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Fact there is no indictment by grand jury nor jury trial in American Samoa does not deprive High Court of jurisdiction over criminal matters arising herein. American Samoa v. Willis, 1 A.S.R. 635.

At time United States assumed control of American Samoa, treaty was in effect that applied laws of any nation signing treaty which judge considered appropriate for criminal offenses, and customs of Samoa were applied with respect to natives. American Samoa v. Willis, 1 A.S.R. 635.

Conviction may stand even though no person actually witnessed crime. American Samoa v. Sale, 2 A.S.R. 635.

Clerk of Court has no authority to excuse person from standing trial for criminal offense. Government v. Si’u, 3 A.S.R. 479.

Court acquires personal jurisdiction in criminal case if defendant is personally served with summons while in American Samoa. Government v. Tobu Boeki, K.K., 4 A.S.R. 843.

Court acquires personal jurisdiction in criminal case against foreign corporation if it has local registered agent or is “doing business” in American Samoa. Government v. Tobu Boeki, K.K., 4 A.S.R. 843.

Unlike federal rules of criminal procedure promulgated under the authority of Congress and binding on federal courts to the same extent as statutes, territorial rules are made by the Court itself, so that a time limit provided by territorial rule is not as obviously jurisdictional as a similar limit provided by federal rule. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. § 3.1002(c). American Samoa Gov't v. Tile, 8 A.S.R.2d 120.

Court will not interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion unless it is shown that such discretion was unconstitutionally vested in the prosecutor or that it has been abused or exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner. American Samoa Gov't v. Julio, 9 A.S.R.2d 128.

Order issued in open court is binding from the moment it is announced, whether or not it is ever reduced to writing. American Samoa Government v. Laumoli, 12 A.S.R.2d 111.

Because the High Court's rules were promulgated solely on its own authority, they must give way to territorial statutes defining the court's jurisdiction, unless the statutes themselves are unconstitutional. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

In the interest of judicial economy, we place the burden on defendants to give the court sufficient reason to continue trial. American Samoa Gov't v. Fairholt, 28 A.S.R.2d 26.

Judicial economy and legitimate public interests favor a joinder of all offenses against the accused. American Samoa Gov't v. Antonio, 28 A.S.R.2d 165.

Whether joinder of offenses or defendants is appropriate is determined on a case by case basis. American Samoa Gov't v. Antonio, 28 A.S.R.2d 165.

A.S.C.A. § 46.0501 does not make 18 U.S.C.S. § 3144 applicable to the Territory. A.S.C.A. § 46.0501 brings our criminal procedure into conformance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, not with every rule of criminal procedure applicable in the federal courts. The term "Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" refers specifically to the 68 rules, which go by that title. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3144, while a rule of criminal procedure applicable to federal courts, is not part of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Re Proceedings to Compel Attendance of May Fitiausi, 29 A.S.R.2d 71.

Criminal procedure in the High Court must conform as nearly as practical to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The High Court will consider interpretations of the federal rules by federal courts to be highly persuasive in the interpretation of the local rules, which mirror the federal rules. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lafoga, 30 A.S.R.2d 110.

A change of venue for a criminal prosecution is not available under the Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. A.S.G. v. Fruean, 31 A.S.R.2d 1.

There is no other venue available for ASG's felony prosecutions other than the High Court of American Samoa. A.S.G. v. Pu`aa, 31 A.S.R.2d 73.

§ 2 Criminal Complaints, Indictments and Bills of Information

Provisions of Article V and VI of amendments to Constitution of United States relating to right to be tried on indictment returned by grand jury and jury of peers do not apply to American Samoa because form of government was established to suit conditions of locality, and justice cannot be administered according to form in United States. American Samoa v. Willis, 1 A.S.R. 635.

Cases in other jurisdictions taking an extremely narrow view of the power of courts to construe indictments, motivated by a vestigial regard for the technical rules of common law pleading or by concern for the separation of powers between grand juries and prosecutors, are not helpful in determining the validity of a criminal information in a territory that does not have grand juries and in which pleadings are to be construed in order to do justice. Rule 7, Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. American Samoa Gov't v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

The sufficiency of a criminal information is to be judged by whether it states the essential facts of the alleged crime in a way that gives the defendant fair notice of what he is being charged with. Rule 7, Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. American Samoa Gov't v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

Language in an information alleging that defendant "fired a shotgun toward certain people" implicitly charged that defendant intended the probable results of such an act. Rule 7, Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. American Samoa Gov't v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

Where a criminal information was otherwise sufficient to charge intentional second degree murder, and where throughout the proceedings the prosecution had obviously been attempting to prove that defendant had acted intentionally and there had been no objection from defense counsel, the inclusion of the word "recklessly" in a part of the information separate from the description of the alleged conduct was mere surplusage rather than an essential limiting term in the information. American Samoa Gov't v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

Where prosecution explicitly and unequivocally argued that the defendant should be found guilty of intentional second-degree murder, and defense counsel responded by contesting the charge on the merits rather than by asserting its inconsistency with the information, defense counsel had waived any variance between the information and a conviction of intentional second degree murder or any lesser-included offense. American Samoa Gov't v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

No criminal information can be filed in the High Court without a prior judicial determination that probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the crime with which he is charged. T.C.R.C.P. 5.1. Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

Criminal charge using statutory language is permissible providing the statute sets forth fully, directly and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, all the elements needed to comprise the offense intended to be punished. T.C.R.Cr.P. 7(c). American Samoa Gov't v. Afamasaga, 17 A.S.R.2d 145.

Though a bill of information must plainly, concisely, and definitely state in writing the essential facts constituting the offense charged, it need not set forth facts and evidentiary details needed to establish each element of the charged offense. T.C.R.Cr.P. 7(c). American Samoa Gov't v. Afamasaga, 17 A.S.R.2d 145.

Bill of information charging sodomy without specifying which of the various sexual acts constituting an element of the offense was alleged, sufficiently informed defendant of the nature of the charges to enable him to prepare his defense and did not subject him to double jeopardy since he could refer to the entire record of the preliminary examination, not just the bill of information, when claiming double jeopardy from a subsequent prosecution. American Samoa Gov't v. Afamasaga, 17 A.S.R.2d 145.

A bill of information using the language of the criminal statute is sufficient as long as the statute sets forth all of the elements constituting the offence. American Samoa Gov't v. Luki, 21 A.S.R.2d 84.

Intended to give a criminal defendant adequate notice of the charge against him, a bill of information is made with sufficient specificity if it fully and unambiguously sets forth the elements constituting the offense. American Samoa Gov't v. Schuster, 24 A.S.R.2d 15.

A bill of particulars is not required as long as a defendant has enough information to adequately prepare a defense, avoid surprise at trial, and protect him against a second prosecution for an inadequately described offense; as such, a defendant is required to look at all of the government's sources and not simply the information formally charging him with the crime. American Samoa Gov't v. Wilson, 24 A.S.R.2d 26.

Even if an arrest was illegal, a bill of information setting forth criminal charges is not necessarily void. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. American Samoa Gov't v. Meleisea, 24 A.S.R.2d 32.

The district court is authorized to issue process, and an arrest warrant is a form of process. A.S.C.A. § 3.0304, T.C.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(1). American Samoa Gov't v. Meleisea, 24 A.S.R.2d 32.

The district court is authorized to issue process, and an arrest warrant is a form of process. A.S.C.A. § 3.0304, T.C.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(1). American Samoa Gov't v. Tagaloa, 24 A.S.R.2d 37.

Even if an arrest was illegal, a bill of information setting forth criminal charges is not necessarily void. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. American Samoa Gov't v. Tagaloa, 24 A.S.R.2d 37.

A bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as justice requires, pursuant to T.C.R.Cr.P. Rule 7(f). American Samoa Gov't v. Tali, 25 A.S.R.2d 21.

The bill of particulars, an ancient aid to pleading and procedure, has survived in the federal rules of procedure for criminal cases, but not for civil cases. It provides a basis upon which the defense can formulate strategy when the charges, though legally sufficient, are vaguely stated. American Samoa Gov't v. Tali, 25 A.S.R.2d 21.

The criteria for sufficiency of a bill of particulars is whether the defendant has been fully informed of the charges well in advance of trial, and has been afforded ample opportunity to prepare his defense. To be fully informed of the charges means that the bill of particulars sufficiently apprises the defendant of the theory of the charge against him, and of the general character of the evidence sustaining the charge. American Samoa Gov't v. Tali, 25 A.S.R.2d 21.

All evidence tending to show guilt is broadly prejudicial, but does not preclude joinder of similar charges under T.C.R.Cr.P. 8. T.C.R.Cr.P. 8. American Samoa Gov't v. Bryce, 27 A.S.R.2d 1.

An information may generally be amended in form or substance at any time prior to verdict as long as the substantial rights of a defendant are not prejudiced. T.C.R.Cr.P. 8. American Samoa Gov't v. Bryce, 27 A.S.R.2d 1.

An amendment to an information will be allowed as long as the defendant is well apprised. T.C.R.Cr.P. 8. American Samoa Gov't v. Bryce, 27 A.S.R.2d 1.

T.C.R.Cr.P. 5(a) and A.S.C.A. § 46.0807(b) serve different purposes, and are not inconsistent. Rule 5(a) is meant to apply when a person is arrested and it is contemplated that he will be charged with a crime. Section 46.0807(b), on the other hand, contemplates the situation where a person is arrested and needs to be held for some period of time for his own safety or to protect the public safety, but will not be charged with a crime. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lolesio, 30 A.S.R.2d 24.

A prisoner already in custody who is merely returned to custody following an escape does not possess the liberty interest protected by T.C.R.Cr.P. 5. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lafoga, 30 A.S.R.2d 110.

§ 3 Pleas

When criminal defendant has agreed to plead guilty in exchange for agreement by prosecutor to request a particular sentence, court must specifically warn defendant that prosecutor's recommendation is not binding on the court and that he will have no right to withdraw his guilty plea if the court imposes a harsher sentence. Rule 11(e)(2), Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Uiliata v. American Samoa Gov't, 3 A.S.R.2d 102.

To satisfy rule requiring court to find a factual basis for accepting a guilty plea, the sentencing judge must develop a record of that basis, for example by having the accused describe his criminal conduct, or by asking the defendant whether he understands the charges against him and whether he committed the acts charged in the indictment. T.C.R.Cr.P. Rule 11(f). Suisala v. Moaali'itele, 6 A.S.R.2d 15.

Judicial assessment of factual basis for accepting a guilty plea may be made at any time prior to judgment and sentencing and may be based on any evidence sufficiently articulated in the record. T.C.R.Cr.P. Rule 11(f). Suisala v. Moaali'itele, 6 A.S.R.2d 15.

Difference between defendant's testimony and prosecution evidence did not preclude court from finding sufficient factual basis for accepting guilty plea when aggregation of evidence fully justified acceptance of plea. Suisala v. Moaali'itele, 6 A.S.R.2d 15.

If a defendant wishes to limit the scope of his civil liability without unreservedly admitting his guilt, he can seek to enter a plea of nolo contendere, although the government or the Court might reject such a plea bargain, or the Court might accept the plea and impose the maximum legal sentence. Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

The government acts improperly when it introduces evidence of defendant's pleas of nolo contendere in previous criminal proceedings. T.C.R.Ev. 410. American Samoa Gov't v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

A plea of nolo contendere is recognized as having no effect beyond the action in which it is entered and no evidentiary value as an admission of guilt. American Samoa Gov't v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

Normally, the relevance of a witness' testimony is decided by the trial judge after the witness has been sworn and objections have been made. American Samoa Gov't v. Talamoni, 27 A.S.R.2d 123.

A nolo contendere plea is provided for the purpose of facilitating compromise in the plea bargaining process by allowing the accused to avoid an admission of guilt and the attendant evidentiary impact of that admission in potential future proceedings. American Samoa Gov't v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

Where prosecutors have improperly introduced evidence of defendant's pleas of nolo contendere in previous criminal proceedings, court will not grant a mistrial, but will strike and disregard the evidence. American Samoa Gov't v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

The High Court generally rejects plea agreements under T.C.R.Cr. P. 11 (e)(1)(C) that remove the court's discretion in sentencing except in very rare occasions where the interests of justice were found to be better served by their acceptance. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 28 A.S.R.2d 7.

A plea agreement that does not state a disposition allowable under applicable law is invalid. The Territory’s criminal law has been codified, so the fact that a disposition is not disallowed does not make it available to the sentencing court. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3102-3104. American Samoa Gov’t v. Nofoagatotoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 20.

There is only one exception to the general requirement that the court must deal with criminal offenders as proscribed in Chapter 19 of the Criminal Justice Act (A.S.C.A. § 46.1901 et seq.). This exception provides for the option of deferred proceedings, upon a plea of guilt or finding of guilt, in the context of a possession of a controlled substance charge, under Title 13. A.S.C.A. § 13.1024. There is no parallel provision for deferred proceedings in the context of assault related prosecutions. American Samoa Gov’t v. Nofoagatotoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 20.

§ 4 Trial

§4(1) Pre-Trial Matters

While pre‑trial motions in criminal matters should ordinarily be heard in a timely manner, an inflexible policy in this regard is inappropriate. Each situation must be individually considered. American Samoa Gov't v. Tali, 25 A.S.R.2d 21.

From the face of the statute, the court does not appear to have discretion in ordering forfeiture of bail if a condition of the bond is violated. T.C.R.Cr.P. 46(e)(1). American Samoa Gov’t v. Togialeoli, 30 A.S.R.2d 130.

Failure to appear for trial and violating travel restrictions are ample justification for forfeiture of a bond. American Samoa Gov’t v. Togialeoli, 30 A.S.R.2d 130.

There is not undue prejudice to a criminal defendant so great as to deny a defendant a fair and impartial trial when newspaper accounts of an assault and the victim’s death were largely exculpatory and the government has stipulated that the defendants did not cause the victim’s death. A.S.G. v. Fruean, 31 A.S.R.2d 1.

§4(2) Competence to Stand Trial

The Court may order a mentally incompetent defendant to be confined for a maximum of 120 days; within 120 days a hearing shall be held to determine whether the defendant has become competent to stand trial and, if not, whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain competency within one year or the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime charged. A.S.C.A. § 46.1305 American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 16 A.S.R.2d 44.

The Court may order a mental examination of a defendant. A.S.C.A. § 46.1303. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 16 A.S.R.2d 44.

A defendant will be found incompetent to stand trial if he does not have a sufficient and present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 18 A.S.R.2d 42.

Although tests to assess general intelligence, capability of abstract thought, and presence of mental disorders had not been specifically "validated" for Samoans or Pacific Islanders as a group, there was little risk that such tests would give false results when applied to a Samoan defendant in determining his competency to stand trial. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 18 A.S.R.2d 42.

§4(3) Bifurcated Proceedings

The bifurcated-proceedings statute divides the inquiry into whether the defendant "committed the criminal act charged" and whether he was "insane at the time of the commission of the criminal act." A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

In a bifurcated criminal trial, the jury is not exposed to evidence of the defendant's mental capacity until the jury makes an independent finding as to whether the defendant committed the act charged. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

Although a defense of diminished mental capacity is arguably comprehended within the "guilt" phase of a bifurcated trial, the interests in a fair trial and an orderly proceeding may be better served by reserving all evidence of mental disease or defect for the "insanity" phase because a jury is likely to view the evidence as being highly probative of issues other than the criminal defendant's mental state, and a limiting instruction would likely be ineffective. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

During the first phase of a bifurcated criminal trial involving the defense of diminished mental capacity, the court limited the evidence to whether the defendant is or would be guilty, assuming the absence of any mental disease or defect such as would render him incapable of understanding the difference between right and wrong, incapable of conforming his conduct to such a standard, or otherwise incapable of having any requisite mental element of the crimes charged or of any lesser-included offenses. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

During the first phase of a bifurcated criminal trial involving the defense of diminished mental capacity, though necessarily concerned with the defendant's thoughts relevant to the charged offenses, the court limited both parties from addressing such questions by expert testimony from psychiatrists or psychologists or by other evidence calculated to show that defendant did or not have a mental disease or defect. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302, 46.1304. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

During the "guilt" phase of a bifurcated criminal trial, the government may not make any use of statements made by the defendant to the government's expert witness or of any evidence discovered as a result of such statements that would not ultimately have been discovered had the statements not been made, unless the defendant put a fact at issue which could only be effectively addressed by the otherwise-inadmissible evidence and if required in the interest of justice. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302, 46.1304. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

If the defendant is found guilty of one or more crimes in the first phase of a bifurcated criminal trial involving the defense of diminished mental capacity, the trial will proceed to the second stage, during which the parties may present evidence on whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect which would either support an insanity defense or tend to negate the existence of any requisite mental elements of the crime or crimes. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

During the second phase of a bifurcated criminal trial involving the defense of diminished mental capacity, the government may use evidence obtained during its expert's examination of the defendant or as a result of such evidence, including but not limited to statements made by the defendant to the expert. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302, 46.1304. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

Defense counsel's motion for a bifurcated criminal trial constituted an implicit waiver of any objection to a procedure which, although clearly consistent with the legislative purpose of the bifurcated-trial statute, is not clearly authorized regarding a defense of diminished mental capacity. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302. American Samoa Gov't v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

§4(4) Discovery

Request that government investigate each of its prospective witnesses at criminal trial in order to ascertain whether any witness had a criminal record in another jurisdiction, and inform defense counsel of any such record, was beyond the scope of defendant's right to discovery. American Samoa Gov't v. Talamoa, 10 A.S.R.2d14.

Provision of territorial constitution prohibiting deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law prohibits prosecution from suppressing any evidence favorable to an accused where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. I § 2. American Samoa Gov't v. Talamoa, 10 A.S.R.2d14.

General request by defense counsel for any evidence in the possession of the prosecution that might tend to exculpate the defendant was within the scope of rule prohibiting suppression of material evidence favorable to the accused. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. I § 2. American Samoa Gov't v. Talamoa, 10 A.S.R.2d14.

When a defendant makes a request for discovery and disclosure of exculpatory information, the prosecutor's responses are inadequate when the prosecutor does not make a diligent inquiry from all relevant branches of government, as he or she must answer for the government as a whole. American Samoa Gov't v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 46.

In responding to a defendant's request for discovery and disclosure of exculpatory information, the prosecutor must identify specifically by category the reason for which an item is not produced. American Samoa Gov't v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 46.

Once the potential for an unfair trial has been cured, no Brady violation is possible, since Brady is premised on the right to a fair trial. American Samoa Gov't v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 46.

A non-capital criminal defendant is not constitutionally or procedurally entitled to a list of the prosecution's prospective witnesses. U.S. Const. Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. I, § 2; T.C.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(2). American Samoa Gov't v. Wilson, 24 A.S.R.2d 26.

Failure to disclose, or late disclosure of, evidence is prejudicial when the evidence would provide a significant chance of establishing a reasonable doubt that would not otherwise exist. American Samoa Gov't v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution suppressed evidence that was favorable to the defense or exculpatory and was material. American Samoa Gov't v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish "materiality" in the constitutional sense. American Samoa Gov't v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

A defendant must show a “significant chance" that the evidence suppressed by the government would have produced reasonable doubt as to guilt. American Samoa Gov't v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

Identities of rebuttal witnesses are not freely discoverable. T.C.R.Cr.P. 16. American Samoa Gov't v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

T.C.R.Cr.P. 12(d)(2) implicitly allows a defendant to request that the government provide him with a list of the evidence it intends to use at trial for its case in chief. However, Rule 12(d)(2) is not explicitly mandatory, except for a defendant's discovery of items listed in T.C.R.Cr.P. 16(a). Nor is a sanction provided. American Samoa Gov’t v. Isaia, 29 A.S.R.2d 224.

The government should normally provide notice of its intention to use evidence at trial, either on its own initiative, see T.C.R.Cr.P. 12(d)(1), or upon the request of defense counsel. See T.C.R.Cr.P. 12(d)(2). In appropriate cases, where the government has failed to comply with a defendant’s request, the court will compel compliance. American Samoa Gov’t v. Isaia, 29 A.S.R.2d 224.

Photographs are discoverable, as they do not explicitly nor implicitly fall under the confines of T.C.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(2). American Samoa Gov’t v. Isaia, 29 A.S.R.2d 224.

§4(5) Speedy Trial

In case of misdemeanors, prosecution must be commenced within six months after commission of crime or offense. (CAS 807.) Government v. Palafu, 3 A.S.R. 556.

There is no fixed formula for determining when the right to a speedy trial has been violated; each case must be determined on its own facts. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa, art. 1 § 6. Pene v. American Samoa Gov't, 12 A.S.R.2d 43.

Relevant factors in determining if right to speedy trial violated include the length of delay, the reasons for the delay, whether defendant demanded trial, and the prejudice to defendant resulting from delay. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa, art. 1 § 6. Pene v. American Samoa Gov't, 12 A.S.R.2d 43.

Defendant's right to speedy trial was not violated, even though the delay was over a year and a prompt trial had been demanded, where the reasons for the delay were substantial, including the need to entertain and grant motions to quash many subpoenas inappropriately issued by defendant and also to conduct competency examinations; and where defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the delay, as he was not incarcerated and the documentary nature of the evidence minimized the danger of fading memories. Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa, art. 1 § 6. Pene v. American Samoa Gov't, 12 A.S.R.2d 43.

§4(6) Severance and Joinder

The decision to sever properly joined defendants is at the trial court's discretion and should be granted only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a defendant's specific trial right or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. T.C.R.Cr.P. 8(b), 14. American Samoa Gov't v. Fealofa'i, 24 A.S.R.2d 10.

In exercising their discretion as to granting separate trials, most courts refuse to grant a severance despite the anticipated exculpatory testimony of a co-defendant. T.C.R.Cr.P. 14. American Samoa Gov't v. Schuster, 24 A.S.R.2d 15.

The decision to sever properly joined defendants is at the trial court's discretion and should be granted only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a defendant's spec ific trial right or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. T.C.R.Cr.P. 8(b), 14. American Samoa Gov't v. Wilson, 24 A.S.R.2d 26.

All evidence tending to show guilt is broadly prejudicial, but does not preclude joinder of similar charges under T.C.R.Cr.P. 8. T.C.R.Cr.P. 8. American Samoa Gov't v. Bryce, 27 A.S.R.2d 1.

The court will grant severance only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right to one of the defendants or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. American Samoa Gov't v. Fairholt, 28 A.S.R.2d 26.

T.C.R.Cr.P. 14 does not give one co-defendant the standing to raise the issue of prejudice due to joinder on behalf of his co-defendants. If one co-defendant's testimony might prejudice others, it is their decision whether or not to move for a severance. American Samoa Gov't v. Fairholt, 28 A.S.R.2d 26.

Judicial economy and legitimate public interests favor a joinder of all offenses against the accused. American Samoa Gov't v. Antonio, 28 A.S.R.2d 165.

Whether joinder of offenses or defendants is appropriate is determined on a case by case basis. American Samoa Gov't v. Antonio, 28 A.S.R.2d 165.

Counts pertaining to the same defendant under T.C.R.Cr.P. 8(a) may be joined if they are of the same or similar character, even if the offenses are distinct and unrelated. Rule 8(a) recognizes the adverse effect on defendants of having evidence of multiple unrelated crimes presented in one proceeding, but this negative effect is outweighed by gains in trial economy when one of the criteria of the rule are met. For this reason, a defendant must show strong or substantial prejudice flowing from the joinder to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by a trial court. American Samoa Gov't v. Antonio, 28 A.S.R.2d 165.

The trial court must weigh the prejudice to a defendant by a joint trial against the interests of judicial economy, and factor in the means of lessening the detriment. A.S.G. v. Pu`aa, 31 A.S.R.2d 73.

The trial court abuses its discretion in refusing a severance when the defendant is denied a fair trial because the prejudice in a joint trial cannot be effectively alleviated and thus compels separate trials. A.S.G. v. Pu`aa, 31 A.S.R.2d 73.

The existence of antagonistic defenses among codefendants is cause for severance when the defenses conflict to the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. A.S.G. v. Pu`aa, 31 A.S.R.2d 73.

The court clearly has a continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant severance if prejudice does appear. A.S.G. v. Pu`aa, 31 A.S.R.2d 73.

§4(7) Trial by Jury

Disqualification of jurors in Samoa on basis of their inability to speak, read, or understand English would defeat concept of randomness that underlies idea of trial by impartial jury. American Samoa Gov't v. Agasiva, 4 A.S.R.2d 110.

A defendant does not have the right to a trial by any particular jury or jurors, but only to a trial by a competent and impartial jury. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. American Samoa Gov't v. Fealofa'i, 24 A.S.R.2d 10.

No right exists for a citizen of another country to be tried in American Samoa by a jury of his compatriots. A.S.C.A. § 46.1504(1). American Samoa Gov't v. Schuster, 24 A.S.R.2d 102.

It is the exclusive function of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts. American Samoa Gov't v. Tauala, 25 A.S.R.2d 179.

In the absence of any contrary evidence, the court will not assume a tainted jury. American Samoa Gov't v. Snow, 26 A.S.R.2d 78.

It is the trial court's province to determine whether or not news media materials have the possibility of prejudicing the jury. A special jury voir dire is not essential to that determination, and a defendant has no right to be granted this procedure. American Samoa Gov't v. Snow, 26 A.S.R.2d 78.

Having neglected to request a sequestered jury, defendant cannot now complain of the jury's minimal exposure to daily life. American Samoa Gov't v. Snow, 26 A.S.R.2d 78.

No rule requires a jury to deliberate for any set length of time, and a verdict reached in about five minutes will be upheld. A.S.G. v. Su`a, 31 A.S.R.2d 8.

A juror may not impeach his own verdict once the jury has been discharged. A.S.G. v. Su`a, 31 A.S.R.2d 8.

While "extraneous" influences on the jury's deliberations can overturn a jury verdict, evidence of discussions among jurors, intimidation or harassment of one juror by another, and other intrajury influences on the verdict is not competent to impeach a verdict. A.S.G. v. Su`a, 31 A.S.R.2d 8.

A.S.C.A. § 3.0232(b), which seems to mandate that jury voir dire is the court's exclusive province, prevails over any court rule to the contrary. See T.C.R.Cr.P. 24(a). A.S.G. v. Pu`aa, 31 A.S.R.2d 73.

§4(8) Right to a Public Trial

Neither the rights to free speech and a free press nor a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a public trial preclude a court from excluding members of the public from the courtroom during the testimony of juvenile complaining witness in a rape case, where the court has determined after a public hearing that such exclusion is necessary to protect the witness's psychological well-being or to prevent her from being harassed and intimidated. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 4 A.S.R.2d 156.

Trial judge may exclude spectators from the courtroom during testimony when necessary to protect or shield the witness; to prevent embarrassment or emotional disturbance; or to enable a reluctant witness to testify to material facts. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 6 A.S.R.2d 114.

Trial judge properly decided, after a public hearing at which each spectator had an opportunity to express reasons for his or her desire to remain in the courtroom, that the public should be excluded during the testimony of a youthful rape victim when trial judge found that certain spectators wished to be present in order to intimidate the witness. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 6 A.S.R.2d 114.

Exclusion of spectators from courtroom under exigent circumstances did not violate criminal defendant's right to a public trial or the public's right to be present. U.S. Const. Amends. I, VI. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 6 A.S.R.2d 114.

§4(9) Witnesses

Under Article I, Section 6 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa, a defendant accused of a crime is guaranteed the right to compel the attendance of witnesses in his/her favor. American Samoa Gov't v. Talamoni, 27 A.S.R.2d 123.

However, a subpoena may be quashed if a trial court determines the subpoena to be an oppressive and unreasonable use of the process of the court. American Samoa Gov't v. Talamoni, 27 A.S.R.2d 123.

Under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 836 (1993) (“Uniform Act”), there are two requirements for the extradition of a witness: (1) the territory of which the request is made must have a reciprocal provision for "commanding persons within its borders to attend and testify in criminal prosecutions . . . in [Hawaii]"; and (2) the witness requested must be "material.” However, a witness may not be extradited from American Samoa because it has not adopted the Uniform Act. It also has no analogous provision for extraditing material witnesses to other jurisdictions or for securing witnesses in foreign jurisdictions to testify here. In Re Proceedings to Compel Attendance of May Fitiausi, 29 A.S.R.2d 71.

§4(10) Juveniles

SEE FAMILY LAW § 3(5) – RIGHTS IN COURT

Prosecution may not wait until juvenile defendant reaches 18 and then prosecute defendant as adult—this decision must be made by High Court. Government v. Fuaalii, 4 A.S.R. 828.

There is no constitutional right to be tried as a juvenile in criminal matters; legislature may therefore vest in attorney general the discretion whether to institute ordinary criminal proceedings or juvenile proceedings against a minor fourteen years of age or older, who has allegedly committed a violent crime. American Samoa Gov't v. Julio, 9 A.S.R.2d 128.

In the absence of statute creating right to certification hearing to determine whether to prosecute minor as a juvenile or an adult, the minor has no due process right to such a hearing. American Samoa Gov't v. Julio, 9 A.S.R.2d 128.

Territorial statute vesting discretion in attorney general to proceed against certain minors as adults was not constitutionally defective due to alleged inconsistency with general purpose of juvenile justice statute to accord special treatment to minors, since both the general rules of statutory construction and the specific language of another statutory provision indicated that the exception was deliberate and purposeful. A.S.C.A. §§ 45.0103(9)(B)(I), 45.0115(c)(2)(a). American Samoa Gov't v. Julio, 9 A.S.R.2d 128.

§4(11) Self-Incrimination

In a joint trial, co-defendants have the right to refuse to testify based on their privilege against self-incrimination. American Samoa Gov't v. Fairholt, 28 A.S.R.2d 26.

§4(12) Mistrial

Mistrial issues are usually fact intensive, and, therefore, are largely within the trial court's discretion. American Samoa Government v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

A mistrial is a last resort and should not be declared absent a showing of a high degree of necessity, or manifest necessity. American Samoa Government v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

In granting a mistrial, a trial court must explicitly find no reasonable alternatives. American Samoa Government v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

The decision of whether to move for a mistrial rather than continuing with the empaneled jury is purely strategic, and therefore not challengeable on appeal. Man v. American Samoa Gov’t, 29 A.S.R.2d 66.

§ 5 Punishment

§5(1) General Provisions

There is no regulation affixing maximum sentence for assault and battery in Samoa, and there is no law of United States making assault and battery a crime and affixing sentence thereto, since federal courts apply laws of states in which assault and battery occurred. American Samoa v. Willis, 1 A.S.R. 635.

Where there is no federal law for assault and battery and no law in American Samoa, court will look to laws of territories and states which are available to determine maximum sentence. American Samoa v. Willis, 1 A.S.R. 635.

Sentence of six months imprisonment for assault and battery is equal to maximum in Alaska and California for first offense, and although severe, is not illegal, it being within the power of trial court. American Samoa v. Willis, 1 A.S.R. 635.

Imprisonment in Samoa is construed to mean imprisonment at hard labor during whole or any part of sentence. Akeimo v. Mulu, 2 A.S.R. 89.

Court may take into consideration fact accused thought he was excused from searching for beetle by chief in mitigation of sentence for violating statute requiring such search. Government v. Si’u, 3 A.S.R. 479.

According to law, felony is a crime which is punishable by death or imprisonment for life or more than one year, and all other crimes are misdemeanors. (CAS 801.) Government v. Palafu, 3 A.S.R. 556.

Sentence of 30 years at ordinary labor for second degree murder is less than maximum life imprisonment provided by law and cannot as matter of law be considered unreasonable or excessive punishment. (CAS 4.0453.) Fanene v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 957.

Insofar as T.C.R.Cr.P. 35 purports to extend or abolish the mandatory deadline for alleging errors of law in a criminal sentence, it is in direct conflict with the statute; as such, the statute must prevail over the judge-made rule. A.S.C.A. § 43.2402(a). T.C.R.Cr.P. 35. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

The Court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. T.C.R.Cr.P. 35. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

Although T.C.R.Cr.P. 35 is derived, almost verbatim, from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the federal courts are not subject to a statutory, jurisdictional limitation such as applies to the High Court of American Samoa. A.S.C.A. § 43.2402(a); T.C.R.Cr.P. 35; Fed. R. Crim. P. 35. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

A bill of attainder and ex post facto law, under Rev. Const. Am. Samoa, art. 1, § 13, apply only to criminal laws. In Re Matai Title “Mulitauaopele”, 29 A.S.R.2d 169.

A bill of attainder imposes punishment without judicial process. In Re Matai Title “Mulitauaopele”, 29 A.S.R.2d 169.

An ex post facto law creates a crime out of an innocent act when it was committed or applies a harsher penalty than the one in force when a criminal act was committed. In Re Matai Title “Mulitauaopele”, 29 A.S.R.2d 169.

T.C.R.Cr.P. 35(a), which states that an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, conflicts with and must give way to A.S.C.A. § 46.2402, which requires that a motion for new trial shall be filed within ten days after entry of the judgment or sentence. American Samoa Gov’t v. Leiataua, 30 A.S.R.2d 157.

The sentencing court may take into account retributive goals as well as rehabilitative goals, when framing an appropriate sentence. American Samoa Gov’t v. Tua`ililiu, 30 A.S.R.2d 151.

§5(2) Constitutional Restrictions

Blanket imposition of religious programs on unconsenting inmate violates establishment and freedom of religion clauses of both federal and territorial constitutions. U.S. Const. Amend. I; Rev'd Const. Am. Samoa art. I, § I.. American Samoa Gov't v. Agasiva, 6 A.S.R.2d 32.

Court that ordered defendant released from mental institution, to which he had been committed after being found not guilty of first degree murder by reason of insanity, did not act unconstitutionally in imposing conditions (1) that he reside with his wife in Los Angeles unless granted permission by the court to reside elsewhere; (2) that he refrain from use of alcohol; and (3) that he consult with a physician periodically. American Samoa Gov't v. Satele, 7 A.S.R.2d 154.

That a criminal may be unable to determine the exact punishment and exceptions to punishment does not render criminal statutes unconstitutional; a person is only entitled to know the maximum punishment available. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

No constitutional right to rehabilitation at public expense exists, nor do statutes authorizing rehabilitation programs or early release give any particular criminal a constitutionally protected "liberty interest" in participating in them. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

The mere fact that a person who has committed a serious crime is required for that reason to return to his own country is not, absent extraordinary circumstances, either cruel or unusual. U.S. Const., Amend. VIII. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

A judgment and sentence entered over 10 years ago is final and not open to further reconsideration by the sentencing court. Any relief from sentence, in the way of commutation, lies exclusively within the executive's competence. See Section 9, Art. IV, Rev`d. Const. of Am. Samoa. A.S.G. v. Adams, 31 A.S.R.2d 112.

§5(3) Deportation

Although federal courts have generally held that it is beyond the power of a sentencing court to order that the defendant leave the jurisdiction, such orders have been a regular feature of criminal sentences in American Samoa for many years. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

Criminal convictions are proper grounds for deportation. A.S.C.A. § 41.0616(4), (6), (9), (10), (11), (16); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5), (11), (14), (15), (16). American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

A person who has been "convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within 5 years after any entry" is deportable; if he were outside the territory, he would be excludable as a convicted felon. A.S.C.A. §§ 41.0615(8), 41.0617(4). American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

§5(4) Probation

Release of prisoner within two weeks after court had sentenced him to a year of detention as condition of probation, whether called a furlough, work release, reward for good behavior, compassionate leave, or by another label, violated statutes and court order. American Samoa Gov't v. Doletorts, 3 A.S.R.2d 63

Prisoner serving a term of detention as a condition of probation was under the direct jurisdiction of the court, which had the power to prescribe conditions of detention. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 5 A.S.R.2d 152.

Where court had ordered that prisoner not be allowed to leave correctional facility without permission of the court except for emergency medical treatment, prison officials had no authority to allow prisoner to appear in court for post conviction motions without requesting permission of court. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 5 A.S.R.2d 152.

Court's purpose in imposing detention as a condition to probation, during which jurisdiction over the prisoner remains with the High Court rather than with prison officials, is to enable the court to monitor and control the extent to which prisoners are allowed to leave the correctional facility. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 5 A.S.R.2d 152.

Sentencing court may require convicted defendant to serve multiple periods of detention as conditions of multiple terms of probation, but the periods of detention must be served concurrently and the aggregate period of detention cannot exceed the statutory maximum. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2206, 46.2207. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 6 A.S.R.2d 114.

Amendment to probation statute, allowing court to impose detention as a condition of probation for up to one-third of the maximum term of imprisonment, was intended to give court the power to prevent the early release of dangerous criminals. A.S.C.A. § 46.2206. American Samoa Gov't v. Peni Samana, 8 A.S.R.2d 1.

Parole and conditional probation statutes provide two alternative modes of sentencing, with the mandatory period of detention limited to one-third of the sentence in both cases but conditional probation statute allowing the court to exercise greater control over the conditions of detention. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2206, 46.2304, 46.2701 et seq. American Samoa Gov't v. Peni Samana, 8 A.S.R.2d 1.

Statute allowing court to impose detention as a condition of probation did not violate the constitutional provision allowing governor to grant pardons, since any prisoner pardoned by the governor could no longer be incarcerated. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. IV § 9; A.S.C.A. § 46.2206. American Samoa Gov't v. Peni Samana, 8 A.S.R.2d 1.

Where probation statute originally provided that probation could be imposed only in cases where incarceration was not necessary for the protection of the public, and also provided that a brief period of detention could be imposed as a condition of probation, but statute was later amended to provide that such detention could be imposed for up to fifteen years, the later enactment implicitly amended the earlier; court could therefore impose detention as a condition of probation not only for the purpose of rehabilitation, but also where incarceration was deemed necessary for the protection of the public. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2203, 46.2206. Atuatasi v. American Samoa Gov't, 9 A.S.R.2d 67.

There is no inconsistency in suspending a "sentence of imprisonment" while simultaneously imposing "detention" as a condition of probation, where statutes use these terms to denote two alternative modes of sentencing. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2206, 46.2301 et seq. Atuatasi v. American Samoa Gov't, 9 A.S.R.2d 67.

The High Court has continuing jurisdiction to terminate or modify the conditions of probation throughout the entire term of probation. A.S.C.A. § 46.2205. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

An untimely motion for a new trial was construed to be one to terminate conditions of probation. A.S.C.A. § 46.2205. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

The High Court has the power to impose detention as a condition of probation for a period equivalent to one-third of the maximum sentence of imprisonment authorized by law. A.S.C.A. § 46.2206. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

Probation's public protection purpose includes the protection of particular people from the probationer, as well as deterring the probationer from future misconduct. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

Conditions of probation are valid if they are reasonably related either to rehabilitation or to public protection, at least if the entire sentence considered as a whole was reasonably calculated to achieve both of these purposes. A.S.C.A. § 46.2205. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

Under the 1987 amendment to the probation statute, sentencing judges are free to impose probation for reasons other than the rehabilitation-related provisions of the statute. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2203, 46.2206. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

In imposing conditions of probation, the sentencing judge is well-situated to know whether a particular offender needs to be insulated from his past environment, his associates, his victim, or those who assisted in his prosecution, as well as the best methods to assure such insulation. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

The Court's power over probationers is strictly limited to the term of the probation, which may not exceed five years. A.S.C.A. § 46.2204. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

Requiring a probationer to reside in a certain place may be imposed for the protection of the public, particularly the victim and others who may have assisted in the prosecution, and to remove the defendant from an environment found to have contributed to his criminal behavior. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

The freedom to travel is one of the freedoms a convicted criminal may lose; therefore, a requirement that a convict spend part or all of his probation outside the Territory does not unconstitutionally abridge any such right. American Samoa Gov't v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

In a criminal case, a court may require a defendant to leave the territory as a condition of probation and may impose other probationary conditions reasonably related to the purposes of probation beyond those conditions enumerated in the statute. A.S.C.A. §§ 41.0614, 46.2205. American Samoa Gov't v. Salu, 22 A.S.R.2d 48.

Although increasing a criminal penalty is to subject the defendant to double punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the court may modify a period of detention ordered as a condition of probation in view of changed circumstances. American Samoa Gov’t v. Leiataua, 30 A.S.R.2d 93.

§5(5) Parole

Employee of Attorney General may make recommendation to Parole Board for reduction of sentence. (CAS 4.0203.) Fanene v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 957.

Powers of pardon and parole granted to executive by statutes and constitution do not give the executive carte blanche to ignore court orders and sentences. American Samoa Gov't v. Doletorts, 3 A.S.R.2d 63.

Where prisoner had not served one-third of his sentence of imprisonment, parole board had no jurisdiction to entertain his application for parole, and parole board order was of no legal effect. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2304, 46.2702. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.

Where one section of parole statute provided that parole should not be given unless institutional confinement is deemed unnecessary, and later amendment to another section of the statute was clearly designed to allow court to impose probation and conditional detention in certain cases where confinement is deemed necessary, the general rule stated in the earlier provision does not operate as a limitation on the power granted by the later provision. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2203, 46.2206. American Samoa Gov't v. Peni Samana, 8 A.S.R.2d 1.

Statute providing for parole of prisoner who has served one-third of his sentence of imprisonment has no application to probationer whose sentence of imprisonment has been suspended and who is serving a term of detention, for a period no greater than one-third of the suspended sentence of imprisonment, as a condition of his probation. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2203, 46.2206(3), 46.2209. American Samoa Gov't v. Peni Samana, 8 A.S.R.2d 1.

Prisoner whose sentence of imprisonment was suspended but who was required to serve a term of detention as a condition of probation, under a statute providing that such term could be no greater than one-third of the suspended sentence of imprisonment, was not unfairly deprived of the opportunity to apply for parole, since he would be released from detention on the same day that he would otherwise have been eligible to apply for parole. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2206, 46.2304, 46.2701 et seq. American Samoa Gov't v. Peni Samana, 8 A.S.R.2d 1.

Warden who released prisoner in violation of court order, on the authority of invalid order of parole board, was in continuing violation of court order for as long as the prisoner remained at large. American Samoa Gov't v. Peni Samana, 8 A.S.R.2d 1.

Prisoner who was sentenced to detention as a condition of probation, under statute limiting such conditional detention to one-third of the maximum prescribed term of imprisonment for the crime of which he was convicted, was not arbitrarily denied access to parole where under parole statute he would have been required to serve one-third of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2206, 46.2304(a)(1). Atuatasi v. American Samoa Gov't, 9 A.S.R.2d 67.

Although A.S.C.A. § 46.2072(b) does not create strict time parameters for considering or acting upon a parole application, it does plainly indicate that the application must be evaluated "[u]pon receipt." This language clearly does not permit the Parole Board to unduly delay consideration of a parole application in order to get several hearings out of the way at the same time, or for other reasons of convenience. American Samoa Gov’t v. Adams, 29 A.S.R.2d 160.

The decision by the Board of whether or not to release a prisoner on parole is a discretionary matter. American Samoa Gov’t v. Adams, 29 A.S.R.2d 180.

This list of three conditions of release is not a comprehensive enumeration of what may be required, but is instead an enumeration of the minimum requirements. The statutory language is inclusive and not preclusive, and the Board is free to place other conditions upon parole which it finds "reasonable," as long as the enumerated minimum requirements are included. American Samoa Gov’t v. Adams, 29 A.S.R.2d 180.

§5(6) Parole Revocation

Parole revocation process may be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial. American Samoa Gov't v. Lam Yuen, 11 A.S.R.2d 118.

The heart of due process in parole revocation cases is a concern for basic fairness --- the non-arbitrary treatment of a probationer or parolee by the state. American Samoa Gov't v. Lam Yuen, 11 A.S.R.2d 118.

Requirements of due process in parole revocation proceedings include the parolee's right to hear the evidence against him, to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing such confrontation. American Samoa Gov't v. Lam Yuen, 11 A.S.R.2d 118.

Transcript from a preliminary examination may be considered at a parole revocation hearing. American Samoa Gov't v. Lam Yuen, 11 A.S.R.2d 118.

When a criminal court imposes a term of imprisonment with execution suspended, the sentence is the term of imprisonment, which does not begin unless and until probation is revoked. This sentence is distinct from any detention that is a condition of probation. American Samoa Gov’t v. Leiataua, 30 A.S.R.2d 157.

Unlike a criminal sentence, the court may modify a detention that is a condition of probation under changed circumstances without finding that the party has violated probation. American Samoa Gov’t v. Leiataua, 30 A.S.R.2d 157.

§5(7) Conditions upon Release

Evidence that members of convict's family had been having economic and psychological problems since his incarceration was insufficient to justify his release pending appeal, where the crimes of which he had been convicted were serious felonies involving sexual abuse of a minor child, his behavior in connection with the crimes and the subsequent proceedings had been characterized by violence and other revenge against family members, and the appeal schedule had been accelerated so as to minimize the period of detention between conviction and appellate review. American Samoa Gov't v. Masaniai, 5 A.S.R.2d 143.

Court order permitting release of a prisoner should not be construed to require the release of the prisoner when such release would be contrary to the best judgment of the commissioner of public safety and when defendant's counsel had not informed the court that release had been denied by the commissioner. American Samoa Gov't v. Felise (Mem.), 11 A.S.R.2d 132.

Attempts by warden and prisoner to cover their tracks, by omitting any record of the prisoner's comings and goings from the prison log book and by lying in court when asked whether the prisoner had been released, were inconsistent with their contentions that they had not fully understood the court's order prohibiting release of the prisoner. American Samoa Gov't v. Laumoli, 12 A.S.R.2d 111.

Where defendant had been found not guilty by reason of insanity of two murder charges, trial judge's conclusions that a controlled environment was necessary to minimize the risk that the defendant's dangerous condition would recur was supported in the record, and new evidence purporting to show that defendant was no longer dangerous was based primarily on defendant's physical weakness and lack of co‑ordination, court could not conclude that defendant would no longer be dangerous if released into the general population. American Samoa Gov't v. Satele, 14 A.S.R.2d 95.

In light of the Court's concern about defendant's proximity to the victim, evidence supporting a request for work release should include the testimony or affidavit of the proposed employer setting forth the terms of employment; the testimony or affidavit of the Warden of the Correctional Facility indicating whether the defendant is, in his judgment, a good candidate for work release; and testimony of the Child Protection officials who have been counseling the victim and her family. American Samoa Gov't v. Li`a, 16 A.S.R.2d 23.

The Commissioner of Public Safety does not possess unbridled discretion to release willy nilly persons sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment at the Territorial Correctional Facility. See A.S.C.A. § 46.2303(c). A.S.G. v. Ki, 31 A.S.R.2d 118.

§ 6 Collateral Estoppel

Territorial government was not estopped from rearresting a prisoner where: (1) the prisoner, although ineligible for parole, had been paroled because of a clerical error; (2) prisoner had been released for only twenty-eight days before his rearrest, so that he had not been reintegrated into the community and could show no substantial injury resulting from his release and rearrest; (3) since there had been no significant reintegration into the community, no serious injustice was worked by the rearrest; and (4) since the prisoner had been recently convicted of a violent crime, it was not clear that the public interest would not be unduly damaged by the estoppel. Atuatasi v. American Samoa Gov't, 9 A.S.R.2d 67.

Even under the mutuality doctrine, which has largely been abandoned, the government could sue a convicted criminal for civil damages, and the defendant would be estopped to deny the facts entailed by his conviction. Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

Collateral estoppel applies whether defendant's conviction resulted from a trial or from a guilty plea, even if induced by a plea bargain. Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

With the abandonment of the mutuality requirement, individual victims of crime can now benefit from collateral estoppel in the same ways and to the same extent that the government has always done. Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

Majority rule gives judgments based on guilty pleas the same collateral effect as other criminal convictions and, as such, are conclusive of all issues that would have been resolved by a conviction following a trial. Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

The traditional requirement is that a party should be estopped only with respect to those matters that were genuinely at issue and genuinely decided in the earlier case. Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

At least when a defendant's admission to a crime was made upon the advice of competent counsel, collateral estoppel applies with respect to issues which were distinctly and directly put at issue by the pleadings, which were central rather than peripheral to the proceeding, and which were essential to the outcome. Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

Neither a guilty plea nor a verdict after trial estops the defendant with respect to any issue not squarely resolved by the judgment; with respect to these elements a plaintiff must present evidence other than the guilty plea, and a defendant is free to controvert any such evidence. Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

Because a guilty plea in a prior criminal action necessarily eliminates a full and contested presentation of evidence on the issues and may only indicate a compromise or an expectation of a more advantageous disposition of a criminal accusation, the policy underlying collateral estoppel would not be truly served by making a guilty plea conclusive in a civil action. Amisone v. Talaeai, 23 A.S.R.2d 52.

§ 7 Post-Verdict Motions

§7(1) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

After the jury returns a guilty verdict, a defendant may move that the court set aside the verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal. T.C.R.Cr.P. Rule 29(c). American Samoa Gov't v. Tauala, 25 A.S.R.2d 179.

In considering a motion for acquittal, a trial court must determine whether, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable