triggered until
adverse administrative action constituting a "final" deprivation of
property has taken place. Am. Sam.
Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Recurring and
intentionally dilatory tactics by agency may constitute "final"
action sufficient to trigger due process requirements of notice and
hearing. Am. Sam. Const. art. I §
2. Ferstle v.
The expected
benefit of a license which issues subject to articulated standards of
qualification is a property interest giving rise to due process protection,
although not to the full range of pre-deprivation procedural protections
applicable to entitlements that are less contingent than the expectation of a
license. Am. Sam. Const. art. I §
2. Ferstle v.
Because in most
cases licensing will be a straightforward process, quasi-judicial evidentiary
hearing in all licensing proceedings would needlessly increase government expenditures
and such hearings are required only where the proposed action on a license
application will be final. Am. Sam.
Const. art. I § 2., A.S.C.A. § 31.1508.
Ferstle v.
Both the
territorial Administrative Procedure Act and the Department of Public Safety's
Standard Operating Procedure, a statement of internal management not defined as
an administrative rule under the APA, afford a person under investigation the
basic due-process rights of notice of the hearing, including a concise
statement of allegations, and a right to a hearing at which there is an
opportunity to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues
involved, and conduct cross-examination.
A.S.C.A §§ 4.1025, 4.1026; SOP §§ 4.1.3, 4.1.4. Sala v.
Administrative
code provision purporting to free territorial utility from liability for any
damages attributable to the presence of the utility's property on consumer's
premises, was inconsistent with statute providing that utility could be sued,
especially in light of public policy that provisions purporting to absolve the
drafting party from liability for its own negligence should be strictly
construed. A.S.A.C. § 12.0207(b). Fa'avae v.
Administrative
rule allowing rejection of bids on account of ambiguities in the solicitation,
if construed to allow rejection of a bid which was clearly the low one on
account of an ambiguity in the solicitation that had been cured by the bids
themselves, would violate competitive bidding statute prohibiting changes
prejudicial to fair competition.
A.S.A.C. § 10.0232; A.S.C.A. § 12.0211.
Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v.
ASG regulations which set out those situations in which non-competitive procedures are applicable do not supersede the mandatory statutory requirement relating to the utilization of an applicant supply-file system for the hiring and promotion of government employees. A.S.C.A. §§ 7.0204(b), 7.0205(b), 7.0206; A.S.A.C. § 4.0303(b). Leiato v. Personnel Advisory Board, 21 A.S.R.2d 25.
Existing coastal
management rules and regulations were not nullified by the Development Planning
Office's failure to formally promulgate new, statutorily required rules for
administering the American Samoa Coastal Management Program. A.S.C.A. § 24.0506(a)-(b); A.S.A.C. §§ 26.0201
et seq. Le Vaomatua v.
An administrative rule adopted pursuant to the rulemaking process in the Administrative Procedure Act has the force and effect of law. A.S.C.A. §§ 1.0201(3), 4.1001-4.1010. Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 23 A.S.R.2d 55.
The Department of Public Safety’s rules governing early
release programs are “rules” within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”), and, therefore, must comport with the rulemaking
procedures of the APA. A.S.G. v. Ki, 31 A.S.R.2d 118.
Rulemaking under the APA
requires several steps, including giving meaningful advance notice of the terms
or substance of the proposed action; providing interested persons reasonable
opportunity to submit "data, views, and arguments, orally or in writing;"
filing the rule with the Secretary of American Samoa, with the Clerk of the
House of Representatives, and with the Secretary of the Senate; and making the
rule available for public inspection.
A.S.C.A. §§ 4.1004, 4.1005, 4.1008, 4.1010, 4.1020(a). A.S.G. v. Ki, 31 A.S.R.2d 118.
Rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedures Act requires several procedural steps,
including: 1) the rule-making agency must give at least 20 days notice of
adoption, amendment, or repeal of any non-emergency rule, A.S.C.A. §§ 4.1004
and 4.1010, which must include statutorily required information, and be mailed
to interested persons or publicized in all ASG operated broadcasting media,
A.S.C.A. § 4.1004; 2) the agency must
give all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit “data, views, and
arguments, orally or in writing,” either at a public or other suitable means,
and consider those submissions before the rule is adopted, amended, or
repealed, A.S.C.A. § 4.1005; 3) the agency
must file the rule with the Secretary of American Samoa, and with the Clerk of
the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate of the
Legislature, A.S.C.A. § 4.1008 (the rule become effective 20 days after the
filing is complete, or later if required by statute or rule, A.S.C.A. §
4.1009(c)(1)); and 4) the agency must make the rule available for public
inspection. A.S.C.A. § 4.1020(a). Congressional
Except as
to any person who has actual knowledge of a rule, no agency rule is valid or
effective until the public inspection requirement, A.S.C.A. § 4.1020(a), has
been met. Congressional
The
court will accept an agency’s letter and printed rule as demonstrating
substantial compliance with all applicable procedures, including a public
hearing and public inspection, except the requisite filing. Congressional
Despite procedural deficiencies, administrative rules are
valid and enforceable against persons who have actual knowledge of the
rules. A.S.C.A. § 1009(b). Congressional
§
4(3) —Hearings and Adjudications
Procedural due
process requirements are not fixed, but vary with circumstances and particular
demands of the case; however, some sort of notice and hearing is required
before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Notice and
hearing afforded to satisfy procedural due process need not be full judicial
hearing. Am. Sam. Const. art. I §
2. Ferstle v.
Ordinarily, due process is satisfied by proceedings less
than a full evidentiary hearing prior to adverse administrative action, and the
sufficiency of such proceedings is to be determined in light of 1) the private
interest that will be affected by the official action, 2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and
3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would impose. Am. Sam.
Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Procedural due
process is satisfied by piecemeal proceedings wherein parties were advised of
the required showing, the proofs were considered promptly by the regulating
agency, parties were advised of the agency's findings of insufficiency, parties
submitted further proofs, agency considered proofs and again advised parties
that such proof was insufficient, agency did not issue a denial and remained
open to further submission of proofs.
Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2.
Ferstle v. V. American
Because in most
cases licensing will be a straightforward process, quasi-judicial evidentiary
hearing in all licensing proceedings would needlessly increase government
expenditures and such hearings are required only where the proposed action on a
license application will be final. Am.
Sam. Const. art. I § 2., A.S.C.A. § 31.1508.
Ferstle v.
Appellant's claim that the trial court failed to apply certain evidentiary presumptions was without merit, as in administrative proceedings the agency rather than the court is to weigh the evidence and find facts; evidentiary presumptions used to facilitate fact-finding should be applied at the agency level and not at the level of judicial review. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.
In an
administrative proceeding a fact need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
or even by clear and compelling evidence in order to be proved conclusively;
the applicable standard is, rather, whether the fact appears from the evidence
to be more probably true than not.
Solomona v. Governor of
Regarding proposed land transfers, for which the Land Commission must provide the government with recommendations, the Land Commission should hold public hearings and must give reasonable notice of its deliberations to interested persons, regardless of the forum selected to "study" proposed transactions. Vaimaona v. Tuitasi, 22 A.S.R.2d 1.
Plaintiffs carry a legal duty to file administrative claims within a
reasonable time or they will be barred by the doctrine of laches. Bradcock v.
The statute of limitations may begin
to run before the filing of an administrative claim if the prospective plaintiff
unreasonably delays the administrative filing.
Bradcock v.
§ 5 Judicial
Review of Administrative Decisions
SEE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11(11) – ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISIONS
§ 5(1) —Finality and Exhaustion
Where statute provided
for appeal to board of registration from a denial of voter registration by
election officer, and for judicial review of an adverse decision of the board
of registration, court would not issue writ of mandamus to election officer
ordering him to register prospective voter who had not yet appealed to board of
registration. A.S.C.A. §§ 6.0224,
6.0230. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 8 A.S.R.2d
81.
One who challenges the right of another person to be registered or to vote as a qualified elector must exhaust administrative remedies before submitting the matter to court. A.S.C.A. §§ 6.0230 et seq. Election Office v. Tuika, 9 A.S.R.2d 1.
Court would not
exercise its power to render a declaratory judgment where the party seeking the
judgment had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Election Office v. Tuika, 9 A.S.R.2d 1.
Under statute requiring plaintiff to file an administrative claim before bringing action against the government, administrative claim by mother that she and her family had suffered damages adequately notified the government of the claims of her minor children, so that suit by minors should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A.S.C.A. § 43.1205(a). Utu v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 9 A.S.R.2d 88.
Requirement that
a claimant against a government agency must exhaust administrative remedies
before bringing suit comprises both waiveable and non-waiveable elements. Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v.
Laws prescribing
detailed procedures for presenting claims to an agency, designed to give the
agency a fair chance to review and respond to the claim before being hauled
into court, may be waived by the agency. Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v.
Neither
administrative agency nor court may dispense with requirements designed to
ensure that case admits of judicial resolution: that there be a genuine dispute
between the claimant and the agency on at least one specific and identifiable
question of law and fact. Pago Petroleum
Products, Inc., v.
Jurisdictional requirement that an agency decision be final before claimant challenges it in court may not be waived.
Pago Petroleum
Products, Inc., v.
Insofar as
territorial statute prescribing final decision by administrative agency as
prerequisite to judicial review simply gave the agency the right to insist on
exhaustion of its internal review procedures, it was waiveable by the agency,
but insofar as it incorporated the rule that courts should decide real
controversies it could not be waived.
A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum
Products, Inc., v.
Administrative
agency decision to issue a new invitation for bids for fuel supply contract was
a final decision rejecting bidder's contention that it had a right to the
contract as a result of being the low bidder in the original bidding
procedure. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v.
Whether an
administrative agency decision was lawful and whether it was final are separate
questions; a decision may be substantively illegal and yet be the real and
settled position of the agency. A.S.C.A.
§ 4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum Products,
Inc., v.
Administrative
agency decision is final, for the limited purpose of giving rise to a
justiciable controversy, even if there were procedural defects in the process
by which it was made, provided that it is meant to reflect the settled position
of the agency and leaves the parties genuinely adverse. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v.
Decision by
board of directors of administrative agency to reject bidder's claim of
entitlement to fuel supply contract was final and gave rise to a justiciable
controversy, notwithstanding the absence of a quorum at the board meeting,
where (1) agency's chief executive officer implemented the decision by
canceling the original award and issuing an invitation for new bids, and (2) in
subsequent litigation, agency did not assert its continuing discretion to
review the decision but instead sought a judicial order that the new bidding
process go forward. A.S.C.A. §
4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum Products,
Inc., v.
Where a statute or rule of common requires an administrative claim to be presented and prohibits suit until the claim has been rejected or a period for official action has expired, the cause of action does not accrue and the limitation period does not begin to run until the claim is rejected or the stated period expires. Mataipule v. Tifaimoana Partnership, Ltd. (Mem), 14 A.S.R.2d 100.
Filing of the
administrative claim required as a prerequisite to suit under the Government
Tort Liability Act may toll the Act's statute of limitations. Mataipule v. Tifaimoana Partnership, Ltd.
(Mem), 14 A.S.R.2d 100.
Cause of action
accrues under the Government Tort Liability Act when the administrative
remedies under the Act are exhausted, because plaintiff cannot seek judicial
relief until then. Mataipule v. Tifaimoana Partnerships, Ltd., 16 A.S.R.2d 48.
An
administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit against ASG
under the Government Tort Liability Act.
A.S.C.A. §§ 43.1201 et seq. Rakhshan
v.
Although a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not absolutely preclude
judicial action, such action is permissible only in exceptional circumstances,
including the exception for violations of statutory or constitutional
rights. Sala v.
To file suit
regarding disciplinary matters, a public employee need not await a final agency
decision only if a preliminary agency decision clearly and unambiguously violates
a statutory or constitutional right of the employee or if the prescribed
administrative process is clearly inadequate to prevent irreparable
injury. Sala v.
The requirement of filing an administrative claim before filing suit under the Government Tort Liability Act is jurisdictional. A.S.C.A. § 43.1205. Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 22 A.S.R.2d 23.
Although based
on the Federal Tort Liability Act, the territorial Government Tort Liability
Act does not contain the former’s exception for third-party complaints from the
requirement that an administrative-claim is a prerequisite to filing suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2675; A.S.C.A. § 43.1205. Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 22
A.S.R.2d 23.
Though modeled on the Federal Tort Claims Act, as amended in 1966, the territorial Government Tort Liability Act does not contain the F.T.C.A.'s exception from the administrative-claim prerequisite for a cause of action asserted by third-party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); A.S.C.A. § 43.1205(a). Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 22 A.S.R.2d 88.
Being an
extraordinary remedy, a preliminary injunction is granted only when clearly
warranted and may be denied when administrative remedies have not been
exhausted. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040. Le Vaomatua v.
Although the Attorney General's decision on an administrative claim is final and conclusively binding on all ASG officers, except when procured by fraud, his action cannot result in a waiver or estoppel preventing ASG from raising a jurisdictional issue at any stage of future litigation. A.S.C.A. § 43.1206. Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 23 A.S.R.2d 55.
The sum-certain
requirement for administrative claims filed against ASG is both statutorily and
administratively an integral part of the jurisdictional administrative-claim
process. A.S.C.A. § 43.1203(c); A.S.A.C.
§ 43.0103(a).
Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 23 A.S.R.2d 55.
When the issue
of the alienation of a parcel of communal land was improperly referred to the
Secretary of Samoan Affairs instead of being the subject of a Land Commission
hearing, the action was dismissed as being prematurely before the court. Tuioti v. Fonoti, 24 A.S.R.2d 100.
A.S.A.C. § 26.0320(h) requires that
"[w]ithin 10 days after receipt of the decision the applicant or any other
interested party may file a written motion for reconsideration." McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
When a statute prescribes administrative remedies, which must be exhausted before judicial review is allowed, these procedures are jurisdictional. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
Judicial review is available to a "person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within an agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case." McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
Whether compelled by statute or
exercised as a matter of judicial discretion, the "long settled rule of
judicial administration [is] that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy had
been exhausted. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
When a statute prescribes
administrative remedies, which must be exhausted before judicial review is
allowed, these procedures are jurisdictional.
McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
The Zoning Board, and not this court,
has the jurisdiction to decide the issues, at the administrative level, where
court has already determined that it lacked jurisdiction to decide these issues
based on party's failure to exhaust administrative remedy. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
Filing a
complaint before administrative remedies have been exhausted fails to invoke
the court's jurisdiction, but such a filing is sufficient to toll the statute,
on the theory that filing an administrative claim constituted the beginning of
an action. Randall v.
Courts will not grant declaratory judgments until administrative remedies have been exhausted unless such administrative remedies are inadequate. Moetoto v. Tauileva, 28 A.S.R.2d 144.
It is appropriate
to stay proceedings pending completion of the dispute resolution process before
the Secretary of Samoan Affairs.
Meredith v. Koko, 28 A.S.R.2d
149.
Appeals of
Zoning Board decisions proceed in like manner to appeals under the
Administrative Procedures Act, in that the administrative record must be
submitted within 30 days and the court is confined to that record, though it
may receive evidence to supplement the record.
Appeals to the High Court from
the Zoning Board "may be taken in like manner to appeals under the
Administrative Procedure Act. McGuire v.
Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
Within 30 days from the service of the
petition for appellate review, an agency is to send the court the record of the
proceedings in the matter under review.
A.S.C.A. § 4.1042; A.C.R. 17(a).
McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
Appellate review is confined to the record. On a party's request, "the court shall receive briefs and hear oral argument"; and the court has the discretion to receive evidence to supplement the record. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
When reviewing a decision of an
administrative agency, the High Court may not consider evidence absent in the
administrative record unless the evidence (a) is necessary and (b) supplements
or explains the evidence contained in the administrative record. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). Taufete'e v.
Territorial
workmen's compensation statute, under which reviewing court could set aside
decision of workmen's compensation commission only if it was "not in
accordance with the law," precluded court from reversing a finding of fact
by the commission for which there was substantial evidence in the record of the
commission's proceeding. A.S.C.A. §
32.0652. Continental Insurance Co. v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 105. 5
Court reviewing findings of fact by workmen's compensation would not reverse a finding unless a reasonable person could not have concluded as the commission did from the evidence in the record. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 105.
Workmen's compensation commission decision should be overturned on appeal only if it is not in accordance with the law. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Star-Kist Samoa, Inc., v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 149.
Workmen's compensation commission decision should be upheld by reviewing court if supported by substantial evidence, whether or not the court would have reached the same conclusion from the evidence as the commission did. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Star-Kist Samoa, Inc., v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 149.
Court will not disturb workmen's compensation commission decision if record contains evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that the injury and death were work-related and it does not appear that the commission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded substantial evidence to the contrary. A.S.C.A. §§ 32.0642, 32.0652. Star-Kist Samoa, Inc., v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 149.
Court should grant an interlocutory stay of an administrative board decision only if there is a substantial likelihood that the petitioner will prevail on the merits and the petitioner will be greatly or irreparably injured if the stay is not granted. Leti v. Immigration Board, 8 A.S.R.2d 107.
Decision of workmen's compensation commission may be set aside only if the decision was not made in accordance with law. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.
Finding by workmen's compensation commission that there was an "injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment" must be supported by substantial evidence. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.
Trial court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard where it upheld a workmen's compensation commission decision "as long as reasonable people could differ on the facts presented to the Commission." Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.
Substantial evidence test in judicial review of administrative decision is limited to whether a reasoning mind could reasonably have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached, and reviewing court may neither find its own facts nor substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.
Appellant's claim that the trial court failed to apply certain evidentiary presumptions was without merit, as in administrative proceedings the agency rather than the court is to weigh the evidence and find facts; evidentiary presumptions used to facilitate fact-finding should be applied at the agency level and not at the level of judicial review. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.
Finding of fact based on no evidence is an error of law and thus a workmen's compensation commission award which is not supported by any evidence will be reversed, but where the commission has statutory power to find the facts its findings must be affirmed even if the reviewing court believes the evidence points the other way. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.
Workmen's compensation commission order should be set aside only if it was based on "whimsy evidence"; order should be affirmed if reasonable people might differ as to the weight of the evidence. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.
Administrative body's failure to act may be addressed through extraordinary writ proceedings. T.C.R.C.P. Rule 88. Siofele v. Hall, 12 A.S.R.2d 9.
The Workmen's Compensation Commission's findings of fact and inferences derived therefrom are to be upheld by the High Court if supported by "substantial evidence," using a reasonableness standard. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 15 A.S.R.2d 130.
That the evidence might also have supported a different conclusion is insufficient to warrant reversal of the Workmen's Compensation Commission's conclusions. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 15 A.S.R.2d 130.
An interlocutory
appeal of an agency action or ruling is available only if review of the final
agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(c). Sala v.
A court gives
considerable deference to administrative decisions involving an agency's
construction of its governing statute and regulations, unless the court deems
the interpretation to be inconsistent with a statutory mandate or to frustrate
legislative policy. National Pacific
Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of the
If a Workmen's
Compensation Commission's statutory interpretation is permissible under the
statutes and regulations, the court should defer to the Commission's decision;
but if that construction is inconsistent with a statutory mandate, frustrates
legislative policy, or renders the statutes ineffective, the court must set
aside the decision. A.S.C.A. §
32.0652(a). National Pacific Insurance
Co. v. Commissioner of the
Being an
extraordinary remedy, a preliminary injunction is granted only when clearly
warranted and may be denied when administrative remedies have not been
exhausted. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040. Le Vaomatua v.
If made upon unlawful procedure, a decision
of the Immigration Board may be reversed, modified, or remanded for further
proceedings by the Appellate Division of the High Court. A.S.C.A. § 41.0212(3). Farapo v.
The fact that
this court has held, on one occasion, that substantial compliance with
statutory requirements was sufficient, should not yield an expectation that
public officials will ordinarily receive judicial recognition of their faulty
acts. Tuitasi v. Lauofo, 25 A.S.R.2d 57.
Appellate review is confined to the record. On a party's request, "the court shall receive briefs and hear oral argument"; and the court has the discretion to receive evidence to supplement the record. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
The court is not to reweigh the
evidence on factual questions and is to give "appropriate weight to the
agency's experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge." A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(b). McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.
When reviewing a
decision of an administrative agency, the High Court may not consider evidence
absent in the administrative record unless the evidence (a) is necessary and
(b) supplements or explains the evidence contained in the administrative
record. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). Taufete'e v.
Post hoc
rationalizations for an agency decision, which are absent from the
administrative record, are not admissible upon judicial review of the
decision. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). Taufete'e v.
Where evidence
consists of affidavits from individuals who were neither employees of the
administrative decisionmaking body nor involved in the administrative
proceedings, and the affidavits do not purport to clarify or explain evidence
from the existing record, the evidence is not supplemental to the
administrative record and is not admissible upon judicial review of the
decision. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). Taufete'e v.
Courts will not grant declaratory judgments until administrative remedies have been exhausted unless such administrative remedies are inadequate. Moetoto v. Tauileva, 28 A.S.R.2d 144.
A.S.C.A. § 4.1040 provides for appellate review of a final administrative decision in a "contested case." In such cases, the Appellate Division may reverse or modify an agency decision if it is contrary to law or based on factual findings which are "clearly erroneous," or if it is otherwise arbitrary, capricious or abusive of discretion. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043-44. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.
Certain administrative functions, such as the determination of whether an alien should be deported according to existing immigration and probably the determination of whether an alienation of land is improvident within the meaning of A.S.C.A. § 37.0203(c), are beyond the reach of any judicial review because they are committed to agency discretion by law. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.
An administrative decision does not concern a contested case under A.S.C.A § 4.1040 when a party was not represented at Land Commission hearings and could not contest the lease. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.
Appellate courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider issues that were not presented to the administrative agency. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.
There is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review
of agency action, which can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence
that the Fono intended to cut off review above the agency level. The court is not convinced that the Fono
intended the Territorial Correctional Facility to conduct prison affairs beyond
the purview of the High Court. A.S.G. v. Ki, 31 A.S.R.2d 118.
Court would not exercise its power to render a declaratory judgment where the only relief it could grant would require the court to assume a supervisory role over administrative processes. Election Office v. Tuika, 9 A.S.R.2d 1.
Chief election officer did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying petitioner's eligibility for election where, although petitioner supplied all the information requested on candidacy forms, he refused reasonable requests by the chief election officer for further information relevant to his eligibility. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.
Court could
grant review by mandamus of chief election officer's determination that
petitioner was ineligible to run for elective office, where statutory scheme
was silent as to appeals procedure and circumstances appeared to render any
alternative review procedures inadequate.
T.C.R.C.P. Rules 87, 88. Siofele
v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.
Court would not compel chief election officer to find the petitioner a bona fide resident where petitioner was not on the current voter registration lists, was not present in the territory during the period at issue, refused to supply additional information requested by the chief election officer, and was identified as a registered voter in another jurisdiction during the period at issue. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.
An agency's head may only reassign an employee involuntarily with the concurrence of the Director of Human Resources and with a finding that the reassignment be in the best interests of the government; failure to follow the regulatory standard is arbitrary and an error of law. A.S.C.A. § 4.1044(6); A.S.A.C. § 4.0804(b). Leiato v. Personnel Advisory Board, 21 A.S.R.2d 25.
The Workmen's Compensation
Commission's decision that the hospital's off-island medical-referral procedure
does not apply to those covered by the workmen's compensation statute is a
permissible interpretation of applicable statutes and regulations, so the court
will defer to that decision. A.S.C.A. § 11.0312. National Pacific Insurance Co. v.
Commissioner of the
A preliminary injunction is unwarranted when
an environmental organization fails to plead specific harm to itself or its
members and when it did not seek a stop order from the territorial Development
Planning Office. A.S.C.A. §§ 4.1040,
24.0505(c). Le Vaomatua v.