§ 1 The Federal Government, Constitution, & Laws of American Samoa
§ 3 The Legislature
3(1) Power and Authority
3(2) Committees
3(3) Legislation
§ 4 The Executive
4(1) The Governor
4(2) Power and Authority
4(3) Agencies
§ 5 The Judiciary
5(1) Power and Authority
5(3) Disqualification – Recusal
5(4) Precedence and Stare Decisis
5(5) Supervision of Proceedings and Litigation
5(6) Supervision of Judgments and Settlements
5(7) Contempt
§ 6 Sovereign Rights
§ 7 Public Records
§
1 The
Federal Government, Constitution, & Laws of
SEE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3 – CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
SEE
SAMOAN CUSTOMS § - IMPACT ON AMERICAN
Portions of common law of
Government of
Statute adopts common law of
Federal constitution would not
prohibit American Samoan hiring preference, which is reasonably calculated to
alleviate the difficulties that attend a government composed largely of
officials with no knowledge of the local language and culture and who generally
remain in the territory only temporarily. Banks v.
In "unincorporated"
territories the federal constitution applies only insofar as its tenets restate
"those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights" that are
"the basis of all free government" or insofar as Congress expressly
extends a particular constitutional provision to the territory. Banks v.
Although the due process clause
of the federal constitution, which implicitly forbids racial discrimination by
the federal government, binds the territories in at least some of its
applications, it does not necessarily bind the territories in the same ways and
to the same extent as in the continental United States. U.S. Const. amdt.
14. Banks v.
Federal constitutional
requirement that "citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states" applies to
states and not to unincorporated and unorganized territories.
Federal civil rights laws do not
operate to extend into territories those applications of the federal
constitution that would not apply in the territories under the doctrine of the
Insular Cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Banks v.
Territories are not
"states" within meaning of fourteenth amendment, so Congress acted
under its constitutional power to regulate territories when it revised civil
rights statute to include territories.
Extension of remedial civil
rights statute to territories was premised initially on the concept,
unjustifiable as applied to modern
Applicability of remedial civil
rights statute to
Absent waiver of sovereign immunity
or consent to suit, action for damages under civil rights law may not be
maintained against any of the several states. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Ferstle v.
Right to effective assistance of
counsel applies in
In territories not intended for
incorporation into the
Extent to which the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies
in the
Under its "unorganized and
unincorporated" status,
Although not supreme, independent, or sovereign,
The usual reason given for
construing statutes of limitation for suits against the United States
Government as jurisdictional (i.e., not subject to waiver and/or tolling)--that
the limitations are deemed an integral part of the initial waiver of sovereign
immunity, which should not be extended by courts beyond the intent of
Congress--does not apply to ASG. Randall v.
When a conflict arises, Samoan
custom must give way to the laws of the
Territorial laws which are
inconsistent with applicable
The High Court may interpret
territorial statutes differently than federal courts' interpretations of
similar, but not identical, federal statutes, but this does not imply that
territorial law supersedes federal law. Alamoana Recipe Inc. v.
Federal laws need not be passed
by the
Under the Deeds of Cession
between the chiefs of Eastern Samoa and the
The High Court of American Samoa
is not a federal court.
Federal financial privacy laws
contained in 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 et seq., apply only to agencies and
officials of the United States Government.
To the extent the U.S. Constitution would deprive ASG of
the ability to search the luggage of persons entering
§ 2 Separation of Powers
SEE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4 – SEPARATION OF POWERS
Since courts favor
constitutionality of statutes, courts will construe Industrial Incentive Act as
not giving Governor power to grant partial exemptions in which case it is
constitutional. Bottling Corporation of
Constitution provides that each house of Legislature shall be judge of qualifications of its members. (Const., Art. 22) Tuia v. Yandall, 4 A.S.R. 559.
By making it easier for the
legislature to supervise the quasi-legislative activities of the executive
branch, a territorial statute providing for "legislative veto"
enhanced the diffusion of power among the different branches of
government. A.S.C.A. § 37.2030. Tuika Tuika v. Governor of
Territorial statute providing for
a "legislative veto" of leases of government land did not violate
American Samoa Constitution. A.S.C.A. § 37.2030; Rev. Const'n of Am. Samoa art.
II §§ 9 & 10. Tuika Tuika v. Governor of
Where court had ordered that
prisoner not be allowed to leave correctional facility without permission of
the court except for emergency medical treatment, prison officials had no
authority to allow prisoner to appear in court for post conviction motions
without requesting permission of court.
Territorial statute requiring the
Governor to submit to the Fono for possible disapproval any lease of land
lasting over ten years was not legislation "affecting the powers of the
legislature" requiring the prior approval of the Secretary of the
Interior. A.S.C.A. § 37.2030.
Territorial government is bound
by court orders in proceedings to which it is a party and should not issue
legal opinions that counsel disobedience to such orders.
Statute explicitly recognizing
power of Chief Justice to make exceptions to rules is clearly not inconsistent
with constitutional provision for judicial independence. Rev'd Const. Am.
Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. § 46.0501.
Reasonable legislative regulation
of judicial procedure does not necessarily conflict with judicial
independence. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. §
46.0501.
Since the Fono has declined to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the court should not attempt to do so by judicial fiat. Pacific Reliant Industries, Inc. v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 16 A.S.R.2d 57.
Even if a statute creates
unintended hardships, the responsibility to rewrite a statute belongs to the
Legislature and not the High Court. Nelson & Robertson Pty., Ltd. v.
Diocese of
The ability of the House or Senate to maintain a suit against the executive branch is, in the proper circumstances, beyond question. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
The Executive Branch does not have authority to pay anything in excess of an appropriation without express language granting such action. Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
The Executive Branch's power to fix employees' salaries is limited by the amount appropriated by the Legislature. Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
The Revised Constitution and laws are clear that the Executive Branch recommends and proposes an annual budget to the Legislature, and the Legislature in turn has the authority to appropriate public funds to implement that budget as it deems necessary. Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
The Revised Constitution of American Samoa requires that the land alienation laws be changed by specific political procedures, and not by judicial fiat. Rev. Const. Amer. Samoa, Art. I, § 3. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 117.
The
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings seems to be an intelligent law, benefiting
A court cannot, by injunction or mandamus, control executive branch officials in their legitimate exercise of discretion. A court may, however, enjoin executive action when executive branch officials assume to act in contravention of the constitution or laws applicable in the jurisdiction. The Senate of the Legislature of Am. Samoa v. Lutali, 29 A.S.R.2d 165.
A court's authority extends to restraints on executive branch officials from overspending legislative appropriations. The Senate of the Legislature of Am. Samoa v. Lutali, 29 A.S.R.2d 165.
If an executive branch official has authorized an improper expenditure of public funds, a declaratory judgment is appropriate. If, however, the expenditure is threatened in the future, such as a governor’s announced intention to do business in a manner that would result in a violation of the law, injunctive relief is appropriate. The Senate of the Legislature of Am. Samoa v. Lutali, 29 A.S.R.2d 165.
Separation of powers principles do not prevent the judicial branch from voiding a lease approved by the Governor in violation of due process rights. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.
§ 3 The Legislature
§3(1) Power and Authority
Under 1960 Constitution, Legislature had power to enact laws governing jurisdiction, operations or procedures of judiciary if enactments were approved by Governor and Secretary of Interior. Fanene v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 957.
By making it easier for the
legislature to supervise the quasi-legislative activities of the executive
branch, a territorial statute providing for "legislative veto"
enhanced the diffusion of power among the different branches of
government. A.S.C.A. § 37.2030. Tuika Tuika v. Governor of
Under Constitution of American
Samoa the legislature, and particularly the Senate which is composed of
traditional chiefs chosen according to Samoan custom, has a peculiar
relationship to the preservation of land and culture. Rev. Const'n of Am.
Samoa art. I § 3, art. II § 4. Tuika Tuika v. Governor of
Legislative resolution
disapproving lease of government land, pursuant to statute giving binding
effect to such resolutions, was not a "law" within the meaning of a
constitutional provision requiring all laws to be enacted by bill rather than
resolution. Rev. Const'n of Am. Samoa art. II § 9. Tuika Tuika v.
Governor of
In general, money appropriated for a particular budgetary purpose, which remains unexpended and unobligated at the expiration of the appropriation legislation, lapses and becomes public revenue under the Legislature's plenary control. The Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
Under the administrative rules of
Once the Legislature appropriates funds for a budgetary purpose defined in the annual budget acts, the funds are only available for the term stated in the annual act and no longer, unless expressly provided by the Legislature. The Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
The Revised Constitution and laws are clear that the Executive Branch recommends and proposes an annual budget to the Legislature, and the Legislature in turn has the authority to appropriate public funds to implement that budget as it deems necessary. The Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
A Legislator has the right to request work from the Legislative Financial Officer, and the Legislative Financial Officer may not disclose the request or the resulting information to anyone else before the Legislator making the request has an opportunity to review the resulting work product. Lutu v. Ale, 28 A.S.R.2d 43.
An individual Legislator has the authority of the entire Legislature for purposes of gathering information through the Legislative Financial Officer. Lutu v. Ale, 28 A.S.R.2d 43.
The House rule requiring that the Speaker review materials prepared by the Legislative Financial Officer before their submission to the Legislator requesting the work offends the plain language of the statute and exceeds the constitutional power of a single house to make rules of procedure for itself, and is therefore invalid insofar as it purports to countermand statutory mandate. Lutu v. Ale, 28 A.S.R.2d 43.
The office of the Speaker is an agency of government within the meaning of A.S.C.A. § 2.0602, and the Speaker therefore has a plain duty to cooperate with the Legislative Financial Officer by opening records to the Legislative Financial Officer within normal working hours and times. Lutu v. Ale, 28 A.S.R.2d 43.
A writ of mandamus may not compel the reversal of a decision of a legislative leader, exercising the proper discretion of his legislative capacity, but where the required act of a legislative leader is purely ministerial, mandamus may lie to compel it. Lutu v. Ale, 28 A.S.R.2d 43.
A.S.C.A. § 10.0603 does not contemplate or give any direction regarding the disclosure of financial records to individual members of either house, and falls well short of creating the "plain duty" and "plain right" required for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Lutu v. Ale, 28 A.S.R.2d 43.
more requires Fono
approval. A.S.C.A. § 37.2030.
In light of its constitutional authority to "protect the lands," the Legislature has a legitimate interest in the oversight and regulation of any land development projects by non-Samoans. This interest is legitimately furthered by requiring that detailed plans be submitted and approved by the Governor before a lease arrangement can go forward. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 117.
§3(2) Committees
Questions about the disposal of government property were relevant to an inquiry into the causes of a government budget deficit. Senate Select Investigating Committee v. Horning, 3 A.S.R.2d 14.
Committee created by one house of the legislature is a committee "of the legislature" within the meaning of territorial statute authorizing committees to subpoena witnesses. A.S.C.A. § 2.1003 et seq. Senate Select Investigating Committee v. Horning, 3 A.S.R.2d 14.
Territorial statute requiring legislative committees to adopt rules to govern their procedures, and requiring that person served with subpoenas also be served with a copy of the rules, was not satisfied by a committee's decision to adopt as "rules" the provisions of the statute itself. A.S.C.A. § 2.1003 et seq. Senate Select Investigating Committee v. Horning, 3 A.S.R.2d 14.
Committee's failure to comply with a statute requiring it to adopt rules and to serve a copy of these rules on person served with subpoena justified the refusal of a person served with subpoena to testify. A.S.C.A. §§ 2.1006, 2.1011, 2.1018. Senate Select Investigating Committee v. Horning, 3 A.S.R.2d 14.
§3(3) Legislation
Acts of Samoan legislature, if not vetoed by Secretary of Interior, are entitled to as much weight as legislative enactments in an organized territory. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.
Legislative resolution
disapproving lease of government land, pursuant to statute giving binding effect
to such resolutions, was not a "law" within the meaning of a
constitutional provision requiring all laws to be enacted by bill rather than
resolution. Rev. Const'n of Am. Samoa art. II § 9. Tuika Tuika v.
Governor of
Statute drawing a distinction
between people whose licenses were suspended for driving under the influence
and people whose licenses were suspended for other reasons had a rational
basis, since classification was based on conduct rather than status and legislature
believed there was a special need to deter and punish drunken driving.
A.S.C.A. § 22.0223.
Legislative inaction in the face
of judicial statutory construction strongly suggests agreement with, or at
least acquiescence in, the judicial interpretation of those laws.
When the legislature re-enacts a
statute or adopts amendments to it "without a suggestion of
disagreement" with a prior judicial construction, a very strong
presumption exists that the legislature has adopted the prior
construction.
Even if a statute creates
unintended hardships, the responsibility to rewrite a statute belongs to the
Legislature and not the High Court. Nelson & Robertson Pty., Ltd. v.
Diocese of
The requirement that a statute must have a rational basis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In Re the Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.
Whether a statute operates
retrospectively or prospectively only is a question of legislative
intent.
The Revised Constitution of American Samoa requires that the land alienation laws be changed by specific political procedures, and not by judicial fiat. Rev. Const. Amer. Samoa, Art. I, § 3. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 117.
§ 4 The Executive
SEE TAXATION § 11(2) – AUTHORITY OF GOVERNOR, BOARD
§4(1) The Governor
Since time of cession, authority of Governor is paramount to that of District Governor who is appointed by and holds office at pleasure of Governor. Teo v. Liufau, 1 A.S.R. 628.
When Governor of American Samoa is investigating in his official capacity, statements made to him are privileged, and, as such, cannot form the basis for actionable slander. Dwyer v. McDonald, 1 A.S.R. 652.
Only in extraordinary circumstances will a court compel the testimony of the chief executive of the jurisdiction in which the court sits. Fa'atiliga v. Lutali (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 124.
Most information available from chief executive of state or territory can be just as easily obtained from lesser officials. Fa'atiliga v. Lutali (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 124.
Party may compel testimony from chief executive of state or territory only if it seems absolutely necessary to make out his case and the party can convince the court that there is some chance the testimony will enable him to prevail. Fa'atiliga v. Lutali (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 124.
Before being allowed to compel testimony of territorial Governor regarding alleged scheme to dispose of government property for less than its actual value, party must produce other evidence of Governor's personal involvement in such scheme. Fa'atiliga v. Lutali (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 124.
Where incumbent Governor was actively involved in affairs of a corporation before he became Governor and is the only available witness with detailed knowledge of events material to litigation involving the corporation, a party may compel his testimony. Fa'atiliga v. Lutali (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 124.
Territorial statute requiring
certain transactions to be "approved in writing by the Governor" was
not violated when Governor signed a lease document and then authorized members
of his staff to make certain revisions to the document before it left his
office, even though the Governor did not sign the document a second time after
the changes were made. A.S.C.A. § 30.0131.
A matai's alienation of land must comply with certain statutory procedures, including the approval of the Governor of American Samoa. A.S.C.A § 37.0204. Alaimalo v. Sivia, 17 A.S.R.2d 25.
The power to expel aliens is a
fundamental, sovereign power exercised by the political branches of
government.
Because the Governor has general
supervision and control of all executive departments, agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, personnel decisions are subject to his
direction as long as his actions are in accordance with applicable territorial
and federal laws and rules. Rev. Const. Am.
An application for an order
directing the Government of American Samoa to show cause why it should not be
held liable for a judgment remains unsupported if it is not accompanied by
evidence that the Governor has given prior approval to the garnishment of the
Government pursuant to A.S.C.A. § 43.1803(b). Development Bank of
In light of its constitutional authority to "protect the lands," the Legislature has a legitimate interest in the oversight and regulation of any land development projects by non-Samoans. This interest is legitimately furthered by requiring that detailed plans be submitted and approved by the Governor before a lease arrangement can go forward. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 117.
To become valid, a lease of native land must be approved by the Governor. A.S.C.A. § 37.0221(a). Before the Governor approves any document affecting title to land, it must be reviewed by the Land Commission for recommendations. A.S.C.A. § 37.0203(a). Moetoto v. Tauileva, 28 A.S.R.2d 144.
The Director of Manpower
Resources, not the Governor, has the statutory authority to administer the
personnel laws of
Although
the governor may voluntarily choose to grant audiences to anyone who seeks to
maintain an at-will periodic tenancy or who proposes to lease government land,
due process does not mandate that the governor must conduct formal
administrative hearings whenever he exercises his discretion to terminate an
at-will periodic tenancy or acts on a proposal to lease government land. Congressional
A decision regarding the lease of government land is a matter
solely within the governor’s discretion. Congressional
§4(2) Power and Authority
Powers of pardon and parole
granted to executive by statutes and constitution do not give the executive
carte blanche to ignore court orders and sentences.
Release of prisoner within two
weeks after court had sentenced him to a year of detention as condition of
probation, whether called a furlough, work release, reward for good behavior,
compassionate leave, or by another label, violated statutes and court order.
Territorial government is bound
by court orders in proceedings to which it is a party and should not issue
legal opinions that counsel disobedience to such orders.
Statute allowing court to impose detention as a condition of probation did not violate the constitutional provision allowing governor to grant pardons, since any prisoner pardoned by the governor could no longer be incarcerated. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. IV § 9; A.S.C.A. § 46.2206. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.
When it acts in a sovereign
capacity, the government is generally not subject to estoppel. Atuatasi
v.
Estoppel may be applied against the
government if, in addition to other factors necessary to give rise to an
estoppel, the government's wrongful conduct threatens to work a serious
injustice, and the public interest would not be unduly damaged by the
estoppel. Atuatasi v.
Order of deportation must be made by the Attorney General. A.S.C.A. § 41.0616. Rakhshan v. Immigration Board, 15 A.S.R.2d 29.
The executive branch has the
statutory authority to preserve and administer government lands. Solomona
v. Governor of
Inherent, executive authority
exists to suspend an employee before his removal is effective under
circumstances which would make continued performance of regular duties
detrimental to the territorial government's interests; however, this action may
not be arbitrary or capricious. A.S.C.A. § 7.0802; A.S.A.C. §§ 4.0801,
4.0802(e). Sala v.
If a serious condition exists, ASG
may place plaintiff on annual leave, reassign him to duties in which the
condition does not exist, place him on excused absence, or suspend him with or
without pay pending removal, provided the action is taken in compliance with
all applicable laws and rules and is based on substantive and documented
justification. A.S.A.C. § 4.0802(e). Sala v.
When the government makes rules
to govern the conduct of its affairs, it must abide by those rules and act
within its authority. Sala v.
If done within the scope and by the apparent authority of a de jure public officer, a de facto public officer's acts are binding on third parties; it is as if the de facto public officer were legally selected, qualified and in possession of the office. Toilolo v. Poti, 24 A.S.R.2d 1.
In American Samoa, program managers are given some flexibility to deal with contingencies that were not anticipated during the regular budget development process but this flexibility must be dealt with prudently and in consideration of the policymakers' and the people's wishes. A.S.A.C. § 5.0134(b). The Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
The Executive Branch does not have authority to pay anything in excess of an appropriation without express language granting such action. The Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
The Executive Branch's power to fix employees' salaries is limited by the amount appropriated by the Legislature. The Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
If appropriated funds are available for payment of a particular vendor contract and are properly obligated under the procurement process before the end of the current fiscal year, the obligated funds will carry forward until the obligation is paid rather than revert to the general fund. Otherwise, the Executive Branch has no legal authority to disperse public funds to pay past due debts to vendors incurred in a prior fiscal year without a current fiscal year appropriation for such purposes and timely completion of the procurement process. A.S.A.C. § 5.0103(13)(A). The Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
The Revised Constitution and laws are clear that the Executive Branch recommends and proposes an annual budget to the Legislature, and the Legislature in turn has the authority to appropriate public funds to implement that budget as it deems necessary. The Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
The American Samoa Government does not have a legal obligation to pay step increments to its employees for past fiscal years. A.S.C.A. § 7.1001. The Senate v. Lutali, 27 A.S.R.2d 126.
A contract entered into by a
government official lacking authority, or failing to follow proper procedures,
is void. Rakshan v.
The petitioner will fail the second prong of the test for issuing an alternative writ of mandamus unless he/she establishes that the duty of respondent is purely "ministerial." A duty is ministerial only if it is clearly proscribed and does not involve an exercise of judgment or discretion. Porter v. Registrar of Vital Statistics, 28 A.S.R.2d 175.
§4(3) Agencies
In order for a government
subdivision to be a separate entity capable of suing or being sued in its own name,
such status must bestow by statute or constitution. Aga v.
Administrative board, given
statutory authority to advise agency and to perform such duties as governor
assigns, had no authority to issue binding personnel decisions absent explicit
grant, especially when Code sets forth hiring and termination procedures that
do not involve board. Banks v.
Under territorial statutes
providing that the registrar should not record any instrument appearing to be
illegal, but that any person aggrieved by any official action of the register
could apply to the court "at any time" for direction or redress, a
lessor would not prevail in an action for eviction based on non-recordation of a
lease where (1) the lease was initially recorded by the registrar's office; (2)
an acting registrar later attempted retroactively to reject the lease, citing
certain alleged illegalities; (3) upon trial of the eviction action, defendant
invoked its right to judicial review of the registrar's action and the court
found that the lease was not illegal and was therefore properly accepted for
recordation. A.S.C.A. §§ 4.1104, 4.1106.
Assuming that deputy territorial
registrar had the power to cancel the prior recordation of a lease had there
been something genuinely wrong with it, an aggrieved party would have the right
at any time to apply to the court for direction or redress, and the aggrieved
party could exercise such right by alleging and proving in an action for
eviction that the substantive bases for the cancellation were without
merit. A.S.C.A. § 4.1106.
For purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 3407,
the American Samoa Government is not a federal agency.
The office of the Speaker is an agency of government within the meaning of A.S.C.A. § 2.0602, and the Speaker therefore has a plain duty to cooperate with the Legislative Financial Officer by opening records to the Legislative Financial Officer within normal working hours and times. Lutu v. Ale, 28 A.S.R.2d 43.
The Director of Manpower
Resources, not the Governor, has the statutory authority to administer the
personnel laws of
Although the ASG’s Parks and
Recreation Commission is a statutory agency of the ASG's Executive Branch, it
is not a “commission . . . authorized by law to make rules or to determine
contested cases." A.S.C.A. § 4.1001(a). Congressional
This court functions to ensure
that the executive branch respects a party’s substantive due process rights by
determining whether decisions of the governor and his executive agencies were
arbitrary and capricious, pretextual, or without a rational basis.
Congressional
§ 5 The Judiciary
§5(1) Power and Authority
SEE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1 – JURISDICTION
High Court is a court of equity as well as law. Jewett v. McMoore, 1 A.S.R. 611.
Authority of Secretary of Native Affairs over conduct of magistrates and judges of lower courts is ministerial and not judicial, and interpretation of law by such executive officer is not binding upon High Court. Toomata v. Railey, 1 A.S.R. 623.
At conclusion of case, court may make oral decision and is not obliged to render written decision absent request by one of the parties. Dwyer v. McDonald, 1 A.S.R. 652.
Fact decision is unsigned by Judge does not indicate that it is not order of court. Simaile v. Lafoa’i, 2 A.S.R. 170.
A purported decision of the High Court, not signed by judge rendering same has no value as precedent. Atoa v. Meredith, 3 A.S.R. 159.
Court cannot declare one senatorial candidate victor over another, since it lacks jurisdiction to so do, such being the exclusive province of senate. A.S. Const. Art. II, § 22. Meredith v. Mola, 4 A.S.R. 773.
Since A.S. Const. Art. II, § 22 reserves right to legislature to judge qualifications of “members,” court will not interfere and decide challenge to election of senator once he has been sworn in as member. 11 A.S.C. § 6671. Tuitasi v. Lualemaga, 4 A.S.R. 798.
Judicial power is vested in High Court, District Courts and such other courts as created by law, and judicial branch is independent of legislative and executive. (Const. Art. III, Sec. 1 and 2.) Fanene v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 957.
The courts of
Visit by one member of court to land that was the subject of litigation, and subsequent report of that judge to other judges, did not constitute impermissible "testimony" by the judge when both counsel had been present at the viewing of the land and no objection had been made. Vaimaona v. Paleafei, 3 A.S.R.2d 92.
Territorial statute giving court power to suspend procedural rules that would lead to inequitable result does not give court power to suspend rules of substantive law. A.S.C.A. § 3.0242. Ape v. Puagele, 3 A.S.R.2d 109.
Statute prescribing participation in matai title dispute of one law-trained judge, as well as four associate judges who are not lawyers but who are chosen for their familiarity with Samoan custom, did not require that the law-trained judge be present during all deliberations of the associate judges. A.S.C.A. § 3.0240. In re Matai Title La'apui, 4 A.S.R.2d 7.
When court is considering the application of judge-made rules rather than legislation or a constitution, it has the duty to consider whether changed circumstances warrant modification of such rules. Monte Kaho v. Ron Pritchard Ground Services, Inc., 4 A.S.R.2d 40.
When a rule of law has been adopted in an overwhelming majority of the jurisdictions with which forum state has contact, the rule may give rise to changed customs and usages within forum. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.
Territorial statute permitting court to subordinate rules of "practice or procedure" to exigencies of justice and convenience does not give the court power to overturn a final judgment in the absence of new evidence, fraud, surprise, or similar circumstances, since res judicata is a rule of substantive law and not of procedure. A.S.C.A. § 3.0242(b); T.C.R.C.P. Rule 60. Willis v. Willis, 4 A.S.R.2d 144.
Territorial courts are established not under Article III of the Constitution, but by Congress pursuant to the general legislative powers granted by article I and the power granted by article IV to make rules and regulations for the territories. U.S. Const. arts. I, III, IV. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., v. S & S Contracting, Inc., 5 A.S.R.2d 70.
The High Court of American Samoa exercises judicial power that can be divested only by an Act of Congress. 48 U.S.C. § 1662a; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. III § 1. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., v. S & S Contracting, Inc., 5 A.S.R.2d 70.
The "judicial jurisdiction
of the
Territorial court is not bound to interpret local rules in strict conformity with federal courts' interpretations of parallel federal rules. Wray v. Wray, 5 A.S.R.2d 34.
Trial court rule that written judgment contain separately stated findings of fact and conclusions of law does not require inflexible format of segregated, numbered, and labeled entries. T.C.R.C.P. Rule 52. Development Bank v. Ilalio, 5 A.S.R.2d 110.
Territorial court would defer as
a matter of comity or full faith and credit to the lawful orders of a court of
the
A strong presumption of validity attaches to an order of the High Court signed by a Justice thereof. Satele v. Uiagalelei, 6 A.S.R.2d 143.
Unlike federal rules of criminal
procedure promulgated under the authority of Congress and binding on federal
courts to the same extent as statutes, territorial rules are made by the Court
itself, so that a time limit provided by territorial rule is not as obviously
jurisdictional as a similar limit provided by federal rule. Rev'd Const.
Am. Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. § 3.1002(c).
Statute explicitly recognizing
power of Chief Justice to make exceptions to rules is clearly not inconsistent
with constitutional provision for judicial independence. Rev'd Const. Am.
Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. § 46.0501.
Reasonable legislative regulation
of judicial procedure does not necessarily conflict with judicial
independence. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. §
46.0501.
Even if court has authority to
disregard or make exceptions to its own rules, it would be imprudent to make
such exceptions on an ad hoc basis in order to reach the desired result in a
particular case.
The court is bound by statute
and treaty to recognize freehold grants made by the Land Commission of Samoa,
which operated in
The Court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time. T.C.R.Cr.P. 35.
Because the High Court's rules
were promulgated solely on its own authority, they must give way to territorial
statutes defining the court's jurisdiction, unless the statutes themselves are
unconstitutional.
In imposing conditions of
probation, the sentencing judge is well-situated to know whether a particular
offender needs to be insulated from his past environment, his associates, his
victim, or those who assisted in his prosecution, as well as the best methods
to assure such insulation.
The High Court refused to
approve parties' stipulation to lift a stay of an action in federal district
court when no such stay was issued because of the lack of statutory authority
to do so. Fa'atasiga v. M/V Ocean
The Chief Justice's rulemaking
authority under A.S.C.A. § 46.0501 does not include the power to amend
unambiguous legislative enactments setting out the prerequisites to
appeal. Fa'amaoni v.
A court may compel specific
performance of a partially performed, unwritten agreement; the court's power to
compel specific performance is expressly recognized in the statute of frauds
relating to land transactions. A.S.C.A. § 37.0211. Manoa v.
The High Court looks to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance and must conform to them as
closely as practicable. A.S.C.A. § 43.0201(a). Crispin v.
Though the Immigration Board's
documents are confidential by statute, this statute may not be used to deny
constitutionally guaranteed due-process rights, nor does it prohibit the Court
from ordering the Attorney General to produce these records when needed.
The district court is authorized
to issue process, and an arrest warrant is a form of process. A.S.C.A. §
3.0304, T.C.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(1).
The High Court possesses the statutory authority to issue an injunction if it deems money damages to be an inadequate remedy; as such, it may order a special shareholders' meeting if a board of directors, though lacking any discretion in the matter, fails to call a meeting. A.S.C.A. § 43.1302. Lutali v. Foster, 24 A.S.R.2d 39.
The rules of civil procedure do not limit a court's power to (1) entertain an independent action for relief from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or (2) set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); T.C.R.C.P. 60(b). Rocha v. Rocha, 24 A.S.R.2d 55.
A single justice has the authority to issue an alternative writ, schedule a hearing, and set a briefing schedule; however, resolution of substantive issues, other than in connection with any preliminary or supplementary matter, requires a quorum of two justices and one associate judge. A.S.C.A. §§ 3.0209, 3.0220. In re Complaint of Voyager, Inc., 24 A.S.R.2d 90.
A court may dispose of an entire controversy by granting both equitable relief and damages, in order to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits. Thompson v. Toluao, 24 A.S.R.2d 127.
The High Court of American Samoa
is empowered to enforce a judgment of any
The High Court of American Samoa
is not a federal court.
If a majority of the four associate judges make a decision, the justice need not participate in the four associate judges' deliberations. In Re Matai Title "Tuaolo", 28 A.S.R.2d 137.
The western style court system delivers clearly identifiable winners and losers by providing decisive final decisions and orders that are legally binding and enforceable by the collective force of the community. Litigants who cannot win family support for their views, and decide instead to take their chances in court, should be aware that their interpretations of custom may not be persuasive to the court either. Fanene v. Fanene, 30 A.S.R.2d 115.
The High Court is not bound to
accept the definition of misapplication of funds expounded by the federal
courts. In fact, federal courts have used varying definitions for
misappropriation of funds.
From the face of the statute, the
court does not appear to have discretion in ordering forfeiture of bail if a
condition of the bond is violated. T.C.R.Cr.P. 46(e)(1).
The court may, on its own motion, clarify its discussion in an opinion and order. Mailo v. Aumavae, 31 A.S.R.2d 6.
§5(2) Administration of Court
Governor is authorized to appoint temporary Chief Justice in case of disability, disqualification or absence of Chief Justice. (CAS 168.) Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Actual payment of estimated transcript cost coupled with timely request for cost of transcript (although no formal order for transcript) is sufficient to satisfy Rule 55(2) requiring transcript order. 11 A.S.C. 5122(3). In re Matai Title Alalamua, 4 A.S.R. 974.
If counsel is dissatisfied with the interpreter's English translation of a witness's Samoan testimony, his remedy is to object immediately so that any error can be corrected or to ask the witness any questions that may be necessary to eliminate
ambiguities in the official record, which is kept in English. Lea'e v. Lea'e (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 56.
Associate Judges of the High Court of American Samoa, who speak both Samoan and English, may correct any inaccuracies they detect in the translation of Samoan testimony into English as soon as such inaccuracies occur. Lea'e v. Lea'e (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 56.
The post-trial and appellate stages of a proceeding, which with a few extraordinary exceptions must be based upon the record made at trial, are not the appropriate forum for counsel to request corrections of English translation of Samoan testimony. Lea'e v. Lea'e (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 56.
Courts of
Criminal procedure in courts of
To hold a trial only a few
minutes after the filing of the answer, over the objection of a party or under
equivalent circumstances would be fundamentally unfair. Diocese of Samoa
High Court opinions between 1978
and 1986 were reported only if they established or altered a rule of law,
criticized existing law, or, in the Justices' opinion, "involve[d] a legal
issue of continuing public interest." Saufo`i v.
A court reporter is to produce a transcript within a thirty days after receiving an order for it. A.C.R. 11(b). Rocha v. Rocha, 17 A.S.R.2d 15.
Statute providing that the High
Court shall have interpreters deals with the method of appointing permanent
court employees and does not require Court to find, employ, and compensate
special ad hoc officers whenever a litigant demands an
interpreter. Kim v.
When the High Court dismisses
cases for want of diligent prosecution, civil actions will be dismissed with
prejudice if good cause is not shown to the contrary, but land-and-titles
actions will be dismissed without prejudice.
A damage award to a minor shall be deposited directly into the depositary of the High Court of American Samoa and placed in an interest-bearing account with the minor as beneficiary; disbursements are to be made only on application by the guardian ad litem and with the approval of one of the Justices. Sciascia v. Lutali, 23 A.S.R.2d 38.
Although a defendant is not to be
prejudiced because of his indigent circumstances, he is not entitled to a
transcript as of right simply upon demand.
Reasonable costs may be required of litigants. Because litigation costs are borne not only by a plaintiff but also by defendants, taxpayers, and parties in other lawsuits (which may be delayed or receive less attention), even a small filing fee helps a plaintiff to think about the merits of his case. An indigent plaintiff may even be required to pay a partial filing fee. Mckenzie v. Tuimavave, 26 A.S.R.2d 13.
A litigant desiring to proceed in forma pauperis must submit a sworn affidavit supporting his motion. The affidavit is to specifically detail the reasons for the alleged inability to pay court fees and must enumerate all sources of funds. Mckenzie v. Tuimavave, 26 A.S.R.2d 13.
Proceeding in forma pauperis is undeniably a privilege and not a right; therefore, permission to do so is at the court's discretion. McKenzie v. Tuimavave, 26 A.S.R.2d 13.
General statements are insufficient to make the required showing that plaintiff has necessary expenditures which would preclude his paying the filing fee. Mckenzie v. Tuimavave, 26 A.S.R.2d 13.
A receiver is a ministerial officer, agent, creature, hand, or arm of, and a temporary occupant and caretaker of the property for the court, and represents the appointing court, and is the medium through which the court acts. Samoa Aviation, Inc. v. Bendall, 28 A.S.R.2d 222.
One of the inherent powers of a trial court is the power to dismiss a case for want of prosecution. A.S.G. v. Lavata`i, 31 A.S.R.2d 191.
§5(3) Disqualification – Recusal
Judge should disqualify himself from trying case even though he is entirely free of bias if circumstances have arisen which give bona fide appearance of bias, such as distant relationship to one of parties. Sauafea v. Filipo, 2 A.S.R. 477.
Application to disqualify judge should be filed prior to trial and alleged bias of judge is not timely raised on appeal. Iosia v. Heirs of Lemeanai Family, 3 A.S.R. 482.
Statute (Sec. 172-1952 Amendments) disqualifies judge if he is or has been a material witness, not if he is a mere potential witness. Iosia v. Heirs of Lemeanai Family, 3 A.S.R. 482.
Evidence fails to support that judge was related to one of parties, and any relation based on marriage would have been terminated by divorce. Betham v. Faumuina, 3 A.S.R. 537.
Application to disqualify judge should be filed at earliest opportunity and in case of appeal, immediately after notice of appeal. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Motion for disqualification of
judge which was apparently an attempt at "judge shopping" should be
denied. Pene v.
Trial judge who, in denying
summary judgment against pro se litigant in a previous case, had quoted authority
to the effect that summary judgment was not the appropriate remedy for
incoherent and unskillful pleadings, did not thereby malign the litigant's
person and did not create ground for recusal in subsequent cases involving the
same litigant. Pene v.
Judge has as much obligation not
to recuse himself when there is no occasion for recusal as he has to recuse
himself when there is such occasion. Pene v.
When an Associate Judge of the High Court made a comment during trial that a party had obstructed the installation of a chief who was a cousin of the judge's wife, this relationship was too attenuated and the incident too peripheral to require disqualification of that judge. In re Matai Title Tauala, 15 A.S.R.2d 65.
Waiting until after a trial to move for a judge's disqualification is highly improper; doing so constitutes a waiver of the objection. In re Matai Title Tauala, 15 A.S.R.2d 65.
Mere fact that a judge asked questions which pointed out flaws in counsel's position or is related to a family that serves one of the parties in the case does not mean he is biased or prejudiced against a particular party. Uiagalelei v. Ulufale, 17 A.S.R.2d 158.
Because of the interest in the finality of judgments, "fraud on the court" (1) is typically confined to the most egregious cases, such as an attorney's exerting improper influence on the court or the bribery of a judge or juror, in which the integrity and impartial functioning of the court is directly impinged; and (2) must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence." Rocha v. Rocha, 24 A.S.R.2d 55.
The words of A.S.C.A. § 3.1007(a) "a case in which he ... has a substantial interest" not only mean that such a judge is actually biased in the case at issue, but also that such an interest may appear to exist. A lack of the legitimate appearance of impartiality is as threatening to smooth judicial functioning here as elsewhere. Jessop v. Histake, 25 A.S.R.2d 12.
Antagonistic questions do not necessarily indicate improper judicial bias. Mulitauaopele v. Mulitauaopele, 25 A.S.R.2d 43.
The fact that an associate judge who heard a case at trial also heard the case on appeal, a violation of A.S.C.A. § 3.1007(b), was not a basis for reconsideration of the appeal where a quorum existed without the violating judge, the violating judge's vote was not outcome determinative, the decision of the court was unanimous, and the complaining party waited until after the decision was rendered to object. Soli Corp. v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 25 A.S.R.2d 94.
If a party fails to object to the presence of an associate judge on the appellate panel until after the decision has been rendered, this failure constitutes a waiver of the objection. Soli Corp. v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 25 A.S.R.2d 94.
The words of A.S.C.A. § 3.1007(a) "a case in which he ... has a substantial interest" not only mean that such a judge is actually biased in the case at issue, but also that such an interest may appear to exist. A lack of the legitimate appearance of impartiality is as threatening to smooth judicial functioning here as elsewhere. In re Matai Title "Faumuina", 26 A.S.R.2d 1.
Recusal should never be undertaken lightly, but there are certain instances in which recusal is proper. In re Matai Title "Faumuina", 26 A.S.R.2d 1.
The standard of review applied to a courts denial of a request for recusal is, in accordance with A.S.C.A. § 43.0801(b), "clearly erroneous." In re Matai Title "Faumuina", 26 A.S.R.2d 1.
Recusal is appropriate when an appointing governor appears in his capacity as an individual citizen before an appointee judge. In re Matai Title "Faumuina", 26 A.S.R.2d 1.
A judge has an obligation not to recuse himself or herself unless there is a need to do so. In re Matai Title "Faumuina", 26 A.S.R.2d 1.
There is a duty of recusal incumbent on an associate judge who finds himself or herself assigned to a case in which a governor who appointed the judge appears in his or her personal capacity. In re Matai Title "Faumuina", 26 A.S.R.2d 1.
A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such person is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of the party. Canon of Judicial Conduct 3(C)(1)(d)(i). Atlantic, Pacific, Marine, Inc. v. Clarke, 31 A.S.R.2d 156.
A judge disqualified may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his disqualification. If based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers may agree in writing that the judge is no longer disqualified, and may participate in the proceeding. However, the parties and lawyers must make such determine independently of the judge’s participation and in writing. Canon of Judicial Conduct 3(D). Atlantic, Pacific, Marine, Inc. v. Clarke, 31 A.S.R.2d 156.
§5(4) Precedence and Stare Decisis
Purpose of stare decisis is to maintain uniformity and predictability of law, but not at expense of perpetuating manifest error. In re Matai Title Salave’a, 4 A.S.R. 44.
Although rule of stare decisis is basic, it must not be inflexibly applied if previous decision is erroneous. In re Matai Title Salave’a, 4 A.S.R. 44.
Powers of pardon and parole
granted to executive by statutes and constitution do not give the executive
carte blanche to ignore court orders and sentences.
Release of prisoner within two
weeks after court had sentenced him to a year of detention as condition of
probation, whether called a furlough, work release, reward for good behavior,
compassionate leave, or by another label, violated statutes and court
order.
When Supreme Court has not had occasion to reconsider a precedent for almost a century, almost all applications of precedent have been overruled by statute, and Supreme Court has overruled similar precedents in closely related or analogous areas, lower court may conclude that the precedent no longer represents the law that would be applied by Supreme Court. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.
Rule of heredity that arose in previous trial court decision was not binding precedent when rule resulted from "judicial notice" of Samoan custom that ignored stark variation among different families' practices, rule was stipulated by the parties rather than briefed, argued, and decided, and rule had been criticized in subsequent opinions of the appellate court. In re Matai Title "Tauaifaiva", 5 A.S.R.2d. 13.
Decision of the highest court of a jurisdiction, including a decision of the Trial Division that was not appealed, should be followed by judge deciding subsequent case in the Trial Division unless there is some compelling reason not to do so. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., v. S & S Contracting, Inc., 5 A.S.R.2d 70.
The fact that a trial judge would have decided an earlier case differently is not a compelling reason to disregard the principle of stare decisis and ignore the authority of the earlier case. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., v. S & S Contracting, Inc., 5 A.S.R.2d 70.
Prior judicial decision was not a strong precedent when: (1) the decision resulted from a summary proceeding that did not include full briefing and argument by counsel; (2) the judge sitting in the later case was the same judge who had decided the prior case, so that there was no risk of casual disregard for the reflection and deliberation leading to the first decision; (3) the first decision was itself arguably an unfounded departure from precedent; and (4) both cases involved statutory interpretation, in which case the deciding court's primary duty is one of fidelity to the enacted law. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., v. S & S Contracting, Inc., 5 A.S.R.2d 70.
Alleged "informal practice of the High Court" prior to a contrary decision did not divest that decision of its value as precedent, where no reported decisions or other evidence established the rationale or even the definite existence of the practice. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., v. S & S Contracting, Inc., 5 A.S.R.2d 70.
Territorial government is bound
by court orders in proceedings to which it is a party and should not issue
legal opinions that counsel disobedience to such orders.
Village, county, and district councils have no power to veto a court decision, rendered after trial in accordance with statutory procedure, that a particular person is entitled to hold a matai title. A.S.C.A. § 1.0401 et seq. In re Matai Title Sotoa, 8 A.S.R.2d 10.
Warden who released prisoner in violation of court order, on the authority of invalid order of parole board, was in continuing violation of court order for as long as the prisoner remained at large. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.
Signature of judge on a court order certifies that the judge has in fact exercised his judgment, that the premises of the order are true, that the order itself is lawful, and that it is appropriate under all the circumstances that the order be given the force of law. Bank of Hawaii v. Ieremia, 8 A.S.R.2d 177.
Court was bound by its own judgment in a case decided eighty-two years earlier, whose parties were ancestors in title of the parties to the later case and in which the court had specifically defined the rights of the parties, notwithstanding any contrary implication in an even earlier decision of another court in which the parties and the questions before the court were somewhat different than in both later cases. Willis v. Fai`ivae, 10 A.S.R.2d 121.
A court must find facts consistently with the evidence before it, even if such findings conflict with prior findings made by a court deciding a prior case with different parties and different evidence. Puailoa v. Estate of Lagafuaina, 11 A.S.R.2d 54.
Statement in a judicial opinion that was not necessary to the holding, on a question which was neither briefed nor argued by any party to the prior case, was not binding upon the court in deciding a subsequent case. Puailoa v. Estate of Lagafuaina, 11 A.S.R.2d 54.
Stare decisis applies to questions of law and not of fact, to general propositions rather than to specific inquiries. Puailoa v. Estate of Lagafuaina, 11 A.S.R.2d 54.
Where objectors to registration of land cited a prior case holding that the land belonged to them, but offered no surveys delineating the extent of their respective claims within the disputed area, the court would deny the offer of registration but would express no opinion with regard to the claims of the objectors beyond the holding in the prior case. Sivia v. Alaimalo, 13 A.S.R.2d 95.
A land registration in conflict with a Court order in a prior adjudication of land claims is void--or at least voidable in the absence of reliance by innocent third parties--for the same reasons that a registration would be without legal effect if it conflicted with an earlier valid registration. Fa`aaua`a v. Tauiliili, 15 A.S.R.2d 71.
Even if it would not exceed the Court's power, declaring a prior judicial decision null and void, when witnesses have died and memories have faded in the intervening thirty years, would be imprudent and unjust because the Court at that time was in a much better position to determine the issues material as to whether land should be registered. Lualemana v. Atualevao, 16 A.S.R.2d 34
High Court opinions between 1978 and 1986 were reported only if they established or altered a rule of law, criticized existing law, or, in the Justices' opinion, "involve[d] a legal issue of continuing public interest." Saufo`i v. American Samoa Gov't, 16 A.S.R.2d 71.
The court is bound by statute and treaty to recognize freehold grants made by the Land Commission of Samoa, which operated in Apia under the supervision of the then-Supreme Court of Samoa, prior to the United States-established government. Willis v. Fai`ivae, 17 A.S.R.2d 38.
As a matter of law, an earlier survey registered in accordance with law prevails over a later one. Willis v. Fai`ivae, 17 A.S.R.2d 38.
The court is bound to recognize a land survey which has been registered according to law. A.S.C.A. § 37.0101 et seq. Willis v. Fai`ivae, 17 A.S.R.2d 38.
Informal statements of traditional Samoan custom and law are neither binding on the Court nor persuasive, as they do not represent a recitation of legal authority. Pene v. Bank of Hawaii, 18 A.S.R.2d 65.
Even if erroneous, a court's decision as to whether a parcel of land is a person's individual land or a family's communal land is binding on later courts. Puailoa v. Estate of Lagafuaina, 19 A.S.R.2d 40.
The doctrine of stare decisis applies only to questions of law, not questions of fact or applications of principles of law to particular facts. Puailoa v. Estate of Lagafuaina, 19 A.S.R.2d 40.
A case is not overruled by a later case when they differ in findings of fact or issues raised and not in interpretation of law. Reid v. Puailoa, 23 A.S.R.2d 101.
Court orders entered pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, without the benefit of factual evaluation, may be vacated when a third party intervenes and a factual evaluation is necessary. Ala`ilima v. Zoning Board, 25 A.S.R.2d 146.
An order based on a material mistake of fact can be reopened and modified at the court's discretion. Mobile Marine Ltd. v. Ninna Marianne, 28 A.S.R.2d 88.
It is inappropriate for the Trial Division to revisit a principle settled by the Appellate Division. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 117.
Underlying values of res judicata must sometimes be balanced against the policies implicated by its application, but this principle does not mean that a decision can never be final simply because it implicates a compelling question of policy such as the protection of Samoan custom. Fanene v. Fanene, 30 A.S.R.2d 115.
§5(5) Supervision of Proceedings and Litigation
There was no error in court’s questioning of attorney for lessee to determine whether his relationship with defendants was such that he was also liable under lease. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
It is not error of trial court to delineate evidence surrounding signing of lease and actions of attorney in procuring or omitting such signature, since trial court is judge of fact and law. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Where defendant has important witness who is not available but he knows of witness at time of trial, he should apply for continuance. Tigi v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 902.
Court’s refusal to permit witness to testify with respect to potential title holder’s character, personality and knowledge of Samoan custom was not erroneous where it would have been cumulative and unnecessary since potential title holder testified himself; and there is no indication court doubted his testimony. Utu v. Aumoeualogo, 4 A.S.R. 906.
Trial judge has right to propound questions to witnesses to elicit pertinent facts; he may recall witnesses who have been examined; he may cross-examine; he may ask leading questions; and he may elicit any relevant and material evidence without regard to beneficial or prejudicial effect on either party. Ross v. Scanlan, 4 A.S.R. 913.
Trial court does not err in failing to consider witness present in court room when appellant did not call witness to testify. Willis v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 926.
Court's statutory responsibility to supervise litigation involving minors imposes a duty on the court to exercise its own best judgment on the fairness of attorney fee arrangements. Oto v. National Pacific Insurance Co. (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 114.
Trial Court had discretion to dismiss action four years after it had been filed, eighteen months after court had given notice that the case would be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary should be shown, and one year after the date that counsel estimated he would move for trial, when no such motion had been made. Monte Kaho v. Ron Pritchard Ground Services, Inc., 4 A.S.R.2d 40.
Constitutional right to due process of law is not denied when a court which has repeatedly accommodated counsel's unusual requests and overlooked procedural irregularities finally ceases to do so and dismisses the action. Monte Kaho v. Ron Pritchard Ground Services, Inc., 4 A.S.R.2d 40.
Pursuant to power to make "such order as to him may seem just" in any land case, Chief Justice or Associate Justice of High Court need not stop at denying plaintiff's meritless claim for relief, but may issue preliminary injunction restraining plaintiff from interference with rights of defendant as delineated in earlier judgment. A.S.C.A. § 43.0304. Sialega v. Taito, 5 A.S.R.2d 99.
Trial judge may exclude spectators from the courtroom during testimony when necessary to protect or shield the witness; to prevent embarrassment or emotional disturbance; or to enable a reluctant witness to testify to material facts. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 6 A.S.R.2d 114.
Trial judge properly decided, after a public hearing at which each spectator had an opportunity to express reasons for his or her desire to remain in the courtroom, that the public should be excluded during the testimony of a youthful rape victim when trial judge found that certain spectators wished to be present in order to