CRIMINAL LAW
§ 2 Liability
2(1) Mens Rea (Intent)
2(2) Actus Reus
2(3) Causation
§ 3 Defenses
§ 4 Specific Crimes
4(1) Inchoate Offenses
4(2) Offenses Against the Person
4(3) Sexual Offenses
4(4) Prostitution
4(5) Offenses Against the Family
4(6) Abortion
4(7) Robbery, Arson, Burglary and Related Offenses
4(8) Stealing and Related Offenses
4(9) Weapons
4(10) Gambling
4(11) Pornography and Related Offenses
4(12) Offenses Against Public Order
4(13) Offenses Against the Administration of Justice
4(14) Offenses Affecting Government
4(15) Traffic Offenses
4(16) Drug Offenses
4(17) Miscellaneous Offenses
§ 1 General Provisions
In criminal case, prosecution must prove case beyond
reasonable doubt.
Conviction upon circumstantial evidence is proper if court
is convinced that defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Person accused of crime is presumed innocent until proven
guilty, and in criminal prosecution state has burden of establishing all
essential elements of crime and proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Under rule of burden of proof, prosecution is compelled to
establish every essential element of crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.
Accessory before the fact is one who procures, commands, or counsels commission of felony by another but who is not present when felony is committed, and under Code such accessory is principal. CAS 805.) Government v. Tulei, 2 A.S.R. 656.
Conviction is not warranted where evidence is as consistent with innocence as it is with hypothesis of guilt. Government v. Nomura, 2 A.S.R. 658.
In order to sustain conviction on circumstantial evidence, all circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with hypothesis that accused is guilty and inconsistent with hypothesis that he is innocent. Government v. Nomura, 2 A.S.R. 658.
Burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases
does not prohibit trier of fact from drawing inferences from the
evidence.
§ 2 Liability
§2(1) Mens Rea (Intent)
Their testimony indicates that accused may have honestly
believed that destroyed plants were one their own land, there can be no
criminal intent or mens rea and no conviction since criminal intent is element
of trespass.
Territorial forgery statute requires that defendant have
created the false writing with intent to defraud, not that he have actually
succeeded in defraudying anyone. A.S.C.A. § 46.4115.
Statute providing that assault in the first degree is
committed when a person "attempts to kill or cause serious physical injury
to another person" requires proof of specific intent. A.S.C.A. §
46.3520 (a)(2). Tauasosi v.
Where a statute requires that a person act intentionally,
knowingly, or purposefully, or "attempt" to commit a crime, proof of
specific intent is required. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3503 (a)(1), 46.3503 (a)(2),
46.3520 (a)(1), 46.3520 (a)(2). Tauasosi v.
No proof of specific intent is required by statute providing
that a person commits a crime if "under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3503 (a)(3), 46.3520 (a)(3).
Tauasosi v.
A crime that requires proof of specific intent is not a
lesser-included offense of a crime that does not require proof of specific
intent and must be separately charged. Tauasosi v.
Because third-degree assault can be committed "recklessly" or even "with criminal negligence," a guilty plea does not establish what injuries, if any, were inflicted upon plaintiff, nor does it establish that defendant acted intentionally, an essential element of the tort of battery. A.S.C.A. § 46.3522(a)(1) & (4). Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.
When a crime includes an intent element, a finding of guilt
in the first part of a bifurcated trial also implicitly includes a finding that
the defendant either had the requisite intent or would have had it but for the
mental disease or defect. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302.
Intent to injure or defraud a bank exists when the defendant
acts knowingly and the natural result of this conduct would be to injure or
defraud the bank, regardless of motive. It is not required that the bank
suffer a loss or injury, since the intent of the law is to protect the bank's
right to make its own decisions regarding the use of its funds.
Furthermore, there exists an inherently fraudulent nature to bank loans made by
officers for their own benefit.
For purposes of determining criminal culpability under a possession statute, a person need not own the illegal thing but may still have possession of it if the person knows of its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to control it. The court may reasonably infer that a defendant knew of the presence and had physical control of a gun where the gun was found in a residence that defendant lived in as evidence by his presence in and familiarity with the residence. American Samoa Gov’t v. Se`iuli, 29 A.S.R.2d 176.
§2(2)
Actus
Under the "objective territorial" principle of
jurisdiction, criminal acts taking place outside a state are within its
territorial jurisdiction if those acts produced proscribed effects within the
state.
When conduct, taking place within a state, produces its
effect in another state, the two states have concurrent jurisdiction over the
transaction.
In providing prison warden with an unsigned document stating
the terms of a prisoner's sentence, office of the attorney general was acting
to ensure compliance by government officials with an order that had already
been publicly announced in the presence of counsel for the government and was
already binding on the government as well as on the defendant, and receipt of
this document imposed a duty on the warden to inquire further of the court or
the attorney general's office, at the very least, before releasing the
defendant in direct violation of the notice he had been given.
§2(3) Causation
"Proximate cause" within the meaning of homicide
by vehicle statute is proven if the traffic regulation violated by the
defendant was designed to prevent the sort of harm that actually occurred and
the violation was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident.
A.S.C.A. § 22.0706.
An accused cannot escape criminal liability for a vehicular
homicide if intervening contributing conduct is foreseeable.
Accountability is excused only if the intervening cause
supersedes the defendant's original act.
§ 3 Defenses
Provocation is not defense to assault, but may be considered
as extenuation, and when considering provocation, question is what is
impression made on mind of person committing assault.
Serious allegations against defendant by victim which
provoke assault do not constitute defense or excuse for assault.
Evidence of accusations made against defendant and of
actions of defendant demonstrating she was acting in rage at time she committed
assault constitute provocation.
Lower court’s acquittal of sixteen year old boy who went along with criminals because he feared bodily harm was correct. Government v. Tulei, 2 A.S.R. 656.
Ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse for its violation, and belief of defendant that chief could excuse him from searching for coconut beetle was not excuse for violating law by failing to search. Government v. Si’u, 3 A.S.R. 479.
It is no defense for accused that another person pled guilty to same crime and was not punished. Government v. Si’u, 3 A.S.R. 479.
Where defendant’s eyesight is defective, he is not required to comply with statute requiring that he search for coconut beetle and attaching penalty for failure to do so. Fe’a v. Government, 3 A.S.R. 496.
Defective eyesight is not defense to failure to assist in building village pig wall, such failure being misdemeanor, if defendant could have performed work and been of assistance. Fe’a v. Government, 3 A.S.R. 496.
Plea of statute of limitations may be raised under plea of not guilty. Government v. palafu, 3 A.S.R. 556.
That defendant's conduct was similar to pre-Christian Samoan
ceremonial practices was no defense in prosecution for sexual abuse and sodomy,
since territorial legislature enacted no statutory exception for such
practices. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3611, 3612.
A finding of self-defense is a complete defense to a criminal charge of third-degree assault. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3305 & 46.3522(a). Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.
A defense of diminished mental capacity consists of showing
that a mental disease or defect, although not rendering the defendant
"insane," nevertheless prevented him from having the requisite state
of mind to be guilty of the charged crime.
A criminal defendant who puts his mental capacity at issue
may be compelled to submit to an examination by the government's expert, who may
testify about his observations and conclusions. A.S.C.A. § 46.1304.
Regarding a defense of diminished mental capacity, when a
mental disease or defect is alleged to have resulted in a criminal defendant's
"incapacity to intend" rather than in "insanity," the
testimony of the government's expert must be limited to the question of such
incapacity and may not be considered by the jury for any other purpose.
The testimony of the government's expert may, in some
circumstances, include statements made to him by a criminal defendant during
the compelled examination, although the witness may testify only about the
alleged mental disease or defect and not about "guilt or innocence"
(i.e., about whether the defendant would be guilty in the absence of any such
disease or defect). A.S.C.A. § 46.1304.
§ 4 Specific Crimes
§4(1) Inchoate Offenses
Code makes it crime for persons to conspire to injure or oppress rights of another Samoan under law, and these rights include that of family member to occupy communal land. Leasiolagi v. Fao, 2 A.S.R. 451.
§4(2) Offenses Against the Person
Code makes it crime for matai or other chief to injure, oppress, or threaten Samoan to deprive him of any right under law, and such right includes right to occupy family lands. Leasiolagi v. Fao, 2 A.S.R. 451.
Assault with deadly weapon is infamous crime and disqualifies candidate from eligibility for matai title. Akeimo v. Mulu, 2 A.S.R. 89.
Mere threat to commit injury is not actionable wrong and does not constitute assault, which must be apparent attempt by violence to do corporal hurt to another. Fesagaiga v. Alo-Pepe, 3 A.S.R. 118.
Slanderous remarks and assault and battery by one party against another cannot be considered by courts in interpreting trust, but do constitute crimes and torts, and court may give warning to that effect to offending party. Tolivale v. Ufanua, 3 A.S.R. 196.
Statute providing that assault in the first degree is
committed when a person "attempts to kill or cause serious physical injury
to another person" requires proof of specific intent. A.S.C.A. §
46.3520 (a)(2). Tauasosi v.
Because third-degree assault can be committed "recklessly" or even "with criminal negligence," a guilty plea does not establish what injuries, if any, were inflicted upon plaintiff, nor does it establish that defendant acted intentionally, an essential element of the tort of battery. A.S.C.A. § 46.3522(a)(1) & (4). Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.
A finding of self-defense is a complete defense to a criminal charge of third-degree assault. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3305 & 46.3522(a). Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.
§4(3) Sexual Offenses
Charge of rape is improper where both parties consent to
intercourse upon which charge was founded.
Where statute defines the crime of sexual abuse to include
the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, such purpose can be
inferred by the trier of fact from the defendant's conduct.
Statute defining the crime of sodomy does not require proof
that defendant committed the act with the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire. A.S.C.A. § 46.3611.
That defendant's conduct was similar to pre-Christian Samoan
ceremonial practices was no defense in prosecution for sexual abuse and sodomy,
since territorial legislature enacted no statutory exception for such
practices. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3611, 3612.
Record adequately supported trial court's finding that
defendant had made sexual contact with his daughter without her consent and for
the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.
§4(4) Prostitution
RESERVED
§4(5) Offenses Against the Family
RESERVED
§4(6) Abortion
RESERVED
§4(7) Robbery, Arson, Burglary and Related Offenses
RESERVED
§4(8) Stealing and Related Offenses
Petty larceny is a misdemeanor. Government v. Palafu, 3 A.S.R. 556.
Family member may be convicted for larceny for taking
plantations or fruit from another family member’s plot on family lands.
Territorial forgery statute requires that defendant have
created the false writing with intent to defraud, not that he have actually
succeeded in defraudying anyone. A.S.C.A. § 46.4115.
Under territorial statute, one who makes a contract within the territory to extend credit at the rate of 20 per cent commits the crime of usury and is liable to imprisonment and to forfeiture of the entire amount of the debt. A.S.C.A. § 28.1510. Shantilal Brothers Limited v. K.M.S.T. Wholesales, Inc., 9 A.S.R.2d 62.
Under the embezzlement statute, a "person commits the
crime of embezzlement if he knowingly misappropriates property of another which
has been entrusted to him or which has lawfully come under his control.
A.S.C.A. § 46.4104(a).
A person commits the crime of stealing if he appropriates
property of another with the purpose to deprive him of it by means of deceit"
A.S.C.A. § 46.4103(a).
Normally, "value" is determined by the market
value of the thing taken at the time and place of the crime. A.S.C.A. §
46.4102(a). However, when the thing taken is an instrument evidencing
debt, that value is the amount due or collectible on it. A.S.C.A. §
46.4102(b)(1).
In a criminal case involving fraud on a bank, the government
has the burden to show that the defendant acted with the intent to injure or
defraud the bank.
Intent to injure or defraud a bank exists when the defendant
acts knowingly and the natural result of this conduct would be to injure or
defraud the bank, regardless of motive. It is not required that the bank
suffer a loss or injury, since the intent of the law is to protect the bank's
right to make its own decisions regarding the use of its funds.
Furthermore, there exists an inherently fraudulent nature to bank loans made by
officers for their own benefit.
Harm to a bank is established if there are special circumstances demonstrating injury or risk of injury to the bank despite the obligation of a financially responsible party to the bank. A.S.G. v. Leiataua, 31 A.S.R.2d 89.
§4(9) Weapons
RESERVED
§4(10) Gambling
Gambling and the keeping of gaming facilities is a criminal
offense, though an exception exists for occasional bingo games whose profits
are used for charitable, religious, or educational purposes. A.S.C.A. §
46.4301-46.4302. Le Vaomatua v.
Money lending is not within the ambit of the gaming
statute's proviso exempting gaming for religious, educational, or charitable
purpose. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.4301-02. United Congregational Christian
Church of the
§4(11) Pornography and Related Offenses
RESERVED
§4(12) Offenses Against Public Order
RESERVED
§4(13) Offenses Against the Administration of Justice
Criminal trial is not a private matter between victim and
defendant or his family, and anyone who enters an agreement with the purpose of
rendering court unable to proceed by making evidence unavailable may be held in
contempt of court.
Criminal contempt statute authorizing the executive to
prosecute certain conduct as criminal contempt of court does not limit court's
power to act on its own under general contempt statute. A.S.C.A. §§
3.0203, 46.4617.
General contempt statute may give rise to criminal liability
despite existence of separate statute making certain acts criminal
offenses. A.S.C.A. §§ 3.0203, 46.4617.
Agreement between prospective witness in criminal proceeding
and members of the defendant's family that defendant would leave the territory
and victim would refuse to testify constituted resistance to process of court
within meaning of contempt statute, even if "process" is construed
narrowly to refer to a subpoena and even though the agreement was made prior to
the issuance of a subpoena to the witness, since the agreement could not
reasonably be construed to mean that the witness would refuse to testify only
if she received no subpoena. A.S.C.A. § 3.0203.
Agreement between prospective witness and members of
criminal defendant's family that defendant would leave the territory and
witness would refuse to testify, made after court's order that defendant stand
trial and with the purpose of preventing the trial, constituted resistance to
the court's mandate within the meaning of contempt statute. A.S.C.A. § 3.0203.
Where evidence at hearing on order to show cause showed that
former warden and other prison officials had wilfully violated court order, but
that incumbent warden to whom order to show cause was directed had taken no
part in releasing prisoner in violation of court order, the incumbent warden
would not be held in contempt of court.
Where court had allowed defendant a limited "work
release" during a term of detention as a condition of probation, and
defendant had wilfully violated the terms of the work release by spending time
at home and engaging in social activities during times when he was released
solely for purposes of employment, the work release would be revoked and the
defendant held in contempt of court.
Warden's contention that judgment and sentence prohibiting
release of prisoner was not binding on him because the copy he initially
received did not bear the signatures of the judges was without merit, where
sentence had been previously been announced from the bench and where a signed
copy of the written order had been served on the government prior to the time
the warden willfully disregarded the order.
Persons continuing to occupy and cultivate land adjudicated as belonging to another family are subject to sanctions for contempt. Lualemaga v. Asifoa, 23 A.S.R.2d 17.
§4(14) Offenses Affecting Government
RESERVED
§4(15) Traffic Offenses
Code of
Where policeman testifies as to speed of defendant following his automobile and ascertains speed from his speedometer, this would be accurate evidence. Tigi v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 894.
Where defendant admits that he was traveling at a certain speed which he thought lawful but was in fact not lawful, this admission corroborates testimony of witnessing policeman. Tigi v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 894.
Corroboration of testimony of prosecution’s witness in traffic case is not required. Tigi v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 902.
Same transaction may constitute both careless driving and speeding, subjecting defendant to conviction for each offense. Tigi v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 902.
Police officer's uncontroverted testimony that speed limit
sign had been posted because the road was near a school did not bind the court
to find that the posted limit applied only during school hours.
"Proximate cause" within the meaning of homicide
by vehicle statute is proven if the traffic regulation violated by the
defendant was designed to prevent the sort of harm that actually occurred and
the violation was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident.
A.S.C.A. § 22.0706.
Court could conclude beyond any doubt that defendant who
received speeding ticket was the same defendant whose license had previously
been suspended after conviction for driving under the influence, although the
speeding defendant had signed a different first name to the ticket, where (1)
the last names were identical; (2) the signature on the ticket appeared to have
been written in the same distinctive handwriting as the signature on the
earlier ticket for driving under the influence; (3) the speeding defendant gave
the same date of birth and village of residence as the driving under the
influence defendant; (4) the speeding defendant did not present the arresting
officer with a driver's license; (5) since the license of the driving under the
influence defendant was still suspended at the time the speeding ticket was
issued, he would not have had his license in his possession, and would have had
motive and opportunity to misinform the officer of his identity.
Under A.S.C.A. § 22.0708 the injury to any person resulting
from the operation of a motor vehicle by a person under the influence of
intoxicating liquor creates a felony offense.
Under A.S.C.A. § 22.0607(a)(3), a driver having a
blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or more is presumed to be "under the
influence of intoxicating liquor." Toleafoa v.
Additional evidence regarding driving under the influence
may also be presented at trial. A.S.C.A. § 22.0607(b). Toleafoa v.
Once a driver is found to have a blood-alcohol level of
0.08% or more, the statute presumes that he is under the influence and so is
incapable of operating a vehicle safely. This statutory presumption
reflects the proven medical fact that ingesting substantial quantities of
alcohol impairs one's driving ability. Toleafoa v.
Appellant's contention that his not getting in an accident
supports a finding that he was capable of safe driving, this is a
"specious argument." The whole point of traffic laws is to
prevent accidents, not just to punish drivers after an accident. Toleafoa
v.
Only two elements constitute the offense of Driving under
the Influence of Alcohol or Other Drugs: (1) the defendant was driving a motor
vehicle, (2) while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. Being a
legal and not a medical term, "under the influence" means a person's
intoxication has reached "a degree which renders him incapable of safely
driving." A.S.C.A. § 22.0707(a). Toleafoa v.
The means of proving "under the influence" varies
with each case and may include (1) observations of the defendant's manner of
driving, his physical symptoms, and his performance of field sobriety tests;
(2) his blood-alcohol level as shown in test results; and (3) admissible
statements made by the defendant. Toleafoa v.
If evidence of past crimes speaks more to defendant's
proclivity to commit crimes in general, rather than his participation in the
crime at hand, it has a high probability of instigating the jury to convict
because defendant "is a bad person" - an unallowable inference.
An accused cannot escape criminal liability for a vehicular
homicide if intervening contributing conduct is foreseeable.
The difference between "suspension" and
"revocation" of a driver's license is insignificant for determining
whether a defendant has committed a felony for driving while license is
suspended in violation of A.S.C.A. § 22.0223. A.S.C.A. § 22.0223.
A.S.C.A. § 22.0803 does not apply to felonies. Under
A.S.C.A. § 22.0708 the injury to any person resulting from the operation of a
motor vehicle by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor creates a
felony offense. Officers may upon reasonable grounds, arrest persons
found near the scene of a felony within a short time after its
commission. See A.S.C.A. § 46.0805 (3).
§4(16) Drug Offenses
In
Marijuana need not appear in its "recognizable" or "customary" form for an individual to be guilty of unlawful possession of marijuana. The Fono has explicitly included marijuana resin as a disallowed controlled substance and did not distinguish between typical and atypical forms if marijuana resin. A.S.G. v. Mapu, 31 A.S.R.2d 148.
§4(17) Miscellaneous Offenses
Where person tells three witnesses to tell false story in
court to support conviction of accused for rape, he is guilty of subornation of
perjury.
Pig running at large would not necessarily be criminal nuisance unless feces of pig were allowed to collect on land in such quantities as to constitute unsanitary nuisance. (CAS 429.) Government v. Nomura, 2 A.S.R. 658.
False statement must be material to issue or question under consideration in order to constitute perjury, and false statement with respect to who types letter does not constitute perjury. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Misleading questions and questions containing more than one proposition to which different answers might be applied will not support conviction for perjury based on their answers. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of unauthorized
practice of law where it was established that appellant filed a memorandum in a
criminal case containing legal argument offered on behalf of the
defendant. A.S.C.A. § 31.0104. Pene v.