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AGENCY AND PRINCIPAL

 

§          1          Creation, Existence, and Termination of Agency

§          2          Authority of Agent

2(1)      General Provisions

2(2)      Express Authority

2(3)      Implied Authority

§          3          Rights, Duties, and Liabilities

3(1)      Between Principal and Agent

3(2)      Between Principal and Third Person

3(3)      Between Principal and Independent Contractor

3(4)      Between Agent and Third Person

 

 

§ 1       Creation, Existence, and Termination of Agency

 

Court will not presume that agency exists from mere fact that person apparently is acting for another.  Bank of American Samoa v. Brown, 2 A.S.R. 365.

 

Oral agreement by person who negotiated on behalf of purchaser that negotiator would guarantee payment from purchaser created an agency or surety relationship between purchaser and negotiator, and vendor could look to third party for payment.  Ryan, Inc., v. Vaka, 5 A.S.R.2d 31.

 

Agency relationship exists between owner of vehicle and one who drives the vehicle in furtherance of the owner's interest or enterprise.  Sataua v. Himphill, 5 A.S.R.2d 61.

 

Agency exists where a principal has the right to control the conduct of an agent, and the agent has power to affect the legal relations of the principal. On this basis, a seller named in an invoice is an agent for her or his principal.   Joseph D. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Comm. Credit Corp. of American Samoa, 29 A.S.R.2d 121.

 

Whether a master/servant relationship has been established depends on a number of factors, the most important of which is the master's right to control the physical conduct of the servant.  Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

 

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§ 2       Authority of Agent

 

§ 2(1)   —General Provisions

 

Agent may sign contract for principal whether or not principal is present, and alleged erroneous statement of trial court that principal was present was harmless error.  Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

 

Even under Statute of Frauds, one partner may obligate partnership by signing contract, acting as agent for other partners.  Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

 

Where bus driver's supervisor submitted affidavit that any use of bus other than transporting children to school was outside the scope of driver's employment, but there is evidence that passengers on school bus may have been government employees who had been working on the bus, whether driver was within scope of employment is a disputed material fact precluding summary judgment.  Utu v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 9 A.S.R.2d 88.

 

When an agent settles a claim on behalf of its principal, which settlement is dependent upon facts known to be doubtful, the settlement is not voidable when the doubtful facts turn out to be incorrect.   Kent Samoa Inc. v. Shimasaki, 29 A.S.R.2d 44.

 

Servants, in master/servant relationships, are also capable of appointing subservants, who act under the primary control of the servant but who create liabilities for both the servant and the master.  Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

 

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§ 2(2)   —Express Authority

 

RESERVED

 

§ 2(3)   —Implied Authority

 

Owner's consent to another person's use of a vehicle may be inferred from a past course of conduct or relationship between the parties.  Toleafoa v. Sioka, 5 A.S.R.2d 18.

 

When the driver of a vehicle is a member of the vehicle owner's family or household, it is more likely that the driver has the owner's implied consent to use the vehicle.  Toleafoa v. Sioka, 5 A.S.R.2d 18.

 

Principle that family relationship between driver and vehicle owner suggests owner's implied consent does not apply to Samoan extended communal family.  Toleafoa v. Sioka, 5 A.S.R.2d 18.

 

Implied permission to use a vehicle is inferred from past occasions of acquiescence or absence of objection in circumstances signifying consent on the part of the vehicle owner.  Tauiliili v. American Samoa Government, 13 A.S.R.2d 61.

 

Evidence was contrary to a showing of acquiescence and passive consent by government to personal use of its vehicle by its employee, where written statement of policies forbade any after-hours or weekend use without specific prior approval of manager; the Governor himself had sent out a memorandum with respect to such use; and the employee's manager had raised the Governor's concerns at staff meetings and circulated the Governor's memorandum to the staff.  Tauiliili v. American Samoa Government, 13 A.S.R.2d 61.

 

Inferential in nature, implied permission for a vehicle's use is usually shown by usage and practice of the parties over a sufficient period of time.  Leilua v. Ali'itaeao, 23 A.S.R.2d 97.

 

Although weaker evidence will support a finding of implied permission to use a vehicle if the drivers are blood relatives than if they were strangers or mere acquaintances, the mere existence of a close family relationship does not of itself establish permissive use.  Leilua v. Ali'itaeao, 23 A.S.R.2d 97.

 

An agent to whom the principal gives the appearance of authority may bind the principal regardless of whether actual authority exists.  Kent Samoa Inc. v. Shimasaki, 29 A.S.R.2d 44.

 

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§ 3       Rights, Duties, and Liabilities

 

§ 3(1)   —Between Principal and Agent

 

Agent of corporation, acting on behalf of corporation, is not personally liable for corporate debts.  Jt. Holdings & Tr. Ltd. v. P. J. Brennan, Inc., of Samoa, 4 A.S.R. 812.

 

In determining whether a business entity believes in good faith that its claim is just for the purpose of determining whether the claim can be consideration for a settlement, the entity is chargeable with the knowledge of its agents who participated in the transactions giving rise to the claim.  Development Bank v. Ilalio, 5 A.S.R.2d 110.

 

An agent is generally not a party to a contract made for a disclosed principal.  Ryan, Inc., v. Vaka, 5 A.S.R.2d 149.

 

An institutional party to litigation is chargeable with the knowledge, and responsible for the actions, of its agents who conduct the transactions that are the subject of the litigation.  Bank of Hawaii v. Congregational Christian Church, 9 A.S.R.2d 100.

 

Government employee who, in the early hours of the morning and while in an intoxicated condition, went to his place of work and picked up his employer's vehicle and then invited friends to go riding in the vehicle, was acting outside the scope of his employment; although he was to have used the vehicle later that day in his employment, his earlier personal use was unauthorized and contrary to written policies and directives governing private use of government vehicles, and he was clearly on a frolic of his own.  Tauiliili v. American Samoa Government, 13 A.S.R.2d 61.

 

Where employee's negligence was clearly related to her performance of her duties but was also clearly related to her agreement with the child's parents, who had reason to know her strengths and weaknesses and the dangers of their entrustment to her of their child's safety, the employer would be vicariously liable for the employee's negligent performance of her duties and the parents would be liable for such negligence as was attributable to the private agreement.  Saufo`i v. American Samoa Government, 14 A.S.R.2d 15.

 

Employer/bailee is also contractually liable for the negligence of his employees in executing the bailment, since he cannot receive money for performing a duty and at the same time escape liability for violating such duty by shifting the responsibility to an employee.  Garcia v. Galea`i, 15 A.S.R.2d 14.

 

A general agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal subjects his principal to liability for acts done on his account which usually accompany or are incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct if, although they are forbidden by the principal, the other party reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to do them and has no notice that he is not so authorized.  Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

 

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§ 3(2)   —Between Principal and Third Person

 

One who delegates his affairs to lawyers, accountants, and others, and who signs the documents his own agents have prepared for him, cannot escape liability to a third party by claiming that the documents are not binding on him because he did not read or understand them.  Ralston Purina Co. v. The Louise V, 3 A.S.R.2d 48.

 

Employer/bailee is also contractually liable for the negligence of his employees in executing the bailment, since he cannot receive money for performing a duty and at the same time escape liability for violating such duty by shifting the responsibility to an employee.  Garcia v. Galea`i, 15 A.S.R.2d 14.

 

Under doctrine of respondeat superior, a bailee employer is vicariously liable for loss or injury with respect to the bailed property which results from the negligence or wrongful acts or omissions of his employees in executing the bailment within the course and scope of their employment.  Garcia v. Galea`i, 15 A.S.R.2d 14.

 

When a servant steps outside of his employment to do some act for himself, not connected with the master's business, the master is not vicariously liable if those acts cause tortious harm.  Fa'aola v. Taumua, 27 A.S.R.2d 115.

 

A party who conducts a transaction with an agent is liable to a disclosed principal to the same extent as if the principal had conducted the transaction.  Joseph D. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Comm. Credit Corp. of American Samoa, 29 A.S.R.2d 121.

 

The relationship of master and servant is a species of agency in which the principal may be liable for the torts of the agent.  Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

 

Inherent in the power of agency, is the power of the agent to subject the principal to liability for unauthorized conduct.  Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

 

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§ 3(3)   —Between Principal and Independent Contractor

 

SEE EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3 – INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

 

A garageman who had possession of a vehicle in order to repair it and who was outside the direction or control of the owner was an "independent contractor" for whose negligence the owner could not be held liable under a theory of agency or master/servant liability.  Sataua v. Himphill, 5 A.S.R.2d 61.

 

The employer of an independent contractor is generally not liable for physical harm done by the contractor or the contractor's employees; however, an employer is liable when he knows or has reason to know that, in the ordinary course of doing the work in a usual or prescribed manner, the work is likely to result in trespass.  Letuli v. Le'i, 22 A.S.R.2d 77.

 

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§ 3(4)   —Between Agent and Third Person

 

When a seller conditions his agreement to sell goods on an agent's proffer of his own creditworthiness on behalf of that agent's principal, the agent becomes an accountable party to the sales contract.  Ryan, Inc., v. Vaka, 5 A.S.R.2d 149.

 

A known agent is not liable for the debts of its disclosed principal.  Korea Deep Sea Fisheries Assn. v. M/V Corona #1, 27 A.S.R.2d 53.

 

Under the partially disclosed principal theory of an agent's liability to a third party for actions the agent has taken on behalf of a principal, the third party must establish that the third party was aware of the agency, was without knowledge of the principal's identity, and had formed a valid contract with the agent.  Korea Deep Sea Fisheries v. M/V Corona, 27 A.S.R.2d 155.

 

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