§ 1 Judicial Review
§ 2 Case or Controversy (Standing and Mootness)
§ 3 Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation
3(1) General Provisions
3(2) Legislative Intent
3(4) Conflict of Laws
7(1) Due Process
7(2) Equal Protection
7(3) Freedom of Speech, Press, and Religion
7(4) Takings and Just Compensation
7(5) Cruel and Unusual Punishment
§ 8 Contracts
§ 9 Habeas Corpus
§ 1 Judicial Review
In deciding whether questions asked a witness by members of a legislative committee were relevant to the committee's charter, a court should impose no stricter standard than it would impose on itself in a similar case. Senate Select Investigating Committee v. Horning, 3 A.S.R.2d 14.
Only in extraordinary circumstances will a court compel the testimony of the chief executive of the jurisdiction in which the court sits. Fa'atiliga v. Lutali (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 124.
Where evidence indicated that decision
to terminate probationary employee was made by appropriate executive official
with governor's approval rather than by advisory board, court would not
question the decision. A.S.C.A. §§ 7.0102, 7.0206, 7.0211. Banks v.
Judiciary must not substitute its
own judgment for that of executive branch on what is in "the best interest
of the government." A.S.C.A. § 7.0211. Banks v.
Where court had ordered that
prisoner not be allowed to leave correctional facility without permission of
the court except for emergency medical treatment, prison officials had no
authority to allow prisoner to appear in court for post conviction motions
without requesting permission of court.
While the judiciary cannot
ordinarily employ writ of habeas corpus to review prison management or the
conditions of a prisoner's otherwise lawful confinement, exceptional prison
circumstances rising to the level of constitutional deprivations are within the
court's jurisdiction.
Territorial government is bound
by court orders in proceedings to which it is a party and should not issue
legal opinions that counsel disobedience to such orders.
Where statute provided for appeal to board of registration from a denial of voter registration by election officer, and for judicial review of an adverse decision of the board of registration, court would not issue writ of mandamus to election officer ordering him to register prospective voter who had not yet appealed to board of registration. A.S.C.A. §§ 6.0224, 6.0230. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 8 A.S.R.2d 81.
First amendment prohibits court
from assuming jurisdiction to review church electoral processes or other
disputes concerning church policy and church administration. U.S. Const.
amend. 1. Ofa v.
Statute explicitly recognizing power
of Chief Justice to make exceptions to rules is clearly not inconsistent with
constitutional provision for judicial independence. Rev'd Const. Am.
Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. § 46.0501.
Reasonable legislative regulation
of judicial procedure does not necessarily conflict with judicial
independence. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. §
46.0501.
Court could grant review by mandamus of chief election officer's determination that petitioner was ineligible to run for elective office, where statutory scheme was silent as to appeals procedure and circumstances appeared to render any alternative review procedures inadequate. T.C.R.C.P. Rules 87, 88. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.
Court would not compel chief election officer to find the petitioner a bona fide resident where petitioner was not on the current voter registration lists, was not present in the territory during the period at issue, refused to supply additional information requested by the chief election officer, and was identified as a registered voter in another jurisdiction during the period at issue. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.
Where the identity of a church's governing body is a matter of substantial controversy, civil courts are not to make the inquiry into religious law and usage that would be essential to the resolution of the controversy, but instead should attempt to apply "neutral principles of law." Tele`a v. Savea, 11 A.S.R.2d 110.
Where territorial government had
confined and sought judicial commitment of a person whose psychiatric condition
could not be adequately treated within the territory, but had refused to refer
him for treatment outside the territory because of the relatively short
duration of his presence in the territory, court would order immediate referral
for treatment; the respondent had a right to treatment not because of his
residential status but because of the government's decision to take him into
its custody and to confine him pending recovery or remission.
Even if a statute creates
unintended hardships, the responsibility to rewrite a statute belongs to the
Legislature and not the High Court. Nelson & Robertson Pty., Ltd. v.
Diocese of
Although a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies does not absolutely preclude judicial action, such
action is permissible only in exceptional circumstances, including the exception
for violations of statutory or constitutional rights. Sala v.
To file suit regarding
disciplinary matters, a public employee need not await a final agency decision
only if a preliminary agency decision clearly and unambiguously violates a
statutory or constitutional right of the employee or if the prescribed
administrative process is clearly inadequate to prevent irreparable
injury. Sala v.
Though the Immigration Board's
documents are confidential by statute, this statute may not be used to deny
constitutionally guaranteed due-process rights, nor does it prohibit the Court
from ordering the Attorney General to produce these records when needed.
A court's mandate is to decide controversies between adverse parties and their respective viewpoints, not to decide which policies, public or otherwise, are best; such policy decisions properly belong to other branches of government. Lutali v. Foster, 24 A.S.R.2d 53.
In light of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, a court will not inquire into the wisdom of public policy but will sustain a challenged action as long as it does not violate the Constitution. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 24 A.S.R.2d 134.
The requirement that a statute must have a rational basis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In Re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.
The Revised Constitution of American Samoa requires that the land alienation laws be changed by specific political procedures, and not by judicial fiat. REV. CONST. AMER. SAMOA, Art. I, § 3. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 117.
§ 2 Case or Controversy (Standing and Mootness)
Where plaintiffs were two banks, one of which had lent money and the other of which had guaranteed the loan, at least one plaintiff clearly had standing to sue and the addition of another plaintiff who may or may not have had standing did not necessitate reversal of the trial court's decision that defendants were liable to one or the other of the plaintiffs. Pritchard v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 8 A.S.R.2d 157.
Neither administrative agency nor
court may dispense with requirements designed to ensure that case admits of
judicial resolution: that there be a genuine dispute between the claimant and
the agency on at least one specific and identifiable question of law and
fact. Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v.
A person who does not own the
land for which a land-use permit was denied has no standing to raise the
question as to whether special enabling legislation was necessary to allow the
Governor to promulgate the coastal zone management regulations affecting the
rights of private property owners. Solomona v. Governor of
To establish standing to enforce
environmental laws, (1) a party must show that he has suffered an
injury-in-fact, and (2) the alleged injury must arguably be within the
statute's zone of interests. Le Vaomatua v.
Although an organization may
represent members who are injured, a mere "interest in a problem" is
insufficient to establish standing. Le Vaomatua v.
Claims for money damages are seldom
moot and are subject to judicial resolution, even if other issues in a lawsuit
are moot. Samoana Fellowship, Inc. v.
A court may refuse to determine
the merits of a claim on the ground that, even though the claim may be correct,
the litigant advancing it is not entitled to its judicial determination.
Standing concerns the party, and not the issue to be adjudicated.
The doctrine of standing is
derived from the "case or controversy" requirement in Article III of
the United States Constitution. This limitation imposed by a standing
requirement is based on the separation of powers which underlies the federal
government. Because the government and constitution of
To establish standing, a party must demonstrate (1) "injury in fact," meaning an invasion of a legally protected interest that is "(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;" (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, meaning that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant," and has not resulted "from the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, meaning that the "prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not "too speculative." Multitauaopele v. Togafau, 26 A.S.R.2d 52.
The test for standing is whether or not the plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
It is well established that it is not enough to qualify, for standing purposes, merely as a taxpayer. A party must establish that the alleged conduct would result in a tax increase or cause other irreparable injury. This injury must be different than that endured by the citizenry en masse. Additionally, there must be a logical nexus between the alleged wrongful behavior and the harm suffered. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
A case becomes moot when the issues are no longer "live" or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
There is an exception to the mootness rule where the case is "capable of repetition, yet evading review". In non-class actions, this exception is limited to cases where (1) a defendant terminates the challenged action before the issue is fully litigated, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation the plaintiff would be subject to the same actions in the future. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
For purpose of the exception to the mootness rule "reasonable expectation" must go beyond a theoretical possibility of repetition to the same plaintiff. However, the case is not rendered moot simply by the fact that the defendant has, at the moment, ceased the behavior at issue. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
A controversy still smolders when the defendant has voluntarily, but not necessarily permanently, ceased to engage in the allegedly wrongful conduct. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
The ability of the House or Senate to maintain a suit against the executive branch is, in the proper circumstances, beyond question. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
The test for standing is whether or not the plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
It is well established that it is not enough to qualify, for standing purposes, merely as a taxpayer. A party must establish that the alleged conduct would result in a tax increase or cause other irreparable injury. This injury must be different than that endured by the citizenry en masse. Additionally, there must be a logical nexus between the alleged wrongful behavior and the harm suffered. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
A case becomes moot when the issues are no longer "live" or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
There is an exception to the mootness rule where the case is "capable of repetition, yet evading review". In non-class actions, this exception is limited to cases where (1) a defendant terminates the challenged action before the issue is fully litigated, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation the plaintiff would be subject to the same actions in the future. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
For purpose of the exception to the mootness rule "reasonable expectation" must go beyond a theoretical possibility of repetition to the same plaintiff. However, the case is not rendered moot simply by the fact that the defendant has, at the moment, ceased the behavior at issue. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d125.
A controversy still smolders when the defendant has voluntarily, but not necessarily permanently, ceased to engage in the allegedly wrongful conduct. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.
A party has no standing to sue without an injury-in-fact, or a direct stake in the controversy. Plaintiff must have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the suit. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 167.
The mere fact that a person has standing to bring an action does not mean that they have a property interest at stake. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 29 A.S.R.2d 116.
The requirements for standing are that the plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact, that the injury be fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that the injury be fairly redressable by a favorable decision. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 29 A.S.R.2d 116.
§ 3 Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation
SEE
SEE
SAMOAN CUSTOMS § 1 – IMPACT ON
§3(1) General Provisions
Contemporaneous construction by officers upon whom is imposed a duty to enforce statute is entitled to great weight in interpretation of ambiguous positions of statute, particularly where there is constant uniform practice for long period of time. Government v. Bird, 2 A.S.R. 102.
Courts of Samoa recognize that
common law may not in all respects be suitable to conditions of islands, but
will follow so much of common law of
When Supreme Court has not had occasion to reconsider a precedent for almost a century, almost all applications of precedent have been overruled by statute, and Supreme Court has overruled similar precedents in closely related or analogous areas, lower court may conclude that the precedent no longer represents the law that would be applied by Supreme Court. Monte Kaho v. Ron Pritchard Ground Services, Inc., 4 A.S.R.2d 40.
Unless Samoan court has ruled otherwise, High Court should ordinarily follow Restatement of the Law in construing common law. Tung v. Ah Sam, 4 A.S.R. 764.
Existing laws not inconsistent with the Constitution of 1960 continued in force when Constitution was ratified. (Const., Art. V, Sec. 2) Haleck v. Lee, 4 A.S.R. 519.
Revised Constitution of 1967 does not provide for continuance of existing laws and approval of new legislation on judicial matters by Secretary of Interior. Fanene v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 957.
Where promulgators of territorial
constitution omitted equal protection clause, it would be inappropriate for
judicial branch to construe some other constitutional provision to include an
unwritten equal protection clause more demanding than the equal protection
clause of the federal constitution. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. I.
While the UCC does not of its own
force apply in
In construing the common law, the High Court ordinarily follows the Restatement of Law. Etimani v. Samoa Packing Co., 19 A.S.R.2d 1.
A case is not overruled by a later case when they differ in findings of fact or issues raised and not in interpretation of law. Reid v. Puailoa, 23 A.S.R. 2d 101.
A court exercising judicial review starts with the presumption that a statute is valid and will construe a statute so as to avoid finding it unconstitutional. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 24 A.S.R.2d 134.
It is appropriate for the courts
of
Samoan custom is defined by an evolutionary process, not by the judicial process. Mulitauaopele v. Mulitauaopele, 25 A.S.R.2d 43.
A constitutionally authorized rule of procedure loses its procedural character when it determines the status of substantive legal rights. Lutu v. Ale, 28 A.S.R.2d 43.
The Revised Constitution of American Samoa envisions vigorous constitutional and statutory protection for Samoan ownership of land. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 117.
§3(2) Legislative Intent
Object of interpretation of legislation is to ascertain true meaning and will of law making body. Government v. Bird, 2 A.S.R. 102.
Resort to preamble to statute in
construing enacting portion explains ambiguities by relating them to general
scope and meaning of statute. Bottling Corporation of
When court is considering the application of judge-made rules rather than legislation or a constitution, it has the duty to consider whether changed circumstances warrant modification of such rules. Monte Kaho v. Ron Pritchard Ground Services, Inc., 4 A.S.R.2d 40.
Although a federal statute does not apply to proceedings in the High Court of American Samoa, its passage by Congress should be taken into account in determining whether changed current circumstances warrant the application of rules announced in nineteenth-century precedents. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.
Legislative inaction in the face
of judicial statutory construction strongly suggests agreement with, or at
least acquiescence in, the judicial interpretation of those laws.
When the legislature re-enacts a
statute or adopts amendments to it "without a suggestion of
disagreement" with a prior judicial construction, a very strong
presumption exists that the legislature has adopted the prior
construction.
Even if a statute creates
unintended hardships, the responsibility to rewrite a statute belongs to the Legislature
and not the High Court. Nelson & Robertson Pty., Ltd. v. Diocese of
In light of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, a court will not inquire into the wisdom of public policy but will sustain a challenged action as long as it does not violate the Constitution. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 24 A.S.R.2d 134.
The requirement that a statute must have a rational basis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In Re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.
Whether a statute operates
retrospectively or prospectively only is one of legislative intent.
§3(3) Statutory Construction
Statute provides in construing A.S.C. that words are to be understood in their ordinary sense unless defined or explained otherwise. 1 A.S.C. § 304. Letuli v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 830.
In construing to give effect to
Legislative intention, court may construe “or” as meaning “and” or “and” as
“or.” Bottling Corporation of
Term “along” as used in ordinance means “within reasonable distance of.” Lago v. Mageo, 4 A.S.R. 287.
“Along high-water mark of
Since courts favor
constitutionality of statutes, courts will construe Industrial Incentive Act as
not giving Governor power to grant partial exemption in which case it is
constitutional. Bottling Corporation of
Similarly worded constitutional
and statutory provisions may be construed differently in different
jurisdictions, especially where they have been adopted and applied in different
circumstances. Tuika Tuika v. Governor of
Conflict between constitutional
provisions are ordinarily resolved in favor of the more recently enacted.
Ferstle v.
Territorial court is not bound to interpret local rules in strict conformity with federal courts' interpretations of parallel federal rules. Wray v. Wray, 5 A.S.R.2d 34.
Where territorial statutes
differed in language and structure from federal statutes on same subject
matter, territorial court should not disregard clear language of territorial
statutes on the basis of judicial decisions construing federal statutes.
Lutu v.
Territorial statute vesting
discretion in attorney general to proceed against certain minors as adults was
not constitutionally defective due to alleged inconsistency with general
purpose of juvenile justice statute to accord special treatment to minors,
since both the general rules of statutory construction and the specific
language of another statutory provision indicated that the exception was
deliberate and purposeful. A.S.C.A. §§ 45.0103(9)(B)(I),
45.0115(c)(2)(a).
Terms of air carriage contract
which were inconsistent with Warsaw Convention were void, because the contract
itself so provided and also because treaty obligations are the supreme law of
the land and therefore supersede private contracts.
Provision of territorial constitution that county council elect senators in accordance with Samoan custom does not include power to delegate the decision completely to a subdivision of the county, since this would allow a new custom, habit, or practice to repeal explicit and unambiguous constitutional provisions. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. II § 4. Mauga v. Lutu, 10 A.S.R.2d 115.
Cumulative effect of two territorial constitutional provisions, one requiring election of senators by county councils and the other providing that each senator shall hold office for four years, is to require that an election be held once every four years by the county council as it is then constituted; since the membership of the county council changes over time, no one particular council can be permitted to lock senatorial selection into the future by selecting any number of senators to serve during subsequent terms. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. II §§ 4, 6. Mauga v. Lutu, 10 A.S.R.2d 115.
There is a rational basis for a
legislative distinction between (1) people who drive under the influence and
then drive with a suspended license; and (2) those who commit other sorts of
conduct punishable by suspension and then drive with a suspended license;
therefore, a statute embodying such a distinction did not deny equal protection
of the laws. U.S. Const. amdt. 14. Macomber v.
In a situation where the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) controls but is silent or ambiguous concerning a particular issue, analogous UCC provisions that are consistent with the UCP may apply. Pacific Reliant Industries, Inc. v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 16 A.S.R.2d 57.
Statute which sets different
limitation periods for actions based on written and unwritten contracts, but
does not define either term, is not unconstitutionally vague and does not
violate due process, since parties can rely on case law and other legal
authority to determine the meaning of these terms. Pene v. Bank of
The High Court may interpret
territorial statutes differently than federal courts' interpretations of
similar, but not identical, federal statutes, but this does not imply that
territorial law supersedes federal law. Alamoana Recipe Inc. v.
Statutory provision requiring election ties to be decided by lot is not inconsistent with the Revised Constitution of American Samoa. A.S.C.A. § 6.0901. In re the Election for Representative from District No. 3, 27 A.S.R.2d 28.
The Legislature of American Samoa
has not condemned a class of people by passing A.S.C.A. § 27.1001(i), which
defines "foreign" as meaning "any place beyond the limits of
§3(4) Conflict of Laws
SEE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12 – CONFLICT OF LAWS
In cases of otherwise irreconcilable conflict between statutes the later statute governs the earlier, since the new law is deemed to have implicitly amended conflicting prior laws. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.
Apparent conflicts between statutes can often be reconciled by application of the rule that the more specific statute prevails over the more general. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.
In cases of apparent conflict
between two statutes, specific and later statute prevails over more general and
earlier statute. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2203, 46.2206. Atuatasi v.
Insofar as T.C.R.Cr.P. 35
purports to extend or abolish the mandatory deadline for alleging errors of law
in a criminal sentence, it is in direct conflict with the statute; as such, the
statute must prevail over the judge-made rule. A.S.C.A. §
43.2402(a). T.C.R.Cr.P. 35.
Because the High Court's rules
were promulgated solely on its own authority, they must give way to territorial
statutes defining the court's jurisdiction, unless the statutes themselves are
unconstitutional.
There is no need for application
of the rule of lenity, where two statutes that overlap do not possess internal
conflict or ambiguity.
When a claimed conflict between
two statutes is not relevant and not at issue, the court will decline
comment. A.S.C.A. § 32.0619(a)(f). National Pacific Insurance
Co. v. Commissioner of the
Territorial laws which are
inconsistent with applicable
issues subject to articulated
standards of qualification is a property interest giving rise to due process
protection, although not to the full range of pre-deprivation procedural
protections applicable to entitlements that are less contingent than the
expectation of a license. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Where a conflict exists between statute and any customary privilege, the statute governs. In Re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.
Custom in conflict with law must give way. A.S.C.A. § 1.0202. In Re the Matai Title Iu, 25 A.S.R.2d 127.
Laws which do not comply with the Constitution will be found to have no application. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 29 A.S.R.2d 116.
§ 4 Separation of Powers
SEE
§ 5 Full Faith and Credit
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act applies only to foreign judgments entitled to "full faith and
credit" in
The Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act was designed to give a foreign judgment creditor the same
right to enforce his judgment in
Although the
Where enforcement of
The High Court of American Samoa
is empowered to enforce a judgment of any
Full faith and credit requires
that a forum should respect an earlier judgment to the extent that issues
presented therein received a res judicata determination.
Under the full faith and credit
clause, a forum state has as much leeway to modify or depart from a foreign
judgment, as does the state in which it was rendered.
§ 6 Political Questions
Senate is sole judge of member’s qualifications for seat, and thus issue is non-justiciable “political question.” A.S. Const. Art. II, § 3, § 22. Tuitasi v. Lualemaga, 4 A.S.R. 798.
Senate is sole judge of which candidate for seat got most votes, and this issue is thus non-justiciable “political question.” A.S. Const. Art. II, § 22. Tuitasi v. Lualemaga, 4 A.S.R. 798.
Political question doctrine bars judicial consideration of an issue where there has been a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of power to decide the issue to a coordinate branch of government. Mauga v. Lutu, 10 A.S.R.2d 115.
Provision of territorial constitution that the legislature shall judge elections of its members presumes that an election has been held, and therefore does not define the factual question whether the required election ever occurred give rise to as a political question preventing judicial intervention. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. II § 22. Mauga v. Lutu, 10 A.S.R.2d 115.
§ 7 Individual Rights
§7(1) Due Process
SEE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4(1) – DUE PROCESS
SEE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8(1) – DUE PROCESS
Government of
People of American Samoa are protected by due process clause in Fifth Amendment to Constitution of United States, and in particular that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Government v. Soliai, 2 A.S.R. 600.
Constitutional right to due process of law is not denied when a court which has repeatedly accommodated counsel's unusual requests and overlooked procedural irregularities finally ceases to do so and dismisses the action. Monte Kaho v. Ron Pritchard Ground Services, Inc., 4 A.S.R.2d 40.
Fact that jurors who speak only
Samoan must receive jury instructions through translator does not violate constitutional
right to due process; need for translation is inevitable in bilingual territory
where many witnesses and jurors speak one language but not the other. 46
A.S.C.A. § 46.1504.
A government employee with no
contractual or statutory right to continued employment may be fired for any
reason or even "for no reason whatever" without a denial of due
process; only exception is that employee cannot be terminated for a reason that
itself violates some constitutional right, such as free speech or equal
protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amdt. 14. Banks v.
Although the due process clause
of the federal constitution, which implicitly forbids racial discrimination by
the federal government, binds the territories in at least some of its
applications, it does not necessarily bind the territories in the same ways and
to the same extent as in the continental United States. U.S. Const. amdt.
14. Banks v.
Complaint alleging "wrongful
imprisonment in violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights"
sufficiently raises constitutional claim despite failure to cite specific
provisions. A.S.C.A. § 43.1207 Tevaseu v.
Police may initiate prosecution
for traffic offense by issuing ordinary traffic citation and summons even well
after all parties have left the scene of the offense, and due process does not
require usual procedural protection of full criminal prosecution.
A.S.C.A. §§ 22.0802, 22.0803.
Garnishee bank that had elected not to retain counsel and whose employee attended garnishment hearing but did not request to testify could not argue in collateral attack on resulting judgment that it had been denied an opportunity to be heard. Amerika Samoa Bank v. Haleck, 6 A.S.R.2d 54.
Argument that license was
"revoked" without procedural due process was unfounded where evidence
shows license was never granted. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2.
Ferstle v.
In order to have a cognizable
claim for deprivation of procedural due process, one must first possess a
"liberty" or "property" interest in the government action
complained of. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Procedural due process
requirements are not fixed, but vary with circumstances and particular demands
of the case; however, some sort of notice and hearing is required before an
individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Am. Sam. Const.
art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Notice and hearing afforded to
satisfy procedural due process need not be full judicial hearing. Am.
Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
To satisfy requirement of
procedural due process, opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner, but need not always be granted prior to the initial
deprivation of property. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Ordinarily, due process is
satisfied by proceedings less than a full evidentiary hearing prior to adverse
administrative action, and the sufficiency of such proceedings is to be
determined in light of 1) the private interest that will be affected by the
official action, 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards, and 3) the government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would impose. Am. Sam.
Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Procedural due process is
satisfied by piecemeal proceedings wherein parties were advised of the required
showing, the proofs were considered promptly by the regulating agency, parties
were advised of the agency's findings of insufficiency, parties submitted
further proofs which agency considered and again advised parties that such
proof was insufficient but did not issue a denial and remained open to further
submission of proofs. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Due process requirements of
notice and opportunity to be heard are not triggered until adverse
administrative action constituting a "final" deprivation of property
has taken place. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
Recurring and intentionally
dilatory tactics by agency may constitute "final" action sufficient
to trigger due process requirements of notice and hearing. Am. Sam.
Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v.
The expected benefit of a license
which because in most cases licensing will be a straightforward process,
quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing in all licensing proceedings would needlessly
increase government expenditures and such hearings are required only where the
proposed action on a license application will be final. Am. Sam. Const.
art. I § 2., A.S.C.A. § 31.1508. Ferstle v.
Court did not deprive attorney of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, either by injury to his reputation or otherwise, where (1) attorney had represented judgment debtor; (2) attorney also represented other members of judgment debtor's family; (3) after judgment, the judgment debtor and her family had agreed to changes in the record ownership of property formerly recorded as property of the judgment debtor, had arranged for the sale of the property, and had removed themselves from the territorial jurisdiction of the court; (4) attorney had in his possession the proceeds of the sale, which judgment creditor alleged to be the property of the debtor but which debtor and other family members claimed to be the property of other family members; (5) court had held the funds to be the property of the judgment debtor and subject to seizure by the judgment creditor; and (6) court ordered the funds to be deposited in the registry of the court pending further proceedings. In re Guardianship of Tedrow, 7 A.S.R.2d 72.
Court that ordered defendant
released from mental institution, to which he had been committed after being
found not guilty of first degree murder by reason of insanity, did not act
unconstitutionally in imposing conditions (1) that he reside with his wife in
Los Angeles unless granted permission by the court to reside elsewhere; (2)
that he refrain from use of alcohol; and (3) that he consult with a physician
periodically.
Court order for confinement of prisoner, after his trial and conviction for attempted rape, was issued pursuant to due process of law and could be enforced without further judicial proceedings. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.
Due process of law was not denied to a convict who had been released from detention in violation of court order and who was subsequently re-arrested, where (1) convict's lawyer was notified immediately of his re-arrest and did not request a hearing, (2) a hearing was held as soon as the convict's new lawyer requested one; (3) the scope and period of confinement after re-arrest did not exceed that imposed by the original court order, which had itself been issued pursuant to due process of law. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.
That some people may misconstrue
an otherwise clear judgment and sentence, and even that a clerical employee of
the parole board did misconstrue it, does not render the judgment and sentence
so vague and ambiguous as to deprive the person convicted of due process of law.
Atuatasi v.
Reincarceration of an
inadvertently released prisoner denies due process of law only where, under all
the circumstances of the case, reincarceration would contravene fundamental
principles of liberty and justice. Atuatasi v.
Reincarceration of an
inadvertently released prisoner did not deny due process of law where the
release was due to a ministerial mistake and where, having been released for
only twenty-eight days prior to his rearrest, the prisoner had not been so
thoroughly reintegrated into society that his rearrest would contravene
fundamental principles of liberty and justice. Atuatasi v.
In the absence of statute creating
right to certification hearing to determine whether to prosecute minor as a
juvenile or an adult, the minor has no due process right to such a
hearing.
Provision of territorial
constitution prohibiting deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law prohibits prosecution from suppressing any evidence favorable to
an accused where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment.
Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. I § 2.
General request by defense
counsel for any evidence in the possession of the prosecution that might tend
to exculpate the defendant was within the scope of rule prohibiting suppression
of material evidence favorable to the accused. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa
art. I § 2.
There is no general
constitutional right of indigent persons to litigate free of charge. Pene
v.
Denial of access to legal
proceedings to those unable to pay the costs of such proceedings is a denial of
due process of law only in cases where litigants seek to extricate themselves
from family relationships imposed on them by the government. Pene v.
Litigants who demanded costs of
litigation, compensatory and punitive damages on account of mental distress
said to have been caused by a brief disconnection of their electricity, and an
injunction against future disconnections, and whose electricity had been
disconnected after they had stopped paying their electric bill in retaliation
for conduct of the electric company in an unrelated land dispute, had no
constitutional right to a free trial transcript for use on appeal. Pene
v.
Appellants who claimed they could
not afford to pay for a trial transcript had already been afforded due process of
law by a trial on the merits, a written opinion by the trial judge on the
merits of their claims, a hearing on their motion to reconsider, and another
written opinion on that motion. Pene v.
The right of a family member to use communal land is a proprietary right within the due process clause of the territorial constitution. Rev'd Const. of Am. Samoa I § 2. Lutu v. Taesaliali`i, 11 A.S.R.2d 80.
The heart of due process in
parole revocation cases is a concern for basic fairness—the non-arbitrary
treatment of a probationer or parolee by the state.
Requirements of due process in
parole revocation proceedings include the parolee's right to hear the evidence
against him, to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary
evidence, and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing such
confrontation.
While "practice of law"
is a general term, it is sufficiently definite that its employment in a
criminal statute satisfies the demands of due process. A.S.C.A. §
31.0104. Pene v.
Government violates due process
when it seizes a taxpayer's property for unpaid taxes without following the
procedures mandated by the Internal Revenue Code for distraint and levy.
Klauk v.
Where government failed to issue
a 90-day statutory notice of deficiency before seizing plaintiff's property for
unpaid taxes, it was enjoined from depriving plaintiff of his right to due
process, either by continuing to deprive him of his rights under the Internal
Revenue Code to challenge and contest income tax deficiencies or by withholding
the property it had seized from plaintiff, until it complied with the
applicable Code provisions pertaining to distraint and levy. Klauk v.
To hold a trial only a few
minutes after the filing of the answer, over the objection of a party or under
equivalent circumstances would be fundamentally unfair. Diocese of Samoa
Government's refusal to accept a surety bond in lieu of cash bail for an alien arrested for immigration offenses violated his constitutional rights, where government's reason for refusal was its hope that his friends would put up the money it would otherwise cost the government to deport him. Rakhshan v. Immigration Board, 15 A.S.R.2d 29.
When the court finds that adequate grounds for discharge existed and requiring an employer to conduct a post-termination hearing would not change the result, due process has been satisfied. Palelei v. Star-Kist Samoa, Inc., 15 A.S.R.2d 120.
To properly assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, the long arm statute of the proposed forum must permit the exercise of jurisdiction under the particular facts of the case and such exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy the demands of due process. Patau v. Rosendahl Corporation, 16 A.S.R.2d 96.
In order to subject a nonresident defendant to a judgment in personam, due process requires that he have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that maintaining the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Patau v. Rosendahl Corporation, 16 A.S.R.2d 96.
Minimum contacts needed for due process require that a defendant must have performed some act by which he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws. Patau v. Rosendahl Corporation, 16 A.S.R.2d 96.
Minimum contacts required for due process insure that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or because of the unilateral activity of another party or third person. Patau v. Rosendahl Corporation, 16 A.S.R.2d 96.
Minimum contacts required by due
process to assert personal jurisdiction were not satisfied where defendant
neither designed nor manufactured the machinery alleged to have injured
plaintiff in
Destroying the court reporter's shorthand notes in the twenty years between a final judgment and a party's attempt to relitigate the case does not violate due process. Taulaga v. Patea, 17 A.S.R.2d 34.
In some cases, such as when an
illegal sentence was pronounced on a defendant unrepresented by counsel or when
the circumstances surrounding an error of law made it impossible for counsel to
call it to the Court's attention within ten days, a statutory ten-day limit
might amount to an unconstitutional denial of liberty without due process of
law.
That a criminal may be unable to
determine the exact punishment and exceptions to punishment does not render
criminal statutes unconstitutional; a person is only entitled to know the
maximum punishment available.
No constitutional right to
rehabilitation at public expense exists, nor do statutes authorizing
rehabilitation programs or early release give any particular criminal a
constitutionally protected "liberty interest" in participating in
them.
No substantive due process right
exists for not being deported.
The right to interstate travel is
a substantive, virtually unqualified constitutional right, but international
travel can be regulated within the limits of due process.
The freedom to travel is one of
the freedoms a convicted criminal may lose; therefore, a requirement that a
convict spend part or all of his probation outside the Territory does not
unconstitutionally abridge any such right.
Eyewitness identification
evidence is unreliable and must be suppressed as violating due process if
suggestive identification procedures have led to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification.
Though identification procedure
whereby complainant identified defendant in a one-on-one confrontation at
police station was impermissibly suggestive, under the totality of the
circumstances it was not so unfair as to violate due process, since complainant
identified defendant without police prompting or comment, had seen him shortly
before the crime, and at the scene of the crime had described physical
characteristics and clothing of her assailant which matched defendant and had pointed
out a third party who not only had also seen defendant before the crime but
then identified him to the police immediately afterwards.
Statute which sets different
limitation periods for actions based on written and unwritten contracts, but
does not define either term, is not unconstitutionally vague and does not
violate due process, since parties can rely on case law and other legal
authority to determine the meaning of these terms. Pene v. Bank of
Neither the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment nor the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment gives a non-indigent defendant the right to a court-appointed and
government-paid interpreter. Kim v.
American Samoa Constitution
guarantees a court-appointed interpreter only to an indigent defendant who will
otherwise be unable to understand the proceedings against him or to communicate
with his counsel. Kim v.
Court employment of
Samoan-English interpreters, but not interpreters of other languages, is simply
a practice which reflects the cultural and juridical history of
Statute providing that the High
Court shall have interpreters deals with the method of appointing permanent
court employees and does not require Court to find, employ, and compensate
special ad hoc officers whenever a litigant demands an interpreter. Kim
v.
The overlap of the statutes
defining sodomy and deviate sexual assault does not violate a criminal
defendant's due process. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3611, 46.3612.
When the statutes in question
clearly define the conduct proscribed and the punishment available under each,
due process is satisfied.
A "void" judgment, from which relief may be granted, is one in which a court lacked the power to enter the judgment, as when a court lacked jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, violated "due process of law," or engaged in "a plain usurpation of power." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); T.C.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4). Reid v. Puailoa, 23 A.S.R.2d 101.
Though the Immigration Board's
documents are confidential by statute, this statute may not be used to deny
constitutionally guaranteed due-process rights, nor does it prohibit the Court
from ordering the Attorney General to produce these records when needed.
An alien in a deportation
proceeding is entitled to cross-examine the government's witnesses, and an
improper curtailment of this right constitutes a violation of procedural due
process.
The right of a family member to
use land owned by a Samoan communal family is a property right protected by the
territorial constitution's due process clause. Rev. Const. Am.
A non-capital criminal defendant
is not constitutionally or procedurally entitled to a list of the prosecution's
prospective witnesses.
Although constraining government decisions which deprive an individual of some "property" or "liberty" interest, procedural due process does not prohibit the government's taking of property but requires that a person have an opportunity to be heard before his property is finally taken. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 24 A.S.R.2d 134.
The unquestioned right of a
family member to use communal land is a property right under the due process
clause of either the
If, as a matter of trial
strategy, counsel declines to cross-examine a witness or avoids asking certain
questions, the defendant's right to confront witnesses is not violated.
Man v.
As a matter of due process of law, the Land Commission must hold public hearings on proposed transfers of land, and give reasonable notice to interested parties. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.
A.S.C.A. § 46.0807(b) is
reasonable and does not violate a person's due process rights. It is
reasonable to believe that a person lawfully arrested may need to be held up to
the full 24 hours without formal prosecution, because he is endangered or poses
a threat to public safety, even if the district court sits before then.
There is no point in bringing a person before the district court who will not
be charged. Nor is there any logic in releasing a person prior to 24
hours when he is still legitimately held for safety reasons, simply because the
district court has sat within a shorter time frame.
If an arrestee is held for longer
than 24 hours without being brought before the district court and charged, and
if he can show that police personnel never intended to prosecute him, he has
remedies for a violation of his due process rights. Contempt proceedings
might also be appropriate in this situation. A.S.C.A. § 46.0807(b).
A demonstration of actual
prejudice is a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim
arising from pre accusatory delay. The court must also consider the
reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.
In considering the reasons for
pre accusatory delay, broad leeway is given for prosecutorial discretion and
legitimate investigative purposes. Conversely, a delay that is imposed
for purely tactical reasons is probably violative of due process.
When a pre accusatory delay is caused
by prosecutorial neglect rather than by intentional tactical delay, the
evidence of actual prejudice to the defendant must be compelling to sustain a
dismissal based on due process.
The unavailability of witnesses
resulting from an extended delay is not enough by itself to demonstrate that
the defendant cannot receive a fair trial. The defendant must show how
the testimony of the missing witnesses would have been exculpatory.
A claim of denial of due process,
either procedural or substantive, cannot be sustained, absent proof of a
deprivation of a ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interest within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of Article I, § 2 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa,
or of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
Congressional
Not every interest is protected
by procedural due process guarantees. The claim must be derived from a
statute or legal rule or through a mutually explicit understanding to be an
enforceable right or entitlement. Congressional
Though courts have eschewed rigid
definitions of “liberty” and “property” interests, we believe that an interest
in continuing an at-will periodic tenancy is not a constitutionally protected
“liberty” or “property” interest. An at-will tenant may have a subjective
need or desire for the relationship to continue but not a legitimate
expectation for it to continue. Congressional
§7(2) Equal Protection
SEE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8(2) – EQUAL PROTECTION
Personnel board's recommendation
not to employ plaintiff was not shown to have been motivated by
constitutionally impermissible gender-based discrimination when it could have
resulted from past experience applicable to employees of either sex and
plaintiff failed to bring evidence suggesting otherwise. U.S. Const.
amdt. 14. Banks v.
Personnel board's recommendation
not to employ plaintiff was not shown to have been based on allegedly
unconstitutional statutory Samoan hiring preference when evidence showed
overwhelmingly that Board's recommendation was a response to undue manipulation
of hiring process by plaintiff's husband. Banks v.
Federal constitution would not prohibit
American Samoan hiring preference, which is reasonably calculated to alleviate
the difficulties that attend a government composed largely of officials with no
knowledge of the local language and culture and who generally remain in the
territory only temporarily. Banks v.
Plaintiffs were not denied equal
protection when denied license as a hairdresser or cosmetician because they did
not meet standard of experience set out by the legislature.
Territorial constitution contains
no equal protection clause. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. I.
Where territorial application of equal
protection clause of federal constitution was not argued by either party, but
both parties assumed that challenged territorial statute was unconstitutional
if and only if it established a classification for which there was no rational
basis, court would assume that the equal protection clause was applicable at
least insofar as it required a rational basis for statutory
classifications. U.S. Const. amend. 14.
Statutory scheme under which the
same act may be punished under either of two statutes, with prosecutor having
discretion to choose under which statute to prosecute, does not violate equal
protection clause of federal constitution. U.S. Const. amend. 14.
Statutory scheme under which two
statutes define two different crimes, but proof of extra element is required by
statute prescribing higher penalty, does not violate equal protection clause of
federal constitution. U.S. Const. amend. 14.
Even under equal protection
analysis more stringent than the rational basis test, statute punishing those
who drove after their licenses had been suspended for driving under the
influence did not create unconstitutional classification, since (1) statutory
distinction was not incoherent or unclear; (2) court should not substitute its
opinion for that of the legislature on relative culpability, need for
deterrence, and other factors necessary to determine range of appropriate
sentences for various offenses; (3) drunken driving does appear to present
special problems that might suggest the need for special statutory
treatment. U.S. Const. amend 14; A.S.C.A. § 22.0223.
Extent to which the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies
in the
There is a rational basis for a
legislative distinction between (1) people who drive under the influence and
then drive with a suspended license; and (2) those who commit other sorts of
conduct punishable by suspension and then drive with a suspended license;
therefore, a statute embodying such a distinction did not deny equal protection
of the laws. U.S. Const. amdt. 14. Macomber v.
The Revised Constitution of
American Samoa, promulgated in 1967 under the authority of the Secretary of the
Interior, contains no equal protection clause.
Court employment of
Samoan-English interpreters, but not interpreters of other languages, is simply
a practice which reflects the cultural and juridical history of
It is unclear to what extent
equal protection applies in
The extent to which equal protection applies in the territory is unclear because the territorial constitution does not contain an equal protection clause. In Re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.
Eligibility to be a candidate for a matai title is not an incident of one's nationality and therefore A.S.C.A. § 1.0403 does not abridge a constitutionally guaranteed privilege. In re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.
Equal protection does not prevent classifications which are reasonably related to the achievement of a legislative purpose. In Re Matai Title “Mulitauaopele”, 29 A.S.R.2d 169.
Age groupings have been consistently upheld for regulatory objectives such as voting, jury selection, military service, and receiving Social Security and other benefits. In the context of matai title eligibility, the distinction between minority and majority is a logical differentiation. In Re Matai Title “Mulitauaopele”, 29 A.S.R.2d 169.
To prevail under the defense of
selective prosecution, a defendant must show that his prosecution was
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification, and that others similarly situated have not
been prosecuted.
Selective prosecution claims are
reviewed under ordinary equal protection standards.
A claim for selective prosecution
based on the publicity in a case is analyzed under the rational basis
standard.
Under the rational-basis test,
the government need only show that its actions are rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.
§7(3) Freedom of Speech, Press, and Religion
SEE RELIGION
Code prohibits enactment of law respecting establishment of religion or prohibiting free exercise thereof. Mulitauaopele v. Paleafei, 3 A.S.R. 93.
Law against prohibiting free exercise of religion refers to government and does not apply to individuals who object to use of their lands for church purposes. Mulitauaopele v. Paleafei, 3 A.S.R. 93.
Neither the rights to free speech
and a free press nor a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a public
trial preclude a court from excluding members of the public from the courtroom
during the testimony of juvenile complaining witness in a rape case, where the
court has determined after a public hearing that such exclusion is necessary to
protect the witness's psychological well-being or to prevent her from being
harassed and intimidated.
Blanket imposition of religious
programs on unconsenting inmate violates establishment and freedom of religion
clauses of both federal and territorial constitutions. U.S. Const. amend.
I; Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. I, § I.
First amendment prohibits court
from assuming jurisdiction to review church electoral processes or other
disputes concerning church policy and church administration. U.S. Const.
amend. 1. Ofa v.
Where the identity of a church's governing body is a matter of substantial controversy, civil courts are not to make the inquiry into religious law and usage that would be essential to the resolution of the controversy, but instead should attempt to apply "neutral principles of law." Tele`a v. Savea, 11 A.S.R.2d 110.
Court must examine both the
allegedly defamatory language and its context in determining whether it is a
statement of fact or a statement of opinion, since language which taken alone
might seem to be a statement of fact may be a statement of opinion when viewed
in context. King v.
The power to govern a
congregational church vests in the whole congregation, or in persons or
entities which the majority of the congregation may select as the governing
authority for general or particular purposes.
When the identity of the
governing authority or authorities within a church is substantially at issue,
civil courts must refrain from delving into ecclesiastical laws and practices
that may be paramount to resolving the controversy.
§7(4) Takings and Just Compensation
SEE PROPERTY § 1(3) – EMINENT DOMAIN
Private property may not be taken by government for private purposes even though just compensation is paid; but may be taken for public use. Government v. Soliai, 2 A.S.R. 600.
A "taking" of property
by ASG requires it to provide just compensation.
A land use regulation may effect
a constitutional taking if it fails to "substantially advance legitimate
state interests" or "denies an owner economically viable use of his
land."
Coastal zone regulations might
effect a taking, and thus require compensation to the landowner, if they
effectively prohibit any "economically viable" use of private
property.