ADMIRALTY
§ 1 Jurisdiction and Procedure
§ 2 In Personam and In Rem Actions
§ 3 Preferred Ship Mortgages & Maritime Liens
§ 5 Maritime Torts
§ 1 Jurisdiction and Procedure
SEE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1(6) – ADMIRALTY
Congress can vest admiralty jurisdiction in courts created by territorial legislature. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.
Adoption of Federal Admiralty Rules which allow in rem jurisdiction does not extend jurisdiction of High Court absent legislative of constitutional grant of such jurisdiction. 11 A.S.C. § 801. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.
Unless conferred by Constitution of American Samoa, admiralty jurisdiction in rem must be conferred on Trial Division by territorial legislature. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa, art. II, § 1; 5 A.S.C. §§ 1, 402, 801, 803; 11 A.S.C. § 2001. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.
High Court could have in rem admiralty jurisdiction, if Fono, subject to veto by Secretary of Interior, as sub-sub-sub delegatee of Congressional power, chose to enact statutory authorization therefor. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.
Statute authorizing High Court to issue all writs not inconsistent with law does not extend its jurisdiction to in rem admiralty proceedings. 5 A.S.C. § 403. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.
High Court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over admiralty cases pursuant to legislative grant, and may, if due process allows, attach or execute upon vessel, as in any other case. 5 A.S.C. § 3; 11 A.S.C. §§ 6201–6220. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.
High Court of
The High Court of American Samoa has in rem admiralty jurisdiction. A.S.C.A. § 3.0208(a)(3). Rainwater v. The Sea Encounter, 3 A.S.R.2d 87.
The High Court of American Samoa is not a court "of the states" within the meaning of the federal statute denying admiralty jurisdiction to state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Rainwater v. The Sea Encounter, 3 A.S.R.2d 87.
High Court, neither an article
III district court nor a non-article III district court empowered under the
"territorial exception," has no jurisdiction to foreclose mortgage
under federal ship mortgage act, enforcement of which is permissible only by
"district courts of the
Local statute granting admiralty
jurisdiction to High Court allows Court to apply substantive principles of the
maritime common law, even though Congress has never directly and specifically
conferred admiralty jurisdiction upon High Court. A.S.C.A. §
3.0208(a)(3). Gray,
While High Court has no
jurisdiction to foreclose mortgage under federal ship mortgage act, it had
subject matter jurisdiction over mortgaged vessel situated in the territory and
could determine validity of purported mortgage, and therefore properly placed
the vessel in custodia legis upon default by mortgagor, thereby
nullifying subsequent attempt by mortgagor to create second preferred ship
mortgage. Gray,
Admiralty jurisdiction only exists over torts occurring in navigable waters and having a sufficient "martime flavor," which is determined by reference to the parties, the sorts of vessels or other objects involved, the nature and cause of the injury, and the implications for traditional concepts of admiralty law. United Airlines Employee Credit Union v. M/V Sans End, 15 A.S.R.2d 95.
The High Court of American Samoa
has no authority, statutory or otherwise, to order a stay of admiralty
proceedings in a federal district court. Fa'atasiga v. M/V Ocean
The High Court's general
admiralty jurisdiction includes limiting a shipowner's liability to the value of
the ship, although lacking the statutory power of federal district courts to
enforce this principle by injunction, pending the outcome of the limitation
proceeding. Fa'atasiga v. M/V Ocean
The High Court refused to approve
parties' stipulation to lift a stay of an action in federal district court when
no such stay was issued because of the lack of statutory authority to do
so. Fa'atasiga v. M/V Ocean
The High Court cannot enjoin proceedings in other jurisdictions in a limitation-of-liability proceeding, because the federal statute restricts jurisdiction to federal district courts and because neither the territorial legislature nor the court's rules can extend the court's jurisdiction to encompass proceedings in other jurisdictions. 46 U.S.C. §§ 145, 181 et seq.; T.C.R.C.P. Rule F(1). In re Complaint of Voyager, Inc., 23 A.S.R.2d 47.
The widely accepted rule of
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which states that an action for recovery
under a theory of strict products liability may be entertained by a court
sitting in admiralty, is now accepted in American Samoa. Interocean
Ships, Inc. v.
Under the dead-ship doctrine, a vessel which has been permanently removed from navigation (and so is a "dead" ship) does not attract liens of a maritime nature, and any watercrafts deemed to be “dead” are outside a court's admiralty jurisdiction. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc. v. M/V Kwang Myong #71, 24 A.S.R.2d 152.
No maritime lien need be present for admiralty jurisdiction to attach in an action for partition, to try title, for possession of cargo, or by part owners attempting to secure the return of their vessel. T.C.R.C.P. Supp. Rule D. Mobile Marine Limited v. Ninna Marianne, 27 A.S.R.2d 143.
The tort of conversion is a long-standing basis for admiralty jurisdiction. Mobile Marine Limited v. Ninna Marianne, 27 A.S.R.2d 143.
In addition to the power to exercise jurisdiction
over the general maritime claims of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure,
the High Court of American Samoa can exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s
Jones Act claim.
§ 2 In Personam and In Rem Actions
SEE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1 – JURISDICTION
While in rem and in personam claims may be joined, res judicata applies from an in personam action against a shipowner to an in rem action against his ship (and vice versa); thus, one may not sue twice on the legal fiction that a ship and her owner are two different parties. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc. v. M/V Kwang Myong #71, 23 A.S.R.2d 156.
A Jones
Act claim cannot be maintained in rem.
Attorney's fees, in certain limited circumstances, may be awarded as an item of damages in an in rem action, but they are not properly included as custodia legis expenses. Sembawang Maritime Ltd. v. F/V Don Juan, 31 A.S.R.2d 193.
§ 3 Preferred Ship Mortgages & Maritime Liens
SEE SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 11 – MORTGAGES
Unification of common law and admiralty procedure was a factor court should consider in determining whether to apply prior rule that maritime liens could only be foreclosed in admiralty and ship mortgages could only be foreclosed in courts of common law or equity. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.
Although Ship Mortgage Act was inapplicable in High Court of American Samoa, its provisions could be applied by analogy by court in applying general law of admiralty. 46 U.S.C. §§ 911 et seq. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.
Under the general law of
admiralty applicable in
To allow lienholder to obtain higher priority by foreclosing in jurisdiction that does not have a federal district court, where Congress apparently intended to create uniform set of priorities and parties contracted accordingly, would give rise to unjust enrichment. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.
One who furnishes goods or
services to a vessel in custodia legis does not acquire a maritime lien
against the vessel for the value of such goods or services. Gray,
Rule precluding creation of a
maritime lien against a vessel in custodia legis does not apply to a
vessel purportedly in judicial custody but neither actually nor constructively
taken into marshal's possession. Gray,
Courts sitting in admiralty must
show special care for rights of seamen. Gray,
Judicial seizure of a vessel
legally terminates voyage and discharges crew, thus precluding lien for wages
for services rendered after seizure. Gray,
Where vessel undertook a single
fishing voyage after seizure and under limited conditions approved by the
court, and where vessel was already under arrest when crew was hired, vessel
remained in custodia legis during voyage and crew members had no
maritime lien for wages earned during the voyage. Gray,
Although no lien can attach to a
vessel already in judicial custody, costs of services or property furnished by
court authority to preserve and maintain the vessel for the common benefit of
interested parties are "expenses of justice," payable before all
preexisting liens. Gray,
Rule that liens do not accrue on
behalf of those supplying goods and services to vessel in custodia legis
may not apply to a vessel allowed to ply the harbors in furtherance of its
trade without restriction. S.W.
Stipulated receivership order
stating that vessel should be "deemed" in custodia legis, but purporting
not to create any ranking or priority of liens other than that which would
otherwise exist, would arguably preserve the rights of those who, in the
absence of the order, would have obtained liens on the vessel during period of
receivership. S.W.
It is not clear that court has
the power to alter the rank or priority of liens by approving an ex parte
stipulation to which the lienholders were not parties. S.W.
When a vessel is actually or
constructively in the possession of the Court, liens do not ordinarily accrue
in favor of crewmen or other suppliers of goods and services to the
vessel. S.W.
For the purpose of foreclosing a ship's preferred mortgage lien, the High Court is considered a "district court" and thus has jurisdiction to enforce such a lien. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301(2)(E), 31325-26. United Airlines Employee Credit Union v. M/V Sans End, 15 A.S.R.2d 95.
Upon judicial sale in a civil action in rem brought to enforce a preferred mortgage lien, the preferred mortgage lien has priority over all claims against the proceeds, except for (1) expenses and fees allowed by the court, (2) costs imposed by the court, and (3) preferred maritime liens, which include those for damages arising out of maritime tort. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31325, 31301(5)(B). United Airlines Employee Credit Union v. M/V Sans End, 15 A.S.R.2d 95.
Claims for costs incurred in securing vessel while it was in custodia legis prior to judicial sale are recoverable from the proceeds of the sale and have priority over the claims of the litigants. 46 U.S.C. § 31326. United Airlines Employee Credit Union v. M/V Sans End, 15 A.S.R.2d 95.
Wharfage charges can give rise to a maritime lien, though a lien does not arise against a vessel "withdrawn from navigation," which includes an abandoned vessel. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc. v. M/V Kwang Myong #71, 23 A.S.R.2d 156.
Appropriate reasons to arrest a vessel include guaranteeing safe return of the vessel to the chosen forum and preventing defendants from retaining the proceeds earned by the sale of the cargo. T.C.R.C.P. Supp. Rule D. Mobile Marine Ltd. v. Ninna Marianne, 28 A.S.R.2d 1.
Security for a vessel may be effectuated by a bond provided by the party designated to possess the vessel after its release, to be held by the court. T.C.R.C.P. Supp. Rule E(5)(a). Mobile Marine Ltd. v. Ninna Marianne, 28 A.S.R.2d 1.
A maritime bond cannot exceed the total value of the vessel. T.C.R.C.P. Supp. Rule E(5)(a). Mobile Marine Ltd. v. Ninna Marianne, 28 A.S.R.2d 88.
When a vessel is seized and sold, the costs of holding the vessel in custodia legis are generally given priority over other claims. Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.
Claims incurred while the vessel is in custodia legis must be proven and supported just as any other claim. Not only must the claims be equitable and reasonable, they must inure to the benefit of all claimants. Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.
The forfeiture provision of A.S.C.A. § 28.1510 creates a defense for debtors in civil court, not third parties not in privity with the creditor. Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.
A person furnishing goods or services to a vessel after its arrest (in custodia legis) does not acquire a maritime lien against the vessel for the value of those goods or services. Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.
Administrative expenses are recoverable when the expenditures inure to the benefit of all claimants, where they contribute to or create an available fund. Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.
Claims for costs incurred in securing a vessel while it is in custodia legis prior to judicial sale are recoverable from the proceeds of the sale and have priority over the litigants' claims. The principal qualification is that the services or goods for which payment or reimbursement is sought must be necessary for the care and preservation of the vessel and be for the common benefit of all parties who have a claim to the vessel. Sembawang Maritime Ltd. v. F/V Don Juan, 31 A.S.R.2d 193.
§ 4 Maritime Contracts
SEE CONTRACTS
No writing is necessary to establish valid contract for lease of vessel. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.
Lessors recognize lease as valid by delivering ship to possession of lessees. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.
Lessees recognize lease as valid by accepting possession, and such delivery waives alleged condition precedent to execution of lease. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.
Agreement by lessee to indemnify owner of ship for loss of ship in consideration of owner’s withdrawing petition for injunction was supplementary agreement to original lease and not new lease. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.
Change in lease agreement which would require lessee to procure insurance for leased vessel is modification of original terms and, if without consideration, is invalid, and failure of lessee to procure insurance, even though marine insurance is available, is not breach of contract. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.
Repudiation of a contract must be unequivocal and absolute, and petition for injunction by lessor to prevent ship from going out to sea before insurance is procured is not such repudiation. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.
Lessor is under no obligation to accept surrender of lease from lessee, and where lessor refuses to take back leased ship, lessee is still obligated under lease. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.
Lessors suing for back rent are not entitled to recover for rent accruing after date petition was filed. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.
Finding of trial court that signature of one of owners of vessel on lease agreement was not necessary to valid lease was not in error. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Evidence supports conclusion that parties did not intend signature of one of owners to be condition precedent to execution of valid lease. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Change of possession of ship is equivalent of delivery, executing lease agreement. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Where lessor acquiesces in lessee’s possession of ship for period of months, he waives possible condition precedent in lease, which was not complied with. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Agreement by lessee to indemnify lessor for loss of ship in consideration for lessor’s withdrawal of repudiation does not constitute new lease since it does not contain all terms necessary to lease but is supplementary agreement. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Modification of lease to
strike condition that insurance should be acquired for vessel by lessees only
if available in
Where lessor brings an injunction suit to regain possession of ship, and then withdraws suit in consideration for lessee’s promise of indemnification if ship should be lost, this is not repudiation of lease agreement where lessee does not treat it as such and continues to possess ship. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Attempted surrender of lease does not release lessee from obligations unless it is accepted by the lessor. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Circumstantial evidence concerning failure of lessee’s business may be weighed by court in considering validity of attempted surrender lease. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Law providing that lease of land in writing constitutes tenancy at will is not applicable to ships nor interest therein. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Outfitting of vessel for
profit-making voyage that was undertaken after seizure of vessel and that would
not recognizably enhance its value was not "expense of justice," and
crewmembers had no prior claim for wages earned during voyage. Gray,
The terms of a seaman's contract were adjudicated as being those contained in his payroll form when the contract reflected the parties' negotiations by telephone and when the claimed parol variation would be essentially gratuitous on the captain's part. Zuguin v. M/V Captain M.J. Souza, 23 A.S.R.2d 7.
When a seaman had worked to prepare a vessel for an upcoming voyage before leaving the vessel, he was entitled to compensation on a quantum meruit basis. Zuguin v. M/V Captain M.J. Souza, 23 A.S.R.2d 7.
§ 5 Maritime Torts
SEE TORTS
A structure may be a vessel or other appropriate maritime object for the purpose of some admiralty rules but not for others. In re M/V Tradition, 6 A.S.R.2d 99.
The "flotilla rule" governing limitation of liability for accidents involving more than a single vessel states that in "pure tort" cases, in which the parties have no legal relationship to one another, the owner's liability cannot exceed the value of the "offending vessel," while in "consensual" cases, in which the injured party has a contractual relationship to the vessel owner, liability is limited to all commonly owned vessels engaged in the single contractual enterprise. In re M/V Tradition, 6 A.S.R.2d 99.
The "consensual" rule of limitation of maritime liability applies where the injured party is an employee of the vessel owner. In re M/V Tradition, 6 A.S.R.2d 99.
A skiff aboard a fishing boat is not itself a "vessel" for limitation of liability purposes, and an owner seeking to limit his liability for injuries occurring on a skiff lashed to its mother ship would have to tender the aggregate value of both the ship and the skiff. In re M/V Tradition, 6 A.S.R.2d 99.
Having been made applicable by
statute to actions for personal injury or property damage and so being
compatible with the legislature's will, comparative negligence is properly
incorporated into admiralty. Interocean Ships, Inc. v.
Rejecting "expert
user," assumption of risk, and contributory negligence defenses as barring
recovery,
In determining proximate cause
for tort cases in admiralty,
Under the collateral source rule, which applies to torts in admiralty and virtually all other tort cases, an injured party's compensation from a source independent of the tortfeasor is not deducted from damages otherwise collectable from the tortfeasor. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoan Gases, 24 A.S.R.2d 108.
In admiralty, the defendant has the burden of proving the degree of fault of settling third-parties not present before the court; once the exact percentages of fault are established, liability and assessed damages are calculated on a pro rata basis. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoan Gases, 24 A.S.R.2d 108.
The equitable alter ego doctrine is applicable in admiralty but will only disregard a corporate entity upon a proper factual showing. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoan Gases, 24 A.S.R.2d 145.
In the absence of any even
minimally probative evidence tending to show that a defendant bore some
quantifiable measure of responsibility, the court will decline to arbitrarily
guess what that percentage may be. Interocean Ships v.
In admiralty it is well
settled that fishing vessel owners and commercial fishermen may recover for
lost fishing profits under the general maritime law of negligence.
Interocean Ships v.
The duty of the shipowner to provide for the ill or injured seaman can be traced as far back as the Sea Codes of the Middle Ages. This right, to recover maintenance and cure without regard to fault, is among the most pervasive incidents of the responsibility anciently imposed upon a shipowner. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.
A shipowner has a right of indemnity against a third party tortfeasor for maintenance and cure paid to an injured seaman to the extent occasioned by the third party tortfeasor's fault. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.
Admiralty law recognizes that even where a party to a lawsuit settles, it may still bring an indemnity action against a joint tort feasor. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.
Even when defendant rejects plaintiff's tender of defense of the personal injury and wrongful death claims, the failure to tender, alone, would not preclude an indemnity claim by plaintiff, if that claim still presented a valid theory of relief. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.
The fact the crew themselves contributed to the injury does not preclude an indemnity claim, if they were liable as well. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.
The general rule is against recovery of attorney's fees as such, by a party which incurs them in enforcing a claim against another. It is equally well settled, however, that the reasonable expenses incurred by an indemnitee in defending a claim against him may be recovered of his indemnitor--and that these expenses include attorney's fees. This exception applies equally to courts sitting in admiralty. However, the prevailing party in an admiralty case is generally not entitled to an award of attorney's fees, absent statutory authorization. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.
In cases where contribution has been allowed for damages, both in admiralty and non-admiralty, courts have generally denied a right to contribution for attorney's fees and expenses incurred in defense of the action brought by the injured party. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.
The general rule is to award prejudgment interest, although this award always lies soundly within the court's discretion. However, it is also true that when certain "peculiar" circumstances exist, the discretion to deny prejudgment interest is sustained. These peculiar circumstances have fallen into three categories: (1) "plaintiff's delay in bringing suit," (2) "the existence of a genuine dispute regarding ultimate liability or the complexity of the factual and legal issues to be resolved," and (3) "judgment in an amount substantially less than that claimed. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.
The court has wide discretion in allowance of various cost awards in admiralty. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoa Gases, 27 A.S.R.2d 5.
Under general maritime law, an owner or operator of a vessel has an absolute duty to ensure that the vessel is seaworthy. This is a no-fault duty, and no showing of negligence or knowledge is required. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
A seaworthy vessel is one that is reasonably fit and suitable for its intended use. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
To prevail on a claim for unseaworthiness, a plaintiff must show both unseaworthiness and proximate causation. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
The condition of seaworthiness is a relative one. A ship can be unseaworthy as to only one seaman. A condition of unseaworthiness can arise once the ship has set out to sea or from a transitory condition. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
The factfinder determines the question of seaworthiness. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
Where a plaintiff pleads both Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness, a showing of negligence also establishes unseaworthiness. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
To prove that an injury was proximately caused by the unseaworthy condition, the unseaworthy condition must have played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury, and the injury must be either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthy condition. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
There are two elements which a plaintiff must prove in a Jones Act negligence claim: (1) that there was a negligent act by the defendant, and (2) that there is a but-for causal connection between the act and the injury. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
The Jones Act is to be liberally construed in favor of plaintiffs. The "slight negligence" necessary to support an action under FELA or the Jones Act is defined as a failure to exercise great care, and that burden of proof is much less than the burden required to sustain recovery in ordinary negligence actions. Evidence of even slight negligence is sufficient to find liability under the Jones Act. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
The plaintiff’s burden to prove the but-for causation element of a Jones Act negligence claim is minimal. If the employer's negligent act or omission played any part, however slight, in bringing about the injury, the employer is liable. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
A plaintiff, injured from disentangling a net from a vessel’s propeller, establishes but-for causation, in that but-for the negligent entanglement of the net in the vessel's propeller, and the plaintiff’s cutting of the net away, the plaintiff would not have received his injuries. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
The assumption of risk defense is not a defense to either an unseaworthiness claim or a Jones Act claim. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
The doctrine that a defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him applies to Jones Act claims. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
Lost future wages, also called impaired earning capacity, are determined by considering what the plaintiff's income would probably have been, how long it would have lasted, and all the contingencies to which it was liable. To ascertain the amount of lost future wages to be awarded, the court must take four steps: (1) determine whether the worker’s earning capacity has been diminished; (2) determine the duration of the loss; (3) determine the value of the worker’s loss over this period; and (4) consider reducing the award to present value. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
A defendant has the burden of production and proof on the issue of reducing a plaintiff’s award for lost future wages, or impaired earning. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
Pre-judgment interest is not allowed on either Jones Act or unseaworthiness claims. However, post-judgment interest under the Jones Act is allowed from the date of a court's final decree. Interest may also be awarded in general maritime cases at the court's discretion. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
Under general maritime law, a shipowner has an obligation to care for a seaman injured during the course of maritime employment. The obligation includes payment for any injury or illness, which manifests itself during employment, regardless of the source of the injury or whether it preexisted the journey. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
To be eligible to claim maintenance and cure against a shipowner, a seaman must be "in the service of his ship" at the time of the injury. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
Under maintenance and cure a seaman is entitled to receive food and lodging of a kind and quality received aboard ship, as well as necessary medical services to the point of maximum cure. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
The point of maximum cure is reached on the date that a seaman's physician determines that further treatment is unlikely to result in the betterment of the seaman's condition. This can include a determination that the incapacity is permanent. Doubts are to be resolved in the seaman's favor. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
The court has discretion whether to award interest on unpaid maintenance and cure. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
In a normal case of unpaid maintenance and cure, pre-judgment interest is payable from the date the payment was initially due the plaintiff. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
Attorney's fees are allowed for a bad-faith refusal to pay maintenance and cure. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
A claim of unseaworthiness lies against a vessel's owner. A Jones Act negligence claim, on the other hand, lies against a seaman's employer. A seaman’s employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of the vessel's captain and any other employee. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
A Jones Act claim cannot be maintained in rem. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
Pre-judgment interest is not allowed on either Jones Act or unseaworthiness claims. However, post-judgment interest under the Jones Act is allowed from the date of a court's final decree. Interest may also be awarded in general maritime cases at the court's discretion. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.
When a moving vessel strikes an anchored vessel, a presumption of negligence on the part of the moving vessel arises. This presumption is even stronger where the moving vessel lurches onto the shore and strikes a dry-docked vessel. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.
Persons engaged in the business of navigation are bound to see that the vessel is seaworthy, well manned, and equipped for the business in which it is engaged, and whenever a collision ensues from the defective condition or unfitness of the colliding vessel for the voyage, the vessel and the owner are liable. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.
Where a company is aware that fraying is going to occur in a vessel’s throttle cables, resulting in navigational difficulties and possible collisions, the failure to take steps to prevent such an occurrence may be grossly negligent, reckless or willful. However, in order to so find, the court requires evidence of the standard of care in the industry, the number of accidents that occur in the same type of situation, the cost of replacement of faulty parts, etc. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.
Damages in vessel collision cases are estimated in the same manner as in other suits of like nature for injuries to personal property. The award should include all losses proximately resulting from the collision, the general rule being that the owner of the vessel is to be placed in the same position he would have occupied had the disaster not occurred. Although the injured party may be entitled to full indemnity, the respondents are not, as a rule, liable for such damages as might have been reasonably avoided by the exercise of ordinary skill and diligence, after the collision on the part of those in charge of the injured ship. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.
Where repairs are practicable, the measure of damages is the cost of restoring the injured vessel to the condition in which it was at the time of the collision. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.
The court is not required to assess damages with mathematical precision, though it must strive to be as accurate as possible. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.
The court must sometimes make damage determinations in areas that require more than layman’s skill. In doing so, the court may make judgments on the veracity of experts’ statements, such as whether the expert inflated figures. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.
The duty of care that employers owe to seamen under the Jones Act is identical to the duty of care that employers owe to employees under the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. Sections 51 et seq. The duty of care employers owe under the FELA is not merely a duty to exercise reasonable care, as in the typical negligence suit, but is rather a duty to exercise “great care”. Clifton v. Voyager, 31 A.S.R.2d 12.
Determinations of negligence in admiralty cases are findings of fact which will be given application unless clearly erroneous. In general, fact finding does not require mathematical certainty. Factfinders, whether jurors or judges are supposed to reach their conclusions on the basis of common sense, common understanding and fair beliefs, grounded on evidence consisting of direct statements by witnesses or proof of circumstances from which inferences can fairly be drawn. Clifton v. Voyager, 31 A.S.R.2d 12.
Since the question of but-for causation under the Jones
Act is a question of fact, a factfinder’s conclusions with respect to causation
must stand unless clearly erroneous.
In unseaworthiness cases, the plaintiff must not only
establish cause in fact, but also proximate cause, i.e., that the injury was
either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the
unseaworthiness. The question of proximate cause examines whether a cause is so
attenuated in time or space, or whether an act or actor has intervened in the
causal chain, so as to relieve the defendant of liability.
The foreseeability question restricts the imposition of
liability to cases in which the injuries to the plaintiff are the natural and
reasonably predictable consequences of a negligent action, or in the case of an
unseaworthiness claim, of a ship’s unseaworthiness. It is clearly
foreseeable that a crewmember must repair a vessel when it is damaged to the
point of being dead in the water. Volunteering to assist in such repairs
is a normal response to the stimulus of a dangerous
situation.